Monetary Policy, Markup Dispersion, and Aggregate TFP*

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Abstract

We document three new empirical facts: (i) monetary policy shocks increase the markup dispersion across firms, (ii) monetary policy shocks increase the relative markup of firms that adjust prices less frequently, and (iii) firms that adjust prices less frequently have higher markups. This is consistent with a New Keynesian model in which price rigidity is heterogeneous across firms. In the model, firms with stickier prices optimally set higher markups and their markups increase by more after monetary policy shocks. The consequent increase in markup dispersion explains why aggregate TFP declines after monetary policy shocks. In the calibrated model, monetary policy shocks explain substantial fluctuations in markup dispersion and aggregate productivity.

Keywords: Monetary policy, markup dispersion, heterogeneous price rigidity, aggregate TFP.

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1 Introduction

We investigate to what extent cross-sectional heterogeneity in markups and price rigidity are important for monetary transmission. We document three new empirical facts: (i) monetary policy shocks increase the markup dispersion across firms, (ii) monetary policy shocks increase the relative markup of firms that adjust prices less frequently, and (iii) firms that adjust prices less frequently have higher markups. We further document that aggregate TFP falls after monetary policy shocks and that a sizable share of this response can be related to the response in markup dispersion. Analytically, we show that firm heterogeneity in price-setting frictions can explain facts (i)–(iii). The reason is that firms with stronger frictions have a precautionary motive to set higher markups, and their markups increase by more after monetary policy shocks. In a calibrated New Keynesian model with heterogeneous price rigidity, monetary policy shocks explain substantial fluctuations in markup dispersion and aggregate productivity.

Our empirical analysis builds on quarterly balance-sheet data of publicly-listed US firms. We estimate firm-level markups by adopting the approach in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (forthcoming). To capture variation in firm-level price adjustment frequencies, we use data on price adjustment frequencies in five-digit industries together with data on the firm-specific sales composition across industries. In addition, we construct high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks. Our main empirical finding is that markup dispersion significantly increases after monetary policy shocks, even after controlling for two or four-digit industry fixed effects. The response is persistent and peaks about two years after the shock. Heterogeneity in price stickiness (within two or four-digit industries) can partially explain this response. We document that firms with stickier prices have higher markups on average and increase their markups by more after monetary policy shocks.

The response of markup dispersion is important to understand the aggregate implications of monetary policy shocks. Markup dispersion affects the allocative efficiency of inputs across firms and thereby measured aggregate TFP.\(^1\) Empirically, a one standard deviation monetary policy shock lowers aggregate (utilization-adjusted) TFP by 0.8% (0.4%) at a two-year horizon, compared to a 1% response of aggregate output. Following the approach in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Baqaee and Farhi (2020), we show that the estimated increase in markup dispersion accounts for at least half of the utilization-adjusted TFP response at a two-year horizon. At more distant horizons, markup dispersion accounts for a decreasing fraction of the aggregate TFP response.

Analytically, we show that a positive correlation between firm-level markups and the pass-through from marginal costs to prices is sufficient for markup dispersion to increase after monetary policy shocks that lower marginal costs. We further show that such positive correlation can endogenously arise from heterogeneity in price-setting frictions due to precautionary price setting.\(^2\) The

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\(^1\)Markup (or price) dispersion is well known to lower aggregate TFP in the New Keynesian literature, e.g., Galí (2015), as well as in the macro development literature on factor misallocation, e.g., Hsieh and Klenow (2009).

\(^2\)Because the profit function is asymmetric in a firm’s price, firms with stronger price setting frictions optimally set higher markups. Firms respond similarly to higher uncertainty, see Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015).

\(^3\)A competing explanation of the correlation is that firms with more elastic demand set lower markups and adjust
types of price-setting frictions we consider are a Calvo (1983) friction, Taylor (1979) staggered price setting, Rotemberg (1982) convex adjustment costs, and Barro (1972) menu costs. In a nutshell, the presence of heterogeneous price-setting frictions gives rise to TFP effects of monetary policy. This implication of heterogeneous price-setting frictions is novel.

Quantitatively, we study the effect of monetary policy shocks on aggregate TFP in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous price rigidity. We calibrate the heterogeneity in price rigidity across firms to match the within-sector dispersion in price adjustment frequencies documented in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). The calibrated model is consistent with our empirical findings. Firms with stickier prices set higher markups and monetary policy shocks raise markup dispersion. A one standard deviation monetary policy shock lowers aggregate TFP by -0.34%. This is more than half of the empirically estimated peak response of utilization-adjusted aggregate TFP.

To capture the productivity effects of monetary policy in the model, the solution technique plays a crucial role. We use non-linear solution methods to compute the stochastic steady state of the model, to which the economy converges in the presence of uncertainty but absent shocks. In this steady state, firms with more rigid price have higher markups. Firms in the stickiest quintile charge a 10.9% higher markup than firms in the most flexible quintile. Around the stochastic steady state, monetary policy shocks have first-order effects on markup dispersion and aggregate TFP. Contrarily, in the deterministic steady state all firms charge the same markup irrespective of their price rigidity. Around this steady state, monetary policy shocks have no first-order effects on markup dispersion and aggregate TFP.4

Taking the productivity effects of monetary policy into account matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the output gap. The traditional view attributes fluctuations in aggregate productivity to exogenous technology shocks. Whereas technology shocks change natural output, monetary policy shocks do not. With a Taylor rule that responds to the output gap, it is important for the monetary authority to distinguish the source of productivity fluctuations. Suppose the output gap is computed under the counterfactual belief that endogenous TFP responses to monetary policy shocks reflect technology shocks. In this case, interest rates are adjusted less aggressively and monetary policy shocks have a roughly 20% larger effect on GDP.

We also study the implication of the productivity effect for the response of (aggregate) markups to monetary policy shocks. While in the textbook New Keynesian model monetary policy shocks raise markups, some empirical evidence points in the opposite direction, see Nekarda and Ramey (2019). If the endogenous TFP response to monetary policy shocks is sufficiently strong, the aggregate marginal costs may rise and hence aggregate markups fall after monetary policy shocks. This argument extends to sector and firm-level markups if price rigidities are heterogeneous within sectors and firms.

prices more frequently under menu costs. In our empirical analysis, differences in demand elasticities across sectors are subsumed into the industry fixed effect.

4In the presence of positive trend inflation, markup dispersion is positive even in the deterministic steady state of a homogeneous firm model. However, monetary policy shocks lower markup dispersion and increase aggregate TFP, see Ascari and Sbordone (2014), counterfactual to the empirical evidence.
This paper is closely related to three branches of literature. First, a growing literature studies the role of heterogeneous price rigidity for monetary policy. Compared to the case of homogeneous price rigidity, monetary policy shocks have larger and more persistent effects, see Carvalho (2006), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), Carvalho and Schwartzman (2015), and Pasten et al. (2018), and optimal monetary policy differs, see Aoki (2001) and Eusepi et al. (2011). We show that such heterogeneity gives rise to productivity effects of monetary policy. Similarly, Baqaee and Farhi (2017) show that negative money supply shocks lower aggregate TFP if sticky-price firms have higher ex-ante markups than flexible-price firms. We provide empirical evidence which supports this transmission channel and show that the rigidity–markup correlation can arise endogenously from differences in price rigidity.

Second, this paper relates to a literature that studies the productivity response to monetary policy, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005), Comin and Gertler (2006), Moran and Queralto (2018), Garga and Singh (2019), and Jordà et al. (2020). We confirm the empirical finding that monetary policy shocks lower aggregate productivity, but provide a novel explanation based on markup dispersion. Previously, Christiano et al. (2005) show that variable utilization and fixed costs explain a relatively small fraction of the aggregate productivity response. Moran and Queralto (2018) and Garga and Singh (2019) show that R&D investment falls after monetary policy shocks, which may ultimately lower productivity. However, it is unclear whether the R&D response has a large impact on aggregate productivity at short horizons. For example, Comin and Hobijn (2010) estimate that new technologies are adopted with an average lag of five years.

Third, this paper relates to a growing literature that studies allocative efficiency over the business cycle. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that capital misallocation is countercyclical. Fluctuations in allocative efficiency may be driven by various business cycle shocks, e.g., aggregate demand shocks (Basu, 1995), aggregate productivity shocks (Khan and Thomas, 2008), uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2009), financial shocks (Khan and Thomas, 2013), or supply chain disruptions (Meier, 2020). We relate to this literature by studying the transmission of monetary policy shocks through allocative efficiency. Interestingly, the effects of short-run decreases in interest rates appear to differ in sign from the effects of long-run decreases. Whereas we show that the former lowers misallocation, Gopinath et al. (2017) show that the latter increases misallocation through size-dependent financial frictions. Relatedly, Oikawa and Ueda (2018) study the long-run effects of nominal growth through reallocation across heterogeneous firms.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence. Section 3 presents analytical results. Section 4 presents a quantitative model with results. Section 5 concludes and an Appendix follows.
2 Empirical Evidence

In this section, we document three new empirical facts: (i) monetary policy shocks increase the markup dispersion across firms, (ii) monetary policy shocks increase the relative markup of firms that adjust prices less frequently, and (iii) firms with higher markups adjust prices less frequently. We further document that aggregate TFP falls after monetary policy shocks and that a sizable share of this response can be linked to the response in markup dispersion.

2.1 Data, identification, and estimation

Firm-level markups. We use quarterly balance-sheet data of publicly-listed US firms from Compustat.\(^5\) We estimate firm-level markups adopting the approach of Hall (1988) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). If firms have a flexible input factor, \(V_{it}\), then cost minimization implies that the markup \(\mu_{it}\) of firm \(i\) in quarter \(t\) can be computed as

\[
\mu_{it} = \frac{\text{output elasticity of } V_{it}}{\text{revenue share of } V_{it}}.
\]

To estimate the output elasticity, we follow De Loecker et al. (forthcoming) in assuming Cobb–Douglas production function that combines a composite input of labor and materials, assumed to be the flexible factor, with capital. The production function is specific to the quarter and the two-digit-industry a firm operates in. In Compustat data, we use costs of goods sold to measure expenditures for labor and material, and property, plants, and equipment to measure the capital stock. We then estimate these production functions to obtain industry-time specific output elasticities of variable inputs. More details are provided in Appendix A. For robustness, we also consider a four-digit industry-specific translog production function and cost shares as direct estimates of the output elasticity. The revenue share, which is firm-time-specific, is the ratio of costs of goods sold to sales.

