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Economic Commentary

Some Observations on Central Bank Accountability

The independence of the Federal Reserve System within government ensures that monetary policy is insulated from fiscal policy. Yet, calls for the central bank to fine-tune the money supply in response to economic woes continue to be heard. If the Federal Reserve were given a clear legislative mandate to achieve price-level stability and financial market efficiency—along with the independence and accountability necessary to realize these goals—maximum economic growth would be the result. These objectives apply to the System's role in discount window lending and to its relationship with the Treasury in the realm of exchange-rate policy.

The views authors express in Economic Commentary are theirs and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The series editor is Tasia Hane. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. This paper and its data are subject to revision; please visit for updates.

Suggested Citation

Hoskins, W. Lee. 1991. “Some Observations on Central Bank Accountability.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary 10/15/1991.