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Working Paper

Principal-Agent Problems in Commercial-Bank Failure Decisions

The author develops a model that examines the regulator’s role in the bank failure decision process, with attention given to the regulator’s constraints and incentives.

Working Papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.

Suggested Citation

Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli. 1991. “Principal-Agent Problems in Commercial-Bank Failure Decisions.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 91-06.