We consider all industries except public administration, finance, insurance, real estate, and utilities. We drop firm-quarter observations if sales, costs of goods sold, or fixed assets are only reported once in the associated year. We further drop observations if quarterly sales growth is above 100% or below -67% or if real sales are below 1 million USD. We finally drop the bottom and top 5% of the estimated markups. Appendix B.1 provides more details and summary statistics in Table 3. Our results are robust to variations in the data treatment as we discuss toward the end of this section. In our subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on deviations of firm-level log markups from their industry or industry-quarter specific mean. We do so primarily to control for industry-specific characteristics such as competitiveness and production technology.

Estimating output elasticities in the presence of infrequent price adjustment can be problematic. The approach of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) builds on the assumption of a monotonic relation between input demand \(V_{it}\) and (unobserved) firm-level productivity, conditional on other determin-

\(^5\)Compustat data has two central advantages over many other firm-level balance-sheet datasets: First, it is available at quarterly frequency instead of annual (e.g., ASM) or every five years (e.g., Census). This is important to estimate responses to monetary policy shocks. Second, it covers all sectors.
nants of $V_t$. Under common assumptions, increases in productivity raise $V_t$ when prices are adjusted, but lower $V_t$ when prices are fixed. Hence, the relationship may not be monotonic if we do not condition on price adjustment. Extending the approach to account for infrequent price adjustment is an interesting topic for future research. Importantly, our main empirical results are not affected by potential biases in the estimated output elasticities, as we focus on deviations of the markup from the industry-quarter specific mean.

**Price rigidity.** We use average industry-level price adjustment frequencies over 2005–2011 based on PPI micro data from Pasten et al. (2018). The data is at the level of five-digit industries. We further use the Compustat segment files, which provides sales and the industry code of business segments within firms. We use the firm-specific sales composition across industries to compute firm-specific price adjustment frequencies as sales-weighted average of industry-specific price adjustment frequencies. By constructing firm-level price adjustment from sectoral rigidities, we may underestimate the true extent of heterogeneity across firms. We expect this to bias our regression results toward zero. For some firms, Compustat segment files are not available and for others they report only one segment per firm. We are able to construct firm-specific price adjustment frequencies for 42% of firms. For the remaining firms, we use the price adjustment frequency of the five-digit industry they operate in. More details are provided in Appendix B.2. Finally, we define the implied price duration as $-1/\log(1 - \text{adjustment frequency})$.

**Monetary policy shocks.** We use high-frequency data of federal fund future prices, which we acquired from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. We identify monetary policy shocks through changes of the future price in a narrow time window around FOMC announcements. The identifying restrictions are that the risk premium does not change and that no other macroeconomic shock materializes within the time window. We denote the price of a future by $f$, and by $\tau$ the time of a monetary announcement. We use a thirty-minute window around FOMC announcements, as in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). Let $\Delta \tau^- = 10$ minutes and $\Delta \tau^+ = 20$ minutes, then monetary policy shocks are

$$
\varepsilon_{\tau}^{\text{MP}} = f_{\tau + \Delta \tau^+} - f_{\tau - \Delta \tau^-}.
$$

We aggregate the shocks to quarterly frequency following Ottonello and Winberry (2019). We assign daily shocks fully to the current quarter if they occur on the first day of the quarter. If they occur within the quarter, we partially assign the shock to the subsequent quarter. This procedure weights shocks across quarters corresponding to the amount of time agents have to respond. Let $t$

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6Our results are robust when only using sectoral price adjustment frequencies.

7We obtain time and classification of FOMC meetings from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and the FRB. We obtain time stamps of the press release from Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) and Lucca and Moench (2015).
denote quarters, then quarterly shocks are
\[ \varepsilon_{t}^{\text{MP}} = \sum_{\tau \in D(t)} \phi(\tau) \varepsilon_{\tau}^{\text{MP}} + \sum_{\tau \in D(t-1)} (1 - \phi(\tau)) \varepsilon_{\tau}^{\text{MP}}, \] (2.3)

where \( D(t) \) is the set of days in quarter \( t \) and \( \phi(\tau) = \text{(remaining number of days in quarter } t \text{ after announcement in } \tau) / \text{(total number of days in quarter } t \text{)}. \)

As a baseline, we construct monetary policy shocks from the three-months ahead federal funds future, as in Gertler and Karadi (2015). Our baseline excludes unscheduled meetings and conference calls.\(^8\) Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), our baseline further excludes the apex of the financial crisis from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2.\(^9\) The monetary policy shock series covers 1995Q2 through 2018Q3. We discuss alternative monetary policy shocks at the end of this section. Table 4 in the Appendix reports summary statistics and Figure 6 shows the shock series.

### 2.2 Markup dispersion and heterogeneous price rigidity

**Fact 1: Monetary policy shocks increase markup dispersion**

We first estimate the response of markup dispersion to monetary policy shocks. To compute markup dispersion within industry and time, we subtract from firm-level markups the two or four-digit industry \( s \) and quarter \( t \) specific means. Our baseline measure of markup dispersion is hence the cross-sectional variance \( \text{Var} (\log \mu_{it} - \log \mu_{st}) \), where \( \log \mu_{st} \) denotes the mean log markup across all firms in industry \( s \) and quarter \( t \). Figure 6 in the Appendix plots this measure of markup dispersion over time.\(^10\) To estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks on markup dispersion, we use the local projection
\[ y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} = \alpha^{h} + \beta^{h} \varepsilon_{t}^{\text{MP}} + \gamma_{0}^{h} \varepsilon_{t-1}^{\text{MP}} + \gamma_{1}^{h} (y_{t-1} - y_{t-2}) + u_{t}^{h}, \] (2.4)

for \( h = 0, \ldots, 16 \) and where \( y_{t} \) is markup dispersion. Figure 1 shows the response of markup dispersion, captured by the estimates of the coefficients \( \{\beta^{h}\} \). The key finding is that markup dispersion increases significantly and persistently, both within two-digit and four-digit industry-quarters. The response of markup dispersion peaks at about two years after the shock and reverts back to zero afterwards. This result proves robust in a large number of dimensions as we discuss at the end of this section.

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\(^8\)Unscheduled meetings and conference calls are often the immediate response to adverse economic developments. Price changes around such meetings may directly reflect these developments, which invalidates the identifying restriction. Non-scheduled meetings are also more likely to communicate private central bank information about the state of the economy. Our results remain broadly robust when including these meetings.

\(^9\)We discard shocks during 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 and we do not regress post-2009Q2 outcomes on pre-2008Q3 shocks. Our results are robust to including this period.

\(^10\)Similar to De Loecker et al. (forthcoming), we find an increasing trend in markup dispersion.
Figure 1: Responses of markup dispersion to monetary policy shocks

Notes: The figure shows the responses of markup dispersion to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock, coefficients in $\beta^h$ in (2.4). The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on the Newey–West estimator.

Fact 2: Monetary policy shocks increase relative markup of firms with stickier prices

We next study the role of heterogeneous price stickiness in explaining the markup dispersion response. We investigate whether the markup response to monetary policy shocks is stronger for firms with lower average price adjustment frequency. This is not necessarily the case if the average stickiness differs from the stickiness after monetary policy shocks, or if the marginal costs of firms with stickier prices respond differently from other firms.

We estimate panel local projections of firm-level log markups on the interaction between monetary policy shocks and firm-level price rigidity. We measure firm-level price rigidity by the price adjustment frequency or the implied price duration. Let $Z_{it}$ denote a vector of firm-specific characteristics. We consider two specifications for $Z_{it}$: (i) including one of the two rigidity measures, and (ii) additionally including lags of firm size (log of total assets), leverage (total debt per total assets), and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.\footnote{We demean the additional firm-level controls by the firm-level mean to focus on within-firm variation.} Our selection of controls is motivated by recent work in Ottonello and Winberry (2019) and Jeenas (2018), who study the transmission of monetary policy shocks through financial constraints. We use the panel local projection

$$y_{it+h} - y_{it-1} = \alpha^h_i + \alpha^{h}_{st} + B^h Z_{it} \xi^\text{MP}_{t} + \Gamma^h Z_{it} + \gamma^h (y_{it-1} - y_{it-2}) + u^h_{it}$$

for $h = 0, \ldots, 16$, in which we include two-digit-industry-time and firm fixed effects. To focus on the within-industry variation in the interaction between monetary policy shock and price rigidity, we subtract the corresponding two-digit industry mean from the measure of price rigidity. The main coefficients of interest are the elements of $\{B^h\}$ associated with price rigidity. These capture
the relative markup increase for firms with stickier prices. Figure 2 shows the results. The markups of firms with stickier prices increase by significantly more after monetary policy shocks. Firms with a price adjustment frequency one standard deviation above the associated two-digit-industry mean increase their markup by up to 0.2% more. Importantly, the estimates are almost identical when including additional controls.

**Fact 3: Firms with stickier prices charge higher markups**

Finally, we study the correlation between price rigidity and markup. To compare markups with average price adjustment frequencies and implied price durations, we compute average firm-level markups over 2005–2011. We regress average firm-level markups on average firm-level price adjustment frequencies, without fixed effects and with fixed effects at the two-digit or four-digit industry level. Table 1 summarizes the results. In all specifications, we find that firms with stickier prices set significantly higher markups.\(^{12}\) Since the markups of firms with stickier prices are higher on average and increase by more after monetary policy shocks (Facts 2 and 3), cross-sectional heterogeneity in price stickiness can partially explain why monetary policy shocks raise markup dispersion (Fact 1).

\(^{12}\)In addition, we find that firms with stickier prices have significantly higher markups even when controlling for firm size, leverage, and the share of liquid assets.
Table 1: Regressions of markup on price stickiness

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<th>(4)</th>
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<td>Implied price duration</td>
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<td>0.0437</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>(0.00399)</td>
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<td>Price adjustment frequency</td>
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<td>-0.245</td>
<td>-0.0680</td>
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<td>2-digit</td>
<td>4-digit</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2-digit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.019</td>
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Notes: Regressions of (log) firm-level markup on firm-level price adjustment frequency and implied price duration, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

2.3 Aggregate productivity

Fluctuations in markup dispersion can lead to changes in allocative efficiency of inputs across firms and thereby to fluctuations in aggregate TFP. To characterize this link, we build on the seminal work by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Baqee and Farhi (2020). In a static model with monopolistic competition, Dixit–Stiglitz aggregation, and markup wedges, we can express changes in aggregate TFP as

$$\Delta \log TFP_t = -\frac{\eta}{2} \Delta V_t (\log \mu_{it}) + \left[ \Delta \text{ exogenous productivity} \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.6)

where $\eta$ is the substitution elasticity between variety goods. An increase in the variance of log markups by 0.01 lowers aggregate TFP by $\frac{\eta}{2}$%. The details of the derivation are provided in Appendix E.2. Let us provide some intuition. With homogeneous firms, aggregate output is maximal for given aggregate inputs if all firms produce the same quantity, which implies equal markups across firms. If firms face heterogeneous productivity and demand shifts, the output-maximizing allocation of inputs is not homogeneous across firms, but still implies equal markups. Conversely, markup dispersion is associated with an allocation of inputs across firms that implies aggregate TFP losses.

