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Working Paper

Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Wage Determination

Using public-use data from the Current Population Survey, we estimate the effects of changes in unemployment insurance (UI) generosity on the wages of new hires from unemployment, job changers, and continuously employed workers. We find similar, modestly positive elasticities across all groups of workers. Posted wages respond similarly on average, but differences in distributional effects suggest that changes in wage posting are unlikely to fully explain the effects on realized wages. More generous UI also reduces hiring from unemployment and job-to-job transitions, reduces labor force exit, and increases the hiring of new labor force entrants and labor force non-participants.

Working Papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.


Suggested Citation

Rinz, Kevin, and David Wasser. 2026. “Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Wage Determination.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 26-11. https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611