An investigation of the probability of de novo branch entry into rural banking markets in Ohio and Pennsylvania to determine whether potential competition is an effective disciplinary force in bank-market expansion.
Researchers generally have assumed that the impact of multibank holding company (MBHC) affiliation on subsidiary bank efficiency would not vary across holding company groups.
Over the past decade, several researchers have suggested that multibank holding company organizational structure will systematically influence the performance of subsidiary banks.
Two new laws in the early 1980s fundamentally changed the relationship between thrifts and commercial banks, allowing S&Ls to compete for the full range of household and commercial business.
The nature of the relationship between the number and size distribution of competitors in a market (market structure) and their performance is of crucial importance to bank regulators and others responsible.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s an increasing number of nonfinancial corporations decided to alter their asset portfolios through voluntary divestiture- that is, by selling off or spinning off one or more of their operating subsidiaries.’
Even conservative estimates of future federal government deficits suggest that the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing needs will continue to be large in the months ahead.
Like most types of depository institutions, commercial banks operate with a high degree of financial leverage; that is, their equity typically is small relative to their total assets.
Both economic theory and available empirical evidence suggest that the relaxation of geographic restraints on bank expansion, particularly de novo expansion, promotes actual and potential competition in banking markets.