We empirically estimate the aggregate productivity response to monetary policy shocks and compare it with the productivity response implied by equation (2.6) and the response of markup dispersion in Figure 1. We consider aggregate TFP and utilization-adjusted aggregate TFP from Fernald (2014), as well as labor productivity and estimate their responses to monetary policy shocks through equation (2.4). Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that the responses of all three aggregate

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13Aggregate TFP is $\Delta \log TFP = \Delta y - w_k \Delta k - (1 - w_k) \Delta \ell$, with $\Delta y$ real business output growth, $w_k$ the capital income share, $\Delta k$ real capital growth (based on separate perpetual inventory methods for 15 types of capital), $\Delta \ell$ the growth of hours worked plus growth in labor composition/quality. Utilization-adjustment follows Basu et al. (2006) and uses hours per worker to proxy factor utilization. Labor productivity is real output per hour in the nonfarm business sector. Figure 6(c) in the Appendix plots the different aggregate productivity series.
Figure 3: Aggregate productivity response to monetary policy shocks

Notes: Panel (a) shows the responses of aggregate productivity to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. Panel (b) shows the imputed response of TFP, implied by the response of markup dispersion within four-digit industry-quarters, according to $\Delta \log TFP_t = -\eta_2 \Delta V_t (\log \mu_{it})$, see equation (2.6), and using $\eta = 3$ and $\eta = 6$, respectively. Alongside, it shows the empirical response of utilization-adjusted TFP from panel (a). The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on the Newey–West estimator.

productivity measures are negative. At a two-year horizon, a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock lowers aggregate TFP by 0.8%, labor productivity by 0.6% and utilization-adjusted aggregate TFP by 0.4%. For comparison, we show the responses of interest rates, aggregate output and inputs in Figure 10 in the Appendix. A monetary policy shock of this magnitude raises the federal funds rate by up to 30 basis points and lowers aggregate output by about 1% at a two-year horizon. Aggregate factor inputs respond little and thus aggregate TFP accounts for 50–80% of the output response at a two-year horizon.

Using equation (2.6), we compute the implied TFP response by multiplying the response of markup dispersion by $-\eta^2 \%$. In Figure 3(b), we show the implied response for $\eta = 6$, which is the estimate in Christiano et al. (2005), and $\eta = 3$, the assumption in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The imputed TFP responses closely match the estimated TFP response within the first two years of the shock. This suggests that the response in markup dispersion is quantitatively important to understand the productivity effects of monetary policy.

An alternative explanation why aggregate productivity declines after monetary policy shocks is a reduction in R&D investment. In fact, Figure 8 in the Appendix shows that aggregate R&D expenditures fall after contractionary monetary policy shocks, which reconfirms the findings in Moran and Queralto (2018) and Garga and Singh (2019). Hence, there is clearly scope for R&D to explain part of the aggregate TFP response. What is less clear is how quickly changes in R&D investment affect productivity. The evidence on technology adoption suggests that R&D has rather medium-term than short-term productivity effects. For example, Comin and Hobijn (2010) estimates an average adoption lag of 5 years. A sluggish effect of R&D investment on aggregate
productivity is consistent with the finding in Figure 3(b) that markup dispersion accounts for a relatively small fraction of the TFP response 3–4 years after a monetary policy shock.

2.4 Robustness

Markup estimation. To estimate firm-level markups using the method of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we need to specify the production technology of firms. Our baseline specification is a Cobb–Douglas production function with industry-time-specific parameters. Based on De Loecker et al. (forthcoming), we consider two alternatives. First, we estimate a translog production function with industry-specific coefficients. This gives rise to firm- and time-specific output elasticities. Second, we estimate the output elasticity through the cost share (costs of goods sold divided by total costs) at the four-digit-industry-quarter level. This is a valid estimator of the output elasticity under flexible adjustment of all input factors. See Appendix A for details on both alternative approaches. All our results are robust to computing markups based on a translog production function or cost shares. Figure 11 shows that markup dispersion robustly increases. Figure 12 shows the relative markup response to monetary policy shocks. Table 5 in the Appendix shows the correlation between average markup and price rigidity.

Firm-level data treatment. We examine the robustness of our results when tightening or relaxing our baseline data treatment. First, we keep firms with real sales growth above 200% or below -66%. Second, we keep small firms with real quarterly sales below 1 million 2012 USD. Third, instead of dropping the top/bottom 5% of the markup distribution per quarter, we drop the top/bottom 1%. Fourth, we condition on firms with at least 16 quarters of consecutive observations. Figure 13 shows that markup dispersion robustly increases after contractionary monetary policy shocks. Figure 14 shows that the relative markup response to monetary policy shocks is sensitive to removing outliers in the firm-level markups, but robust to other data treatments. Table 6 in the Appendix shows that the correlation between markups and price rigidity is robust across data treatments. A well-known recent trend is the delisting of public firms. We address the concern that this may affect our results in two ways. First, when only considering firms that are in the sample for at least 16 consecutive quarters, we find our results to be robust, as discussed above. Second, we estimate whether the number of firms in Compustat responds to monetary policy shocks. Figure 7(b) shows that the response is insignificant and small.

Monetary policy shocks. For robustness, we consider a policy indicator, similar to Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), computed as the first principal component of the current/three-month federal funds futures and the 2/3/4-quarters ahead Eurodollar futures. High-frequency future price changes may not only reflect conventional monetary policy shocks, but also the release of private central bank information about the state of the economy. We apply two alternative strategies to control for such information shocks. First, following Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018), we regress daily monetary policy shocks on internal Greenbook forecasts and revisions for output growth,
inflation, and unemployment. Second, following Jarocinski and Karadi (forthcoming), we discard daily monetary policy shocks if the associated high-frequency change in the S&P500 moves in the same direction. We further consider a shock series including unscheduled meetings and conference calls. A different concern may be that unconventional monetary policy drives our result. We address this by setting daily monetary policy shocks at Quantitative Easing (QE) announcements to zero. Figure 15 in the Appendix shows the response of markup dispersion for all monetary policy shock series. Figure 16 in the Appendix shows the robustness of the interaction of firm-level price rigidity with the monetary policy shock for all monetary policy shock series. Figure 17 in the Appendix shows the responses of aggregate productivity for all monetary policy shock series. The baseline results hold robust and the estimated responses are in the same order of magnitude.

**LP-IV.** We revisit our main results with the LP-IV method (Stock and Watson, 2018). More precisely, we replace the monetary policy shocks $\varepsilon_t^{MP}$ in equations (2.4) and (2.5) by the quarterly change in the one-year treasury rate and use $\varepsilon_t^{MP}$ as an instrument. Figure 18 in the Appendix shows that our results are robust to the LP-IV method.

**Great Recession.** We exclude the apex of the Great Recession from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 in our baseline estimations. However, our results do not depend on this choice. Moreover, the results are robust to using the Pre-Great Recession period until 2008Q2. Figure 13 and panels (d) and (e) in Figure 14 in the Appendix show that the firm-level heterogeneity in the markup response and the increase in markup dispersion, respectively, after contractionary monetary policy shocks is robust in all samples.

**TFP measurement.** Hall (1986) shows that the Solow residual is misspecified in the presence of market power. He shows that instead of the capital income share $w_{kt}$ as the Solow weight for capital and $1 - w_{kt}$ for labor, the correct weights are $\mu_t w_{kt}$ and $1 - \mu_t w_{kt}$, where $\mu_t$ is the aggregate markup. We therefore examine the response of markup-corrected (utilization-adjusted) aggregate TFP to monetary policy shocks. We use the average markup series from De Loecker et al. (forthcoming) to compute Hall’s weights. Figure 9(c) in the Appendix shows that this barely affects our results. We further investigate whether measurement error in quarterly TFP data is responsible for the effect of monetary policy. This problem was flagged for defense spending shocks by Zeev and Pappa (2015). We follow them in re-computing TFP using measurement error corrected quarterly GDP from Aruoba et al. (2016). Figure 9(d) shows that measurement error corrected TFP also falls after monetary policy shocks. In addition, we show that Fernald’s (2014) investment-specific and consumption-specific aggregate TFP series significantly falls after contractionary monetary policy shocks, see Figure 9(a) and (b). Notably, the response of investment-specific TFP is significantly stronger than that of consumption-specific TFP.
3 Analytical results

In this section, we characterize a novel monetary transmission mechanism. Monetary policy shocks that lower marginal costs increase markup dispersion if firms with lower pass-through have higher markups. Such a negative correlation between markup and pass-through can arise from firm heterogeneity in price-setting frictions.

3.1 Markup dispersion and the pass-through–markup correlation

Let $i$ index a firm and $t$ time. A firm’s markup is $\mu_{it} = P_{it}/(P_t X_t)$, where $P_{it}$ is the firm’s price, $P_t$ the aggregate price, and $X_t$ real marginal cost. Define pass-through from marginal cost to price as

$$\rho_{it} \equiv \frac{\partial \log P_{it}}{\partial \log X_t}. \quad (3.1)$$

The correlation between firm-level markup and firm-level pass-through is a key moment for the response of markup dispersion to shocks.

**Proposition 1.** If $\text{Corr}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}) < 0$, markup dispersion decreases in real marginal costs

$$\frac{\partial V_t(\log \mu_{it})}{\partial \log X_t} < 0,$$

and markup dispersion increases if $\text{Corr}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}) > 0$.

Proof: See Appendix E.1.

Contractionary monetary policy shocks that lower real marginal costs will raise the dispersion of markups if firms with higher markup have lower pass-through.

3.2 Explaining a negative pass-through-markup correlation

We next show that firm-level heterogeneity in various price-setting frictions can explain a negative correlation between firm-level pass-through and markup.

Consider a risk-neutral investor that sets prices in a monopolistically competitive environment with an isoelastic demand curve and subject to adjustment costs:

$$\max_{\{P_{it+j}\}_{j=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^\infty \beta^j \left[ \left( \frac{P_{it+j}}{P_{t+j}} - X_{t+j} \right) \left( \frac{P_{it+j}}{P_{t+j}} \right)^{-\eta} Y_{t+j} - \text{adjustment cost}_{it+j} \right]$$

Adjustment costs differ across firms and may be deterministic or stochastic. This formulation nests the Calvo (1983) random adjustment, Taylor (1979) staggered price setting, Rotemberg (1982) convex adjustment costs, and Barro (1972) menu costs.

