Underlying Determinants of Closed-Bank Resolution Costs
This paper looks at the underlying determinants of bank resolution costs. In the spirit of James (1991), resolution costs are modeled as functions of problem assets. However, we extend previous work by looking at more recent failures (from 1986 through 1992) and by extending our specification to include proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered deposits, and both regional and size effects. Unlike James, we find no evidence that capital reflects net unbooked losses. On the other hand, we find roles for fraud, off-balance-sheet items, and both regional and size dummies. We also find evidence suggesting that regulators may have practiced forbearance.
Suggested citation: Osterberg, William, and James Thomson, 1994. “Underlying Determinants of Closed-Bank Resolution Costs,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 94-03.