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Working Paper
11.09.2022 |
WP 22-31
This paper studies the impact of knowledge specialization on earnings losses following displacement. We develop a novel measure of the specialization of human capital, based on how concentrated the knowledge used in an occupation is. Combining our measure with individual labor histories from the NLSY 79-97 and Norway’s LEED, we show that workers with more specialized human capital suffer larger earnings losses following exogenous displacement. A one standard deviation increase in pre-displacement knowledge specialization increases the earnings losses post-displacement by 3 to 4 pp per year in the US, and by 1.5 to 2 pp per year in Norway. In the US, the negative effect of higher pre-displacement knowledge specialization on post-displacement earnings is driven by the negative impact of knowledge specialization on well-paid outside opportunities. By contrast, this association between outside opportunities and knowledge specialization plays no role in post-displacement earnings losses in Norway, where the negative effect of specialization is in part explained by its association with the routine content and the offshoring probability of the occupation.
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Working Paper
11.08.2022 |
WP 22-30
We model an environment with overlapping generations of labor to show that policies restricting labor mobility increase a firm's monopsony power and labor turnover costs. Subsequently, firms increase capital expenditure, altering their optimal capital-labor ratio. We confirm this by exploiting the statewide adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), a law intended to protect trade secrets by restricting labor mobility. Following an IDD adoption, local firms increase capital expenditure (capital-labor ratio) by 3.5 percent (5.5 percent). This result is magnified for firms with greater human capital intensity. Finally, IDD adoptions do not spur investment in either R&D or growth options as intended.
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Working Paper
09.07.2021 |
WP 21-18
We show that differential IT investment across cities has been a key driver of job and wage polarization since the 1980s. Using a novel data set, we establish two stylized facts: IT investment is highest in firms in large and expensive cities, and the decline in routine cognitive occupations is most prevalent in large and expensive cities. To explain these facts, we propose a model mechanism where the substitution of routine workers by IT leads to higher IT adoption in large cities due to a higher cost of living and higher wages. We estimate the spatial equilibrium model to trace out the effects of IT on the labor market between 1990 and 2015. We find that the fall in IT prices explains 50 percent of the rising wage gap between routine and non-routine cognitive jobs. The decline in IT prices also accounts for 28 percent of the shift in employment away from routine cognitive towards non-routine cognitive jobs. Moreover, our estimates show that the impact of IT is uneven across space. Expensive locations have seen a stronger displacement of routine cognitive jobs and a larger widening of the wage gap between routine and non-routine cognitive jobs.
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Working Paper
08.17.2020 |
WP 20-25
We introduce two types of agent heterogeneity in a calibrated epidemiological search model. First, some agents cannot afford to stay home to minimize virus exposure. Our results show that poor agents bear most of the epidemic’s health costs. Furthermore, we show that when a larger share of agents fail to change their behavior during the epidemic, a deeper recession is possible. Second, agents develop symptoms heterogeneously. We show that for diseases with a higher share of asymptomatic cases, even when less lethal, health and economic outcomes are worse. Public policies such as testing, quarantining, and lockdowns are particularly beneficial in economies with larger shares of poor agents. However, lockdowns lose effectiveness when a larger share of the agents take voluntary precautions to minimize virus exposure independent of the lockdown.
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Working Paper
02.27.2020 |
WP 20-06
With a duopsony model, we show how the degree of labor market slack relates to earnings inequality and firm size distribution across local labor markets and the business cycle. In booms, due to the high aggregate productivity, there is fierce competition with resulting high wages and full employment. During recessions, there is labor market slack and firms enjoy local market power. In periods in which the economy is moving in or out of a recession, there is an “accommodation” phase, with firms shrinking their labor forces and paying lower wages instead of competing for poached workers. We show that the impact of economic shocks on wage dispersion and inequality may vary not only due to the nature of the shock, but also based on which equilibrium the economy may have settled in.
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Working Paper
04.19.2019 |
WP 17-06R
We present a model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that allows us to decompose the overall increase in US wage inequality in the last 30 years into its within- and between-firm and skill components. We calibrate the model to evaluate how much of the overall rise in wage inequality and its components is explained by different channels. Output distribution per firm-skill pair more than accounts for the observed increase over this period. Parametric identification implies that the worker-specific component is responsible for 85 percent of this, compared to 15 percent that is attributable to firm-level productivity shifts.
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Working Paper
12.07.2018 |
WP 17-21R
Many markets rely on information intermediation to sustain cooperation between large communities. We identify a key trade-off in costly information intermediation: intermediaries can create trust by incentivizing information exchange, but with too much information acquisition, intermediation becomes expensive, with a resulting high equilibrium default rate and a low fraction of agents buying this information. The particular pricing scheme and the competitive environment affect the direct and indirect costs of information transmission, represented by fees paid by consumers and the expected loss due to imperfect information, respectively. Moreover, we show that information trade has characteristics similar to a natural monopoly, where competition may be detrimental to efficiency either because of the duplication of direct costs or the slowing down of information spillovers. Finally, a social-welfare-maximizing policymaker optimally chooses a low information sampling frequency in order to maximize the number of partially informed agents. In other words, maximizing information spillovers, even at the cost of slow information accumulation, enhances welfare.
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Working Paper
08.31.2018 |
WP 16-10R
We investigate the impact of mass layoff announcements on the equity value of industry rivals. When a layoff announcement conveys good (bad) news for the announcer, rivals on average witness a 0.44 percent increase (0.60 percent decrease) in cumulative abnormal stock returns. This effect is concentrated on rivals with high growth opportunities. Consistent with this finding, we also show that our results are strongest in technology industries, where growth opportunities matter the most. Our results suggest that investors perceive layoff announcements as news about industry prospects rather than just the announcer.
