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Working Paper

Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note

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We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.
12.01.2006ISSN 2573-7953 WP 06-21DOI 10.26509/frbc-wp-200621

Working Papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.

Suggested Citation

Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst. 2006. “Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 06-21. https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-200621