Importantly, the period profit (net of adjustment costs) is asymmetric in the price $P_{it}$ and hence in the markup $\mu_{it}$. Profits fall more rapidly for low markups than for high markups. This gives rise
to a precautionary price setting motive: when price adjustment is frictional, firms have an incentive to set a markup above the frictionless optimal markup. Setting a higher markup today provides some insurance against low profits before the next price adjustment (Calvo/Taylor), or lowers the likelihood of costly price re-adjustments (Rotemberg/Barro).

To characterize precautionary price setting, we study the problem in partial equilibrium. Analytically solving the non-linear price-setting problem with adjustment costs and aggregate uncertainty in general equilibrium is not feasible. We assume that aggregate price, real marginal costs, and aggregate demand, denoted by \((P_t, X_t, Y_t)\), follow an i.i.d. joint log-normal process around the unconditional means \(\bar{P}, \bar{X}, \bar{Y}\). The (co-)variances of innovations are \(\sigma_k^2\) and \(\sigma_{kl}\) for \(k, l \in \{p, x, y\}\).

**Calvo friction.** Consider a Calvo (1983) friction, parametrized by a firm-specific price adjustment probability \(1 - \theta_i \in (0, 1)\). The profit-maximizing reset price is

\[
P_{it}^* = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} P_t X_t \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \theta_i^j \frac{X_{t+j}}{X_t} \left( \frac{P_{t+j}}{P_t} \right)^\eta \frac{Y_{t+j}}{Y_t} \right]}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \theta_i^j \left( \frac{P_{t+j}}{P_t} \right)^{\eta-1} \frac{Y_{t+j}}{Y_t} \right]},
\]

and the associated markup is \(\mu_{it}^*\). To isolate the role of uncertainty in price setting, we focus on the stochastic steady state, described by the unconditional means \((\bar{P}, \bar{X}, \bar{Y})\). The following proposition characterizes the upward price-setting bias as a function of \(\theta_i\) and establishes a condition under which firms with lower pass-through set higher markups.

**Proposition 2.** If \(P_t = \bar{P}, X_t = \bar{X}, Y_t = \bar{Y}\), and \((\eta - 1)\sigma_p^2 + \sigma_{py} + \eta \sigma_{px} + \sigma_{xy} > 0\), the firm sets a markup above the frictionless optimal one and the markup further increases the less likely price re-adjustment is,

\[
\mu_{it}^* > \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \mu_{it}^*}{\partial \theta_i} > 0.
\]

Pass-through \(\rho_{it}\) is zero with probability \(\theta_i\) and positive otherwise. Expected pass-through, denoted by \(\bar{\rho}_{it}\), of either a transitory or permanent change in \(X_t\), falls monotonically in \(\theta_i\),

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{\rho}_{it}}{\partial \theta_i} < 0.
\]

If the above conditions are satisfied, then \(\text{Corr}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}^*) < 0\).

Proof: See Appendix E.3.

**Staggered price setting.** Consider Taylor (1979) staggered price setting and assume that firms adjust asynchronously and at different deterministic frequencies. Staggered price setting is a deterministic variant of the Calvo setup and yields very similar results.
Rotemberg friction. Consider the price setting problem subject to Rotemberg (1982) quadratic price adjustment costs, parametrized by a firm-specific cost shifter $\phi_i \geq 0$, i.e., adjustment costs $\frac{\phi_i}{2} \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{it-1}} - 1 \right)^2$. The first-order condition for $P_{it}$ is

$$
(1 - \eta) \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{1-\eta} Y_t + \eta X_t \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y_t = \phi_i \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{it-1}} - 1 \right) P_{it} - \phi_i \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{P_{it+1}}{P_{it}} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{P_{it+1}}{P_{it}} \right) \right].
$$

(3.4)

The following proposition summarizes our analytical results.

Proposition 3. If $P_{t-1} = P_t = \bar{P}$, $X_t = \bar{X}$, $Y_t = \bar{Y}$, and $\frac{\sigma_{px}}{\sigma_p \sigma_x} > -1$, then a first-order approximation of (3.4) at $\phi_i = 0$ yields

$$
\mu_{it} \geq \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \mu_{it}}{\partial \phi_i} \geq 0, \quad \text{with strict inequality if } \phi_i > 0.
$$

If in addition $\eta \in (1, \bar{\eta})$, where $\bar{\eta} = 1 + \left[ \exp \left\{ \frac{3}{2} \sigma_p^2 + \frac{3}{2} \sigma_x^2 + 4 \sigma_{px} \right\} - \exp \left\{ \sigma_{px} \right\} \right]^{-1}$, the pass-through, of either a transitory or permanent change in $X_t$, falls monotonically in $\phi_i$,

$$
\frac{\partial \rho_{it}}{\partial \phi_i} < 0.
$$

If the above conditions are satisfied, then $\text{Corr}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}) < 0$.

Proof: See Appendix E.4.

Menu costs. Consider the price-setting problem subject to firm-specific menu costs. Due to the asymmetry of the profit function, price adjustment is more rapidly triggered for markups below the frictionless optimal markup than above. Thus, a higher reset markup may be optimal to economize on adjustment costs. Analytical results, however, are not available for the fully non-linear menu cost problem. Instead, we investigate this problem quantitatively. We find that markups increase in menu costs, consistent with precautionary price setting. Consequently, the correlation between pass-through and markup is negative. More details on calibration, solution, and results are provided in Appendix F.

4 New Keynesian Model with heterogeneous price rigidity

In this section, we study a standard New Keynesian model with heterogeneity in price rigidity. The calibrated model explains almost two thirds of the peak response in utilization-adjusted TFP to monetary policy shocks.
4.1 Model setup

Our model setup builds on Carvalho (2006) and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). We discuss the model only briefly and relegate a formal description to Appendix G. An infinitely-lived representative household has additively separable preference in consumption and leisure, and discounts future utility by $\beta$. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is $\gamma$ and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is $\varphi$. The consumption good is a Dixit–Stiglitz aggregate of differentiated goods with constant elasticity of substitution $\eta$. In contrast to Carvalho (2006) and the subsequent literature which consider models with cross-sector differences in price rigidity, our model is a one-sector economy, in which price rigidity differs between firms. This speaks more directly to our empirical within-industry evidence. In addition, it seems more plausible to assume equal demand elasticities within than across sectors. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms that produce with a linear technology in labor. Firms can reset their prices with a firm-specific probability $1 - \theta_i$ in any given period. They set prices to maximize the value of the firm to the households. The monetary authority aims to stabilize inflation and the output gap. The output gap is defined as deviations of aggregate output from its natural level, that would prevail under flexible prices. Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing, that is subject to monetary policy shocks, $\nu_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_\nu)$.

4.2 Calibration and solution

A model period is a quarter. We set the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods at $\eta = 6$, as estimated in Christiano et al. (2005). This is conservative when compared to $\eta = 21$ in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015), who study precautionary price setting as transmission of uncertainty shocks. A higher $\eta$ means more curvature in the profit function, hence more precautionary price setting, and larger TFP losses from markup dispersion. We use standard values for the discount factor $\beta$ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\gamma$. We set the former to match an annual real interest rate of 3%, and the latter to a value of 2. We use the estimates in Christiano et al. (2016) for the Taylor rule and set $\rho_r = 0.85$, $\phi_\pi = 1.5$, and $\phi_y = 0.05$.

The parameters which play a key role in this model are the price adjustment frequencies. We assume that there are five equally large groups of firms, indexed by $k \in \{1, \ldots, 5\}$, which differ in their price adjustment frequencies $1 - \theta_k$. We calibrate $\{\theta_k\}$ to match the empirical distribution of within-industry price adjustment frequencies based on Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). They document mean and standard deviation of monthly price adjustment frequencies for five sectors. We first compute the value-added-weighted average of the means and variances. The monthly mean price adjustment frequency is 0.1315 and the standard deviation is 0.1131. Second, we fit a log-normal distribution to these moments. Third, we compute the mean frequencies within the five quintile groups of the fitted distribution. Finally, we transform the monthly frequencies into quarterly ones to obtain $\{\theta_k\}$.

We calibrate the Frisch elasticity of labor supply internally. The hours response to monetary policy shocks is small on impact, but larger at longer horizons, see Figure 10 in the Appendix.
Table 2: Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Externally calibrated parameters</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source/Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor ( \beta )</td>
<td>1.03^{-1/4}</td>
<td>Risk-free rate of 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( \gamma )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of substitution between goods ( \eta )</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Christiano et al. (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate smoothing ( \rho_r )</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>Christiano et al. (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy reaction to inflation ( \phi_\pi )</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Christiano et al. (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy reaction to output ( \phi_y )</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Christiano et al. (2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of price adjustment frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firm type ( k )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internally calibrated parameters</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of MP shock ( \sigma_\nu )</td>
<td>0.00415</td>
<td>30bp effect on nominal rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frisch elasticity of labor supply ( \varphi )</td>
<td>0.1175</td>
<td>Relative hours response of 11.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows calibrated parameters for the New Keynesian model with heterogeneous price rigidity. The distribution of price adjustment frequencies is chosen to match the within-sector distribution reported in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016).

The utilization-adjusted TFP response is immediately negative but has a flatter profile at longer horizons. On average, the two responses have similar magnitude. The average difference of the hours response relative to the response of utilization-adjusted TFP, computed as the mean of \( \frac{1 - \text{response of hours in } \%}{1 - \text{response of util-adj. TFP in } \%} - 1 \) up to 16 quarters after the shock, is 11.7%. In the model, we compute the relative hours response in the same way and target 11.7% to calibrate the Frisch elasticity. Importantly, we do not directly target the absolute magnitude of the TFP response, but only a relative quantity. The calibrated Frisch elasticity is \( \varphi = 0.1175 \), which is low compared to the macroeconomics literature, but which is within the range of empirical estimates surveyed by Ashenfelter et al. (2010). The remaining parameter is the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks \( \sigma_\nu \), which we also calibrate internally. The target is the peak nominal interest rate response to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock of 30bp, see Figure 10. This yields \( \sigma_\nu = 0.00415 \).