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Working Paper
06.27.2018 |
WP 16-13R
We examine the link between information produced by auditors and analysts and fraud duration. Using a hazard model, we analyze misstatement periods related to SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) between 1982 and 2012. Results suggest that misconduct is more likely to end just after firms announce an auditor switch or issue audited financial statements, particularly when the audit report contains explanatory language. Analyst following increases the fraud termination hazard. However, increases (decreases) in analyst coverage have a negative (positive) marginal impact on the termination hazard, suggesting that analysts signal whistleblowers with their choice to add or drop coverage. Finally, our results suggest that misconduct lasts longer when it is well planned, more complex, or involves more accrual manipulation. Taken together, our findings are consistent with auditors and analysts playing a key informational role in fraud detection, while managerial effort to conceal misconduct significantly extends its duration.
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Working Paper
11.16.2017 |
WP 17-21
In this paper, we show that information trade has similar characteristics to a natural monopoly, where competition may be detrimental to efficiency due either to the duplication of direct costs or the slowing down of information dissemination. We present a model with two large populations in which consumers are randomly matched to providers on a period-by-period basis. Despite a moral hazard problem, cooperation can be sustained through an institution that gives incentives to information exchange. We consider different information pricing mechanisms (membership vs. buy and sell) and different competitive environments. In equilibrium, both pricing and competitive schemes affect the direct and indirect costs of information transmission, represented by directed fees paid by consumers and the expected loss due to imperfect information, respectively.
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Working Paper
07.25.2017 |
WP 17-13
We show that during the bubble implied growth rates coming from the underpricing of IPO market explains short term returns on the NASDAQ index. This result remains even if we replace actual underprice for others different instruments for underpricing that are based on predetermined variables and not correlated to market returns. We also do placebo tests to assess the relation between underpricing and NASDAQ returns over other periods. We show that growth proxies that are not contaminated by the booms and busts of the stock market are uncorrelated with the returns on the NASDAQ index in periods outside the bubble.
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Working Paper
07.25.2017 |
WP 17-14
We conjecture that the Dotcom abnormal underpricing resulted from the emergence a large cohort of firms racing for market leadership/survivorship. Fundamentals pricing at the IPO was part of their strategy. Consistent with our conjecture, firms’ strategic goals and characteristics fully explain the abnormal underpricing. Contrary to alternatives explanations, underpricing was not associated with top underwriting; there was no deterioration of issuers’ quality; and top underwriters and analysts became more selective.
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Working Paper
07.25.2017 |
WP 16-24R
I present a model of the venture capital (VC) and public markets in which VCs suffer from capacity constraints, due to the shortage of skilled VC managers. Consequently, VC firms can only handle a limited number of new projects at once, having to divest from ongoing projects in order to take advantage of new opportunities. This framework is able to match key features presented by the VC and initial public offer (IPO) empirical literatures.
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Working Paper
05.05.2017 |
WP 17-06
We extend an on-the-job search framework in order to allow firms to hire workers with different skills and skills to interact with firms' total factor productivity (TFP). Our model implies that more productive firms are larger, pay higher wages, and hire more workers at all skill levels and proportionately more at higher skill types, matching key stylized facts.
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Working Paper
12.21.2016 |
WP 16-33
We provide conjectures for what caused the price spiral and the high underpricing of the dotcom bubble of 1999-2000. We raise two conjectures for the price spiral. First, given the uncertainty about the growth opportunities generated by the new technologies and their spillover effects across technology industries, investors saw the inflow of a large number of high-growth firms as a sign of high growth rates for the market as a whole. Second, investors interpreted the wave of highly underpriced IPOs as an opportunity to obtain gains by investing in newly public companies. The underpricing resulted from the emergence a large cohort of firms racing for market leadership. Fundamentals pricing at the IPO was part of their strategy. We provide evidence for our conjectures. We show that returns on NASDAQ composite index are explained by the flow of high-growth (or highly underpriced) IPOs; the high underpricing can be fully explained by firms' characteristics and strategic goals. We also show that, contrary to alternatives explanations, underpricing was not associated with top underwriting, there was no deterioration of issuers’ quality, and top underwriters and analysts became more selective.
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Working Paper
11.14.2016 |
WP 16-24
I present a model of the venture capital (VC) and public markets in which there is a shortage of skilled VC managers. Consequently, VC firms can only handle a limited number of new projects at once, having to take ongoing projects public in order to take advantage of new opportunities. This framework is able to match key features in the VC and IPO empirical literatures.
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Working Paper
06.01.2016 |
WP 16-13
We develop and test a model linking the duration of financial fraud to information produced by auditors and analysts and efforts by managers to conceal the fraud.
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Working Paper
04.18.2016 |
WP 16-10
Using data on layoff announcements by S&P 500 firms, we show that layoff announcements mostly contain industrywide news. Competitors' stock price reactions are positively correlated with the announcer's returns. This contagion effect is stronger for competitors whose values depend on growth opportunities. When layoff announcements induce positive stock returns to announcers, competitors with positive R&D see a 1.15% increase in their returns. Conversely, when announcements induce negative reactions to announcers, competitors with high sales growth see a reduction of 1.09% in returns. Our findings suggest that investors perceive layoffs as a change in growth options rather than a change in the competitive environment.
