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Working Paper

Can Reputation Ensure Efficiency in the Structured Finance Market?

This paper investigates whether the fear of losing its reputation can discipline a credit rating agency (CRA) in the structured finance market, where products are opaque and ratings are unverifiable. The paper has been published in Theoretical Economics Letters and is available at DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.71006. Working Paper no. 14-41 has been removed at the request of the journal.
Topics
Financial markets
12.31.2014ISSN 2573-7953 WP 14-41DOI 10.26509/frbc-wp-201441

Working Papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.

Suggested Citation

Elamin, Mahmoud. 2014. “Can Reputation Ensure Efficiency in the Structured Finance Market?” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 14-41. https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-201441