For markup dispersion to arise from precautionary price setting, it is important to use an adequate model solution technique. We rely on local solution techniques, but, importantly, solve the model around its stochastic steady state. Whereas markup are the same across firms in the deterministic steady state, differences across firms may exist in the stochastic steady state. We apply the method developed by Meyer-Gohde (2014), which uses a third-order perturbation around the deterministic steady state to compute the stochastic steady state as well as a first-order approx-
Figure 4: Model responses to monetary policy shocks

(a) Nominal rate  (b) Aggregate TFP  (c) GDP

(d) Aggregate markup  (e) Markups of firm types  (f) Markup dispersion

Notes: This figure shows responses to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. In panel (e), the responses are the average markup responses of the firm types $k = 1, \ldots, 5$.

imation of the model dynamics around it. In the stochastic steady state, markups of the firms with the largest price rigidity are 10.9% higher than markups of firms with the most flexible prices. The negative correlation between markups and pass-through implies that contractionary monetary policy shocks increase markup dispersion and lower aggregate TFP, see Proposition 1.

4.3 Results

Figure 4 shows the responses to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock. The shock depresses aggregate demand and lowers real marginal costs. In response, firms want to lower their prices. For firms with stickier prices, however, pass-through is lower and on average their markups increase by more. Since firms with stickier prices have higher initial markups, markup dispersion increases. This worsens the allocation of factors across firms and thereby depresses aggregate TFP. The mechanism is quantitatively important. The increase in markup dispersion is about 75% of the peak empirical response, see Figure 1, and the model explains 60% of the peak empirical response in utilization-adjusted TFP, see Figure 3. In addition, the responses show the frequency composition effect described by Carvalho (2006). The firms with flexible prices are quick to adjust. Hence, at

\footnote{At an earlier stage of this paper, we have also solved the model globally using a time iteration algorithm for the case of two firm types with one of them having perfectly flexible prices. This yields very similar quantitative results compared to using the Meyer-Gohde (2014) algorithm. However, the computational costs of time iteration are exceedingly large for more general setup of heterogeneous price rigidities.}
longer horizons, the distribution of firms with non-adjusted prices is dominated by the stickier type of firms. This generates additional persistence in the responses.

We argue in this paper that an important aspect of the monetary transmission channel is the response of aggregate TFP. In contrast, traditional business cycle models assume that the only source of fluctuations in aggregate TFP are exogenous technology shocks. This motivates us to examine the success of a Taylor rule in stabilizing output if the monetary authority in the model (mis-)perceives the aggregate TFP response to monetary policy shocks as originating from technology shocks. We compute a counterfactual change in natural output supposing the TFP response to monetary policy shocks is driven by technology shocks. Panel (a) in Figure 5 shows the difference between the GDP responses under the counterfactual technology shock and the baseline response. Output drops by up to 0.17 percentage points more if the monetary authority attributes aggregate TFP fluctuations to technology shocks, and the response is markedly more persistent.

This finding highlights the importance for the monetary authority to assess the sources of observed aggregate TFP fluctuations. Panel (b) in Figure 5 shows the response of markup dispersion to a negative technology shock with the size and persistence that matches the endogenous response of TFP to a monetary policy shock. The behavior of markup dispersion helps to discriminate between productivity and monetary policy shocks. It increases after contractionary monetary policy shocks but decreases after contractionary productivity shocks.

The fact that aggregate TFP responds to monetary policy shocks can change the sign of the markup response to monetary policy shocks. This relates to a recent debate. While monetary policy shocks raise markups in a large class of New Keynesian models, recent evidence in Nekarda and Ramey (2019) points in the opposite direction. Following Hall (1988), the aggregate markup in our model is

\[ \mu_t = \frac{\text{TFP}_t}{W_t/P_t}, \]  

where \( W_t/P_t \) denotes the real wage. In standard New Keynesian models, tighter monetary policy reduces aggregate demand which lowers real marginal costs and, hence, markups increase. In contrast, equation (4.1) shows that the aggregate markup falls if aggregate TFP falls sufficiently strongly in response to tighter monetary policy. This argument extends to sectoral and even firm-level markups, if monetary policy shocks affect TFP at more disaggregated levels. In general equilibrium, an endogenous decline in aggregate TFP will feed back into real marginal costs, which also affects markups.

Panel (c) in Figure 5 shows the aggregate markup response to monetary policy shocks. In

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15 An alternative channel through which monetary policy has productivity effects is R&D investment, see Comin and Gertler (2006).
16 We recalibrate \( \sigma_\nu \) to ensure the same interest rate response to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock, but keep all other parameters unchanged.
17 Figure 20 in the Appendix provides further impulse responses for this counterfactual scenario.
18 Figure 21 in the Appendix provides further impulse responses for the technology shock.
our baseline calibration with an elasticity of substitution $\eta = 6$ the aggregate markup raises. In some sense, that is because aggregate TFP does not fall strongly enough. We next compare our baseline results with the results when doubling the elasticity to $\eta = 12$. A larger $\eta$ increases the misallocation costs of markup dispersion and thus the TFP loss after a monetary policy shock. The aggregate TFP is almost twice as large, see Figure 22 in the Appendix. Importantly, the aggregate markup falls. Dynamically, the TFP loss leads to an increase in hours worked, which additionally increases marginal costs and lowers firm-level markups, reinforcing the effect on the aggregate markup.

In the Appendix, we analyze the robustness of our results in two dimensions. First, in Figure 23, we vary the Frisch elasticity of labor supply $\varphi$. The markup dispersion and TFP responses are higher for less elastic labor supply and dampened for more elastic labor supply. Second, in Figure 24, we raise the lowest price adjustment frequency, $1 - \theta_1$ to the level of the second quintile group $1 - \theta_2 = 6.78\%$. This dampens the increase in markup dispersion, and an aggregate TFP response of -0.27%.

5 Conclusion

This paper studies an overlooked monetary transmission mechanism. Monetary policy shocks increase the dispersion of markups across firms if firms with stickier prices have higher pre-shock markups. Increased markup dispersion implies a change in the allocation of inputs across firms, which lowers measured aggregate TFP. Using aggregate and firm-level data, we document three new facts, which are consistent with this mechanism. First, firms that adjust prices less frequently have higher markups. Second, monetary policy shocks increase the relative markup of firms with stickier prices. Third, monetary policy shocks increase the markup dispersion across firms, and
lower aggregate productivity. The empirically estimated magnitudes suggest that the response in markup dispersion is quantitatively important to understand the response of aggregate productivity. We show that an explanation for the negative correlation between markup and price stickiness is the stickiness itself. Firms with stickier prices optimally set higher markups for precautionary reasons. In a calibrated New Keynesian model, heterogeneous price stickiness allows us to explain a large share of the empirically estimated TFP response to monetary policy shocks.

References


Appendix
A Markup estimation

We follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (forthcoming) in estimating firm-level markups from firm-level balance sheet data. If a firm can frictionlessly adjust its variable inputs \( V_{it} \), then it follows from cost minimization that the markup can be written as the product of the output elasticity \( \theta_{it}^V \) and the inverse cost share of \( V_{it} \),

\[
\mu_{it} = \theta_{it}^V \frac{P_{it}Q_{it}}{P_{it}^V V_{it}},
\]

where \( P_{it}Q_{it} \) denotes sales and \( P_{it}^V V_{it} \) costs of variable inputs. Letting lower cases denote logs, we assume that deflated log sales are given by

\[
q_{it} = \phi_{st}(v_{it}, k_{it}) + \omega_{it} + \varepsilon_{it},
\]

where \( \phi_{st} \) denotes an industry-time-specific production function, \( \omega_{it} \) is firm-level revenue productivity, and \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is an unanticipated shocks to production, observed by the firm after having input choices are made. Alternatively, \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is classical measurement error. We assume that revenue productivity follows an AR(1) process.

As a baseline, we specify \( \phi_{st} \) as a quarter-two-digit-industry-specific Cobb–Douglas production function of a composite input of labor and materials (measured by costs of goods sold) and capital

\[
\phi_{st}(v_{it}, k_{it}; \theta_{st}^V, \theta_{st}^K) = \theta_{st}^V v_{it} + \theta_{st}^K k_{it}
\]

The estimation proceeds in two stages. First, we project sales \( q_{it} \) on a third-order polynomial in \( v_{it} \) and \( k_{it} \) to obtain an estimate of \( \phi_{st}(v_{it}, k_{it}) + \omega_{it} \) denoted by \( \hat{q}_{it} \). This projection captures unobserved productivity \( \omega_{it} \) under the condition that the demand for inputs \( v_{it} \) is strictly increasing in productivity. In the second stage, we use GMM to find the parameters of the production function: For a given set parameters, revenue productivity can be recovered as \( \omega_{it}(\theta_{st}^V, \theta_{st}^K) = \hat{q}_{it} - \phi_{st}(v_{it}, k_{it}; \theta_{st}^V, \theta_{st}^K) \). In turn, estimated productivity innovations \( \xi_{it} \) can be obtained as the residuals of a regression of \( \omega_{it} \) on \( \omega_{it-1} \). The moment conditions are based on the notion that predetermined input choices are orthogonal to the productivity innovation:

\[
E \left[ \xi_{it}(\theta_{st}^V, \theta_{st}^K) \begin{pmatrix} v_{it-4} \\ k_{it} \end{pmatrix} \right] = 0
\]

We find \((\theta_{st}^V, \theta_{st}^K)\) for all industries \( s \) and quarters \( t \) by minimizing the associated GMM objective functions. Based on equation (A.1), we compute the firm-level markup by multiplying the estimated output elasticity with the ratio of sales to costs of goods sold.

Alternatively, we estimate a translog production function with four-digit-industry-specific parameters:

\[
\phi_s(v_{it}, k_{it}) = \beta_s^V v_{it} + \beta_s^K k_{it} + \beta_{sV}^V v_{it}^2 + \beta_{sK}^K k_{it}^2
\]

\(19\) Similar to De Loecker et al. (forthcoming), who use the first lag of cost of goods sold as an instrument in annual data, we use the fourth lag in quarterly data. This choice improves the stability of our estimated output elasticities within industries over time.

\(20\) For any given quarter \( t \) we use the preceding five years of data to estimate the output elasticities. This follows De Loecker et al. (forthcoming). While they use a centered five-year window, we use a backward-looking one because we are interested in dynamic effects after shocks.
Estimation is analogous to above using the moment conditions

\[
E \left[ \xi_{it}(\theta_{st}, \theta_{st}K_{it}) \begin{pmatrix} v_{it-4} \\ v_{it}^2 \\ k_{it} \\ k_{it}^2 \end{pmatrix} \right] = 0.
\]

This production function gives rise to firm-time-specific output elasticities given by

\[
\theta_{it}^V = \beta_s^V + 2\beta_s^{VV} v_{it}.
\]

Yet another way of estimating the output elasticity of variable is through cost share (Hall, 1988). We do so at the level of four-digit-industry-quarters. This requires an estimate of the user cost of capital. Following De Loecker et al. (forthcoming), we set \( R_t = \frac{FFR_t}{4} + \pi_t + 3\% \) where \( FFR_t \) is the federal funds rate, \( \pi_t \) is measured as the quarterly growth rate in the GDP deflator, and the annual depreciation rate and risk premium is assumed to be 12%. The cost share of an individual firm is the ratio of costs of goods sold to total costs (costs of goods sold plus \( R_t K_t \)). For every four-digit-industry-quarter, we estimate the output elasticity of variable inputs as the median cost share across firms.

### B Data construction and descriptive statistics

#### B.1 Firm-level balance sheet data

We use quarterly firm-level balance sheet data of listed US firms for the period 1995Q1 to 2017Q2 from Compustat North America. We delete duplicate firm-quarter observations. Our industry classification is based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We exclude firms in utilities (2-digit NAICS code 22), finance, insurance, and real estate (52 and 53), and public administration (99). We discard observations of sales (\( saleq \)), costs of goods sold (\( cogsq \)), and property, plant, and equipment (net PPE, \( ppentq \), and gross PPE, \( ppegtq \)), that are non-positive. We fill one-quarter gaps in the firm-specific series of these variables by linear interpolation. All variables are deflated using the GDP deflator, except PPE, which is deflated by the investment-specific GDP deflator. We construct a measure of the capital stock of firms using the perpetual inventory method: We initialize \( K_{i0} = ppegtq_{i0} \) and recursively compute \( K_{it} = K_{it-1} + (ppentq_{it} - ppentq_{it-1}) \). We drop firm-quarter observations if sales, costs of goods sold, or fixed assets are only reported once in the associated year. We further drop observations if quarterly sales growth is above 100% or below -67% or if real sales are below 1 million USD. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our baseline sample.

#### B.2 Data on price rigidity

To maximize firm-level variation in price rigidity, we weight average industry-level price adjustment frequency with firms’ industry sales from the Compustat segment files. Industry-level price adjustment frequency is based on Pasten et al. (2018). We define the implied price duration as \(-1/\log(1 - \text{adjustment frequency})\).

We obtain firms’ yearly industry sales composition using the operation segments and, if these are not available, the business segments from the Compustat segments file. We drop various types of duplicate...
Table 3: Summary statistics for Compustat data

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<td>Fixed assets</td>
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<td>104456.86</td>
<td>329173</td>
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<td>Total Assets</td>
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<td>13374.72</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>559922.78</td>
<td>326632</td>
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</table>

Notes: Summary statistics for Compustat data. All variables are in millions of 2012Q1 US$.

observations: In case of exact duplicates, we keep one. In case there are different source dates or more than one accounting month per year, we keep the observation with the newest source dates or the later accounting month, respectively. We drop segment observations for firm-years if the industry code is not reported. If only some segment industry codes are missing, we assign the firm-specific industry code to the segments with missing industry code.

We then compute every firm’s average price rigidity over segments weighted by sales. In case we do not observe the five-digit-industry-level price stickiness for all segments or we observe only one segment, we use the five-digit price rigidity measure associated to the firm’s general five-digit industry code. Note that even in this case, there is variation across firms within four-digit industries. Our sample comprises 8,091 unique firms. For 1,891 firms (23%), we can compute a segment-based price stickiness level in some year. For firm-years with segment-based price stickiness, the mean (median) number of segments is 2.36 (2) with a standard deviation of 0.67.

B.3 Monetary policy shocks

We compute monetary policy shocks by high-frequency identification as described in Subsection 2.1. Table 4 reports summary statistics for all monetary policy shocks and Figure 6 shows the shock series.

Table 4: Summary statistics of monetary policy shocks

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<td>4.06</td>
<td>-17.01</td>
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<td>... unscheduled meetings and conference calls included</td>
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<td>5.70</td>
<td>-38.33</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>... purged of Greenbook forecasts</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-10.47</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... sign-restricted stock market comovement</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>-15.27</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... QE announcements excluded</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>-13.71</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’Policy indicator’ surprise</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>-14.13</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Summary statistics for monetary policy shocks in basis points.
B.4 Time series plots of monetary policy shocks, markup dispersion, and aggregate productivity

Figure 6: Monetary policy shocks, aggregate productivity, and markup dispersion

(a) Monetary policy shocks

(b) Additional monetary policy shocks

(c) Markup dispersion (Cobb–Douglas)

(d) Markup dispersion (Translog)

(e) Markup dispersion (Cost shares)

(f) Aggregate productivity

Notes: Aggregate productivity (in logs), markup dispersion, and monetary policy shocks are at quarterly frequency. Aggregate (utilization-adjusted) TFP is from Fernald (2014). Labor productivity is from FRED. Markup dispersion is computed from Compustat balance sheet data. Shaded gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
C Additional empirical results

Figure 7: Response of firm-level observations after monetary policy shocks

Notes: This figure shows the response of the number of firm-level observations in our sample to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). The shaded area is a one standard error band based on Newey–West.

Figure 8: Aggregate R&D response to monetary policy shock

Notes: The plots show the response to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. The shaded area indicate one standard error bands based on the Newey–West estimator.
Figure 9: Further productivity responses

(a) Markup-adjusted TFP

(b) Measurement error corrected TFP

(c) Investment TFP

(d) Consumption TFP

Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). Investment-TFP and Consumption-TFP are from Fernald (2014). Markup-corrected TFP is constructed following Hall (1988) using the average markup estimated by De Loecker et al. (forthcoming). Measurement error corrected TFP is constructed using measurement error corrected GDP from Aruoba et al. (2016), total hours from the BLS, and capital stock and output elasticities from Fernald (2014). The utilization-adjusted measure subtracts utilization from Fernald (2014). The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on Newey–West.
Figure 10: Macroeconomic responses to monetary policy shocks

(a) Aggregate productivity

(b) Aggregate output

(c) Aggregate inputs

(d) Interest rates

Notes: The plots show the responses to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. The local projections in Panel (d) are estimated in levels rather than differences. The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on the Newey–West estimator.
D Robustness of main findings

D.1 Results for alternative markup series

Figure 11: Responses of markup dispersion for alternative markup measures

(a) Translog

(b) Cost shares

Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). Panel (a) uses markups based on an industry-specific translog production function, which gives rise firm-quarter-specific output elasticities. Panel (b) uses markups based on output elasticities estimated as the industry-quarter-specific median cost share. Markup dispersion is measured within two-digit and four-digit industry-quarters as well as without fixed effects, respectively. The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on Newey–West.

Figure 12: Relative markup response of firms with stickier prices for alternative markup measures

(a) Translog

(b) Cost shares

Notes: The figures show the response to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock of the firm-level markup of firms with a price adjustment frequency one standard deviation below (or with an implied price duration one standard deviation above) from panel local projections as in equation (2.5). The regressions include interactions with lagged log assets, leverage, and liquidity and their interactions with a monetary policy shock. Panel (a) uses markups based on an industry-specific translog production function, which gives rise firm-quarter-specific output elasticities. Panel (b) uses markups based on output elasticities estimated as the industry-quarter-specific median cost share. The shaded and bordered areas indicate 90% error bands clustered by firms and quarters.
Table 5: Regressions of markup on price stickiness for alternative markup series

(a) Markups based on translog production function

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<td>Implied price duration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00369)</td>
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<td>(0.0243)</td>
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(b) Markups based on cost shares

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<td>(0.0252)</td>
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<td>4-digit</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2-digit</td>
<td>4-digit</td>
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<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.362</td>
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Notes: Regression of firm-level markup (averaged over 2005–2011) on firm-level price adjustment frequency and implied price duration, respectively. Panel (a) uses markups based on an industry-specific translog production function, which gives rise firm-quarter-specific output elasticities. Panel (b) uses markups based on output elasticities estimated as the industry-quarter-specific median cost share. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
D.2 Results for alternative data treatments

Figure 13: Responses of markup dispersion under alternative data treatments

(a) Keep small firms  
(b) Keep firms with excessive growth

(c) Drop top/bottom 1% of markups  
(d) At least 16 quarters

Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). See the notes to Figure 14 for details on the data treatments. The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on Newey–West.
Figure 14: Relative markup response of firms with stickier prices under alternative data treatments

Notes: The figures show the response to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock of the firm-level markup of firms with a price adjustment frequency one standard deviation below (or with an implied price duration one standard deviation above) from panel local projections as in equation (2.5). The regressions include interactions with lagged log assets, leverage, and liquidity and their interactions with a monetary policy shock. Keep small firms does not drop firms with sales below 1 million (in 2012 US$). Keep firms with excessive growth does not drop firms with growth above 100% or below -67%. Drop top/bottom 1% drops markups in the top/bottom 1% in the quarter instead of 5%. At least 16 quarters restricts the sample to firms with at least 16 quarters of consecutive observations. Pre-Great Recession only considers only observations before 2008Q3. Including Great Recession does not drop the period 2008Q3–2009Q2 from the sample. The shaded and bordered areas indicate 90% error bands clustered by firms and quarters.
Table 6: Regressions of markup on price stickiness under alternative data treatments

(a) Keep small firms

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<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>(0.0314)</td>
<td>(0.0736)</td>
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<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.208</td>
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(b) Keep firms with excessive growth

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<td>0.018</td>
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(c) Drop top/bottom 1% of markups

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<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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Notes: Regression of firm-level markup (averaged over 2005–2011) on firm-level price adjustment frequency and implied price duration, respectively. Keep small firms does not drop firms with sales below 1 million (in 2012 US$). Keep firms with excessive growth does not drop firms with growth above 100% or below -67%. Drop top/bottom 1% drops markups in the top/bottom 1% in the quarter instead of 5%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
D.3 Results for alternative monetary policy shocks

Figure 15: Responses of markup dispersion for alternative monetary policy shocks

(a) within 2d-industry-quarter

(b) within 4d-industry-quarter

Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on Newey–West.
Figure 16: Relative markup response of firms with stickier prices for alternative monetary policy shocks

(a) Higher implied price duration

(b) Lower price adjustment frequency

Notes: The figures show the response to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock of the firm-level markup of firms with a price adjustment frequency one standard deviation below (or with an implied price duration one standard deviation above) from panel local projections as in equation (2.5). The regressions include interactions with lagged log assets, leverage, and liquidity and their interactions with a monetary policy shock. The shaded and bordered areas indicate 90% error bands clustered by firms and quarters.
Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections as in equation (2.4). The shaded and bordered areas indicate one standard error bands based on Newey–West.
Figure 18: Main results using LP-IV

(a) Markup dispersion

(b) Aggregate productivity

(c) Relative markup response of firms with stickier prices

Notes: Responses to monetary policy shocks obtained from local projections with instrumental variables (LP-IV), \( y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} = \alpha h + \beta_h \Delta R_t + \gamma_1 (y_{t-1} - y_{t-2}) + u_h \), and analogues of the panel local projections, where the changes in the one-year Treasury rate, \( \Delta R_t \), are instrumented with the monetary policy shocks \( \varepsilon_t^{MP} \). The shaded and bordered areas in panels (a) and (b) indicate a one standard error band based on Newey–West, and in panels (c) they indicate a 90% error band clustered by firms and quarters.
E Proofs

E.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Denote by $V_t(\cdot)$, $\text{Cov}_t(\cdot)$, $\text{Corr}_t(\cdot)$ respectively the cross-sectional variance, covariance, correlation operator. The cross-sectional variance of the log markup is

$$V_t(\log \mu_{it}) = \int (\log P_{it} - \log P_t - \log X_t)^2 di - \left[ \int (\log P_{it} - \log P_t - \log X_t) di \right]^2.$$ 

The derivative w.r.t. $\log X_t$ is

$$\frac{\partial V_t(\log \mu_{it})}{\partial \log X_t} = 2 \int \log(\mu_{it}) \rho_{it} di - 2 \int \log(\mu_{it}) di \int \rho_{it} di = 2 \text{Cov}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}).$$

Hence, the markup variance falls in $\log X_t$ if $\text{Corr}_t(\rho_{it}, \log \mu_{it}) < 0$. \qed

E.2 Markup dispersion and aggregate TFP

Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that produce variety goods $Y_{it}$. Firms employ a common constant-returns-to-scale production function $F(\cdot)$ that transforms a vector of inputs $L_{it}$ into output subject to firm-specific productivity shocks $Y_{it} = A_{it} F(L_{it})$. The cost minimization problem yields that firm-specific $X_{it} = X_t/A_{it}$, where $X_t$ denotes a common marginal costs term. Aggregate GDP is the output of a final good producer, which aggregates variety goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator $Y_t = \left( \int Y_{it}^{(\eta-1)/\eta} di \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)}$. The cost minimization problem of the final good producer yields a demand curve for variety goods $Y_{it} = (P_{it}/P_t)^{-\eta} Y_t$, where $P_t$ is an aggregate price index. Variety good producers choose prices to maximize period profits

$$\max_{P_{it}} \left( \tau_{it} P_{it} - X_{it} \right) Y_{it} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Y_{it} = (P_{it}/P_t)^{-\eta} Y_t,$$

where $\tau_{it}$ is a markup wedge in the spirit of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Baqaee and Farhi (2020). This wedge may be viewed as a shortcut for price rigidities. Profit maximization yields a markup $\mu_{it} = P_{it}/X_{it} = \frac{1}{\tau_{it}} \frac{\eta}{\eta-1}$. We compute aggregate TFP as a Solow residual by

$$\log \text{TFP}_t = \log \left( \int Y_{it}^{(\eta-1)/\eta} di \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)} - \log \int Y_{it}/A_{it} di.$$ 

This Solow residual has a model consistent Solow weight of one for the aggregate cost term. If we (a) apply a second-order approximation to $\log \text{TFP}_t$ in $\log A_{it}$ and $\log \tau_{it}$, or if we (b) assume that $A_{it}$ and $\tau_{it}$ are jointly log-normally distributed, we obtain

$$\log \text{TFP}_t = -\frac{\eta}{2} V_t(\log \mu_{it}) + E_t(\log A_{it}) + \frac{\eta-1}{2} V_t(\log A_{it}).$$

Wedges $\tau_{it}$ drive markup dispersion and distort the economy away from allocative efficiency. Firms with high $\tau_{it}$ charge lower markups and use more inputs than socially optimal, and vice versa for low $\tau_{it}$. This misallocation across firms results in lower aggregate TFP.
E.3 Proof of Proposition 2

We assume that

\[
\log \left( \frac{P_t}{\bar{P}} \right) \sim N \left( \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\sigma_p^2}{2} \\ -\frac{\sigma_p^2}{2} \\ -\frac{\sigma_p^2}{2} \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_p^2 & \sigma_p \sigma_x & \sigma_p \sigma_y \\ \sigma_p \sigma_x & \sigma_x^2 & \sigma_x \sigma_y \\ \sigma_p \sigma_y & \sigma_x \sigma_y & \sigma_y^2 \end{bmatrix} \right). 
\]

Define \( \tilde{\theta}_i \equiv \frac{\delta \theta_i}{\eta - \sigma_p^2} \), as well as

\[
C_{it} \equiv \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t} \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right)^{\eta} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right], \\
D_{it} \equiv \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right)^{\eta^{-1}} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right], \\
\Psi_{it} \equiv \frac{1 + \tilde{\theta}_i C_{it}}{1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it}},
\]

which allows us to rewrite the first-order condition in (3.3) as

\[
P^*_it = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} P_t X_t \Psi_{it}.
\]

The terms \( C_{it} \) and \( D_{it} \) can be simplified

\[
C_{it} = \frac{\bar{X} \bar{P}^{\eta} \bar{Y}}{X_t P_t \bar{Y}_t} \exp \left\{ \eta(\eta - 1) \frac{\sigma_p^2}{2} + \eta \sigma_p \sigma_x + \eta \sigma_p \sigma_y + \sigma_x \sigma_y \right\}, \quad D_{it} = \frac{\bar{P}^{\eta^{-1}} \bar{Y}}{P_t^{\eta^{-1}} \bar{Y}_t} \exp \left\{ (\eta - 1)(\eta - 2) \frac{\sigma_p^2}{2} + (\eta - 1) \sigma_p \sigma_y \right\}.
\]

Since \( \tilde{\theta}_i \in (0, 1) \), we obtain \( \Psi_{it} > 1 \) when \( P_t = \bar{P} \) and \( X_t = \bar{X} \), if

\[(\eta - 1)\sigma_p^2 + \sigma_p \sigma_x + \sigma_p \sigma_y + \sigma_x \sigma_y > 0.\]

Under this condition, we obtain \( \mu^*_{it} > \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \). Under the same condition, we further obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \Psi_{it}}{\partial \tilde{\theta}_i} = \frac{C_{it} - D_{it}}{(1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it})^2} > 0, \quad \text{and hence} \quad \frac{\partial \Psi_{it}}{\partial \tilde{\theta}_i} > 0.
\]

We next study the pass-through of a transitory or permanent change in \( X_t \). Consider first a transitory change in \( X_t \) away from \( \bar{X} \). The expected pass-through is

\[
\bar{p}_{it} = (1 - \theta_i) \frac{\partial \log P_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} = (1 - \theta_i)(1 + \Phi_{it}), \quad \text{where} \quad \Phi_{it} = \frac{\partial \log \Psi_{it}}{\partial \log X_t}
\]

and

\[
\Phi_{it} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_i \frac{\partial C_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} (1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it}) - (1 + \tilde{\theta}_i C_{it}) \tilde{\theta}_i \frac{\partial D_{it}}{\partial \log X_t}}{(1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it})^2} \Psi_{it}^{-1} = -\frac{\tilde{\theta}_i C_{it}}{1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it}} \Psi_{it}^{-1} = \frac{-\tilde{\theta}_i C_{it}}{1 + \tilde{\theta}_i D_{it}} < 0.
\]
Hence pass-through becomes
\[ \bar{\rho}_{it} = \frac{1 - \theta_i}{1 + \theta_i C_{it}} \in (0, 1). \]

In addition, the pass-through falls in \( \theta_i \),
\[ \frac{\partial \bar{\rho}_{it}}{\partial \theta_i} = -(1 + \Phi_{it}) + (1 - \theta_i) \frac{\partial \Phi_{it}}{\partial \theta_i} < 0. \]

We next examine a \textit{permanent} change in \( X_t \), which is a change in \( \bar{X} \) (starting in period \( t \)). At \( P_t = \bar{P} \) and \( X_t = \bar{X} \),
\[ \frac{\partial \log P_{it}^*}{\partial \log \bar{X}} = 1. \]

Expected pass-through is then \( \bar{\rho}_{it} = 1 - \theta_i \) and hence \( \frac{\partial \bar{\rho}_{it}}{\partial \theta_i} < 0. \)

\[ \square \]

E.4 Proof of Proposition 3

Let us first define
\[ C_{it} = \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i,t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i,t-1}}, \]
\[ D_{it} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{P_{i,t+1}}{P_{it}} - 1 \right) \frac{P_{i,t+1}}{P_{it}} \right], \]
such that we can re-write the first-order condition in equation (3.4) more compactly as
\[ (1 - \eta) \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y_t + \eta X_t \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y_t = \phi_i (\bar{C}_{it} - \bar{D}_{it}). \]

Further define \( \bar{\phi}_i = 0 \) and denote by an upper bar any object that is evaluated at \( \bar{\phi}_i \), such as the price \( P_{it} \), which is \( \bar{P}_{it} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} P_t X_t \). In addition,
\[ \bar{C}_{it} = \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{it}}{\bar{P}_{i,t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{\bar{P}_{it}}{\bar{P}_{i,t-1}} = (\Pi_{pt}\Pi_{xt})^2 - \Pi_{pt}\Pi_{xt}, \]
\[ \bar{D}_{it} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{i,t+1}}{\bar{P}_{it}} - 1 \right) \frac{\bar{P}_{i,t+1}}{\bar{P}_{it}} \right] = \frac{\exp \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \sigma_p^2 + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_x^2 + 4 \sigma_{px} \right\}}{(\Pi_{pt}\Pi_{xt})^2} - \exp \left\{ \sigma_{pw} \right\} \frac{\Pi_{pt}\Pi_{xt}}{\Pi_{pt}\Pi_{xt}}. \]

We next use a first-order approximation of the first-order condition at \( \bar{\phi}_i \) and with respect to \( \bar{\phi}_i \) and \( \log P_{it} \). Denoting \( d\log P_{it} = \log P_{it} - \log \bar{P}_{it} \) and \( d\phi_i = \phi_i \), we obtain
\[ (1 - \eta)^2 \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{1-\eta} Y_t d\log P_{it} - \eta^2 X_t \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y_t d\log P_{it} = (\bar{C}_{it} - \bar{D}_{it}) d\phi_i. \]

This yields
\[ \Psi_{it} \equiv \frac{d\log P_{it}}{d\phi_i} = \frac{\bar{D}_{it} - \bar{C}_{it}}{(\eta - 1)^{\eta(1-\eta)} X_t^{1-\eta} Y_t}, \]
and hence \( \log P_t \approx \log \bar{P}_t + \Psi_t d\phi_i \). For \( \phi_i > 0 \), the markup is above the frictionless one if \( P_t > \bar{P}_t \), which holds if \( \Psi_t > 0 \). For \( P_t = \bar{P} \) and \( X_t = \bar{X} \), \( \Psi_t > 0 \) if

\[
\sigma^2_p + \sigma^2_x + 2\sigma_{px} > 0,
\]

for which a sufficient condition is that the correlation

\[
\rho_{px} \equiv \frac{\sigma_{px}}{\sigma_p \sigma_x} > -1.
\]

Under the same condition, \( \frac{\partial P_t}{\partial \phi_i} > 0 \).

We next study the pass-through of a transitory or permanent change in \( X_t \). The pass-through is

\[
\rho_{it} = 1 + \frac{\partial \Psi_i}{\partial \log X_t} d\phi_i.
\]

We next examine the conditions under which pass-through falls in \( \phi_i \), i.e., conditions under which

\[
\frac{\partial \Psi_i}{\partial \log X_t} < 0,
\]

which is equivalent to examining the conditions for

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{D}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} - \frac{\partial \bar{C}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} + (\eta - 1)(\bar{D}_{it} - \bar{C}_{it}) < 0.
\]

Consider first a transitory change in \( X_t \) away from \( \bar{X} \),

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{C}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} = 2(\Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt})^2 - \Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt},
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{D}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} = -2(\Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt})^{-2} \exp \left\{ \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_p + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_x + 4\sigma_{px} \right\} + (\Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt})^{-1} \exp \{ \sigma_{px} \}.
\]

For \( P_t = \bar{P} \) and \( X_t = \bar{X} \), we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \Psi_i}{\partial \log X_t} < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \eta < \tilde{\eta}^{\text{transitory}} = 2 + \frac{1 + \exp \left\{ \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_p + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_x + 4\sigma_{px} \right\}}{\exp \left\{ \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_p + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_x + 4\sigma_{px} \right\} - \exp \{ \sigma_{px} \}}
\]

We next consider a permanent change, for which we have

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{C}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} = 2(\Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt})^2 - \Pi_{it} \Pi_{xt}, \quad \frac{\partial \bar{D}_{it}}{\partial \log X_t} = 0.
\]

For \( P_t = \bar{P} \) and \( X_t = \bar{X} \), we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \Psi_i}{\partial \log X_t} < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \eta < \tilde{\eta}^{\text{permanent}} = 1 + \frac{1}{\exp \left\{ \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_p + \frac{3}{2} \sigma^2_x + 4\sigma_{px} \right\} - \exp \{ \sigma_{px} \}}
\]

It always holds that \( \eta^{\text{permanent}} < \eta^{\text{transitory}} \) and we define \( \tilde{\eta} \equiv \eta^{\text{permanent}} \). \( \square \)
To study the presence of precautionary price setting in menu cost models, we proceed numerically. Consider the partial equilibrium menu cost model

\[ V(p, Z) = \mathbb{E}_\xi \left[ \max \{ V^A(Z) - \xi, V^N(Z) \} \right] \]

\[ V^A(Z) = \max_{p^*} \left\{ \left( \frac{p^*}{P} - X \right) \left( \frac{p^*}{P} \right)^{-\eta} + \beta \mathbb{E}_Z [ V(p^*, Z') ] \right\} \]

\[ V^N(p, Z) = \left( \frac{p}{P} - X \right) \left( \frac{p}{P} \right)^{-\eta} + \beta \mathbb{E}_Z [ V(p, Z') ] \]

where \( p \) is the price a firm sets and \( Z \) denote a vector of the aggregate state variables price level \( (P) \), aggregate demand \( (Y) \), and marginal costs \( (X) \). The firm chooses to adjust prices in the presence of the menu cost \( \xi \).

We set \( \eta = 6 \) and \( \beta = 1.03^{-1/4} \). We solve the model using value function iteration with off-grid interpolation with respect to \( p \) using cubic splines as basis function. To solve accurately for differences in \( p^* \) that arise from small differences in \( \xi \) requires a fine grid for both \( p \) and \( Z \). To alleviate the numerical challenge, we assume \( \xi \) is stochastic and drawn from an iid exponential distribution, parametrized by \( \bar{\xi} \). Results change only little when using a uniform distribution.

We assume 200 grid points on a log-spaced grid for \( p \). To capture aggregate uncertainty in \( Z \), we first estimate a first-order Markov process for \( Z \) in the data and then discretize it using a Tauchen procedure. In the univariate case, when only allowing for inflation uncertainty, the precautionary price setting was accurately captured starting from about 49 grid points for \( Z \). Discretizing a three-variate VAR with 49 grid points for each variable is costly. Even more importantly, the state space, on which to solve the model, becomes very large. We therefore proceed with the univariate case. We estimate an AR(1) on quarterly post-1984 data of the log CPI and apply the Tauchen method with 49 grid points.

We solve the stationary equilibrium of the menu cost and Calvo model for a vector of different \( \bar{\xi} \), which imply different equilibrium price adjustment frequencies. Figure 19 plots the price setting policy \( p^* \) at the unconditional mean of \( Z \) for different average price adjustment frequencies. We compare menu costs in panel

Figure 19: Precautionary price setting under menu costs and Calvo

(a) Menu cost

(b) Calvo

Notes: The figures show percentage difference between the dynamic optimal price relative to the frictionless optimal one.
(a) with Calvo in panel (b). The figures shows that precautionary price setting exists and is amplified by the degree of price-setting friction in a menu cost environment. Compared to Calvo, menu costs generate somewhat muted precautionary price setting.

G  Details on the Quantitative New Keynesian Model

This section presents details on the quantitative New Keynesian model in Section 4. We assume a representative infinitely-lived household who maximizes

\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \frac{\epsilon_t^{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}} - \frac{N_t^{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\varphi}}}{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}} \right),
\]

subject to the budget constraints \( P_tC_t + R_t^{-1}B_t \leq B_{t-1} + W_t N_t + D_t \) for all \( t \), where \( C_t \) is aggregate consumption, \( P_t \) an aggregate price index, \( B_t \) denotes one-period discount bounds purchased at price \( R_t^{-1} \), \( N_t \) employment, \( W_t \) the nominal wage, and \( D_t \) aggregate dividends. We impose the solvency constraint

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[A_t,T \theta_T] \geq 0 \quad \text{for all} \quad t,
\]

where \( A_t,T = \beta^{T-t}(C_T/C_t)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \) is the stochastic discount factor. The final output good \( Y_t \) is produced with a Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator

\[
Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{it}^{\eta-1} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}},
\]

where \( \eta \) is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods \( \{Y_{it}\} \). Intermediate goods are with the technology \( Y_{it} = A_t N_{it} \), where \( A_t \) is a common technology shifter, which follows \( \log A_t = \rho_a \log A_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t} \) and \( \varepsilon_{a,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_a^2) \) are technology shocks. Final good aggregation implies an isoelastic demand schedule for intermediate goods given by \( Y_{it} = (P_{it}/P_t)^{-\eta}Y_t \), where \( P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{it}^{1-\eta} \, di \right)^{1/(1-\eta)} \) denotes the aggregate price index and \( P_{it} \) the firm-level price. Firms may reset their prices \( P_{it} \) with firm-specific probability \( 1 - \theta_t \). The price setting policy maximizes the value of the firm to its shareholder,

\[
\max_{P_{it}} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{A_{t+j}}{P_{t+j}^{1+\eta}} \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{t+j}} - W_{t+j} - \frac{A_{t+j}}{P_{t+j}} \right)^{-\eta} Y_{t+j} \right].
\]

The firm type \( k \)-specific price index is

\[
P_{kt} = \left[ (1 - \theta_k) \tilde{P}_{kt}^{1-\eta} + \theta_k P_{kt-1}^{1-\eta} \right]^{1/\eta},
\]

where \( \tilde{P}_{kt} \) is the optimal reset price of a firm of type \( k \). The monetary authority aims to stabilize inflation \( (P_t/P_{t-1}) \) and fluctuations in output, \( Y_t \), around its natural level, denoted \( \bar{Y}_t \), by following the Taylor-type rule, subject to monetary policy shocks \( \nu_t \),

\[
R_t = R_{t-1}^{\theta_{t-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{\beta} \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\phi_y} \left( \frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}_t} \right)^{\phi_y} \right]^{1-\rho_r} \exp\{\nu_t\}, \quad \nu_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_r^2).
\]

The competitive equilibrium is defined by firm-level allocations \( \{Y_{it}, N_{it}\}_{i=0}^{\infty} \) and prices \( \{P_{it}\}_{i=0}^{\infty} \) for all \( i \), and aggregate allocations and prices \( \{Y_{it}, N_{it}, P_t, R_t\}_{i=0}^{\infty} \) such that households and firms maximize their objective functions, the monetary authority follows the policy rule. The final goods market clears, \( Y_t = C_t \), and the labor market clears, \( N_t = \int_0^1 N_{it} \, di \), in every period \( t \).
H Additional Model Results

Figure 20: Model responses to monetary policy shocks under alternative Taylor rule

Notes: This figure shows impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. Baseline corresponds to the model in the main text. In particular, the central bank follows a Taylor rule, which reacts to fluctuation in the output gap. The gap is defined relative to natural output (the level prevailing under flexible prices), which is unchanged after monetary policy shocks. Alternative Taylor rule corresponds to a setup in which the central bank computes natural output based on the observed movements in aggregate TFP. Consequently, natural output is perceived to react to monetary policy shocks, which leads to a different policy response. The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks $\sigma_\nu$ is re-calibrated to match the response of the nominal rate of 30bp.
Figure 21: Model responses to technology shocks

Notes: This figure compares the impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock to those to a technology shock. The persistence of TFP and the technology shock size are calibrated to match the shape of the TFP response to monetary policy shocks.
Figure 22: Model responses to monetary policy shocks when varying the elasticity of substitution

Notes: This figure shows impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock for two values of the elasticity of substitution between variety goods $\eta$. The value 6 corresponds to our baseline calibration and the value 12 corresponds to an intermediate value of elasticities considered in the literature (e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015). The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks $\sigma_{\nu}$ is recalibrated to match the response of the nominal rate of 30bp.
Figure 23: Model responses to monetary policy shocks when varying the Frisch elasticity

(a) On-impact aggregate TFP response

(b) On-impact markup dispersion response

Notes: This figure plots the size of on-impact impulse responses of TFP and markup dispersion to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock under different calibrations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply $\phi$. The value 0.1 corresponds to the lower end of short-run elasticity estimates surveyed by Ashenfelter et al. (2010). The value 0.1175 corresponds to our baseline calibration, which matches the contribution of TFP to the GDP response and is in the range of Ashenfelter et al. (2010). The value 0.5 corresponds to a lower end and an intermediate value (which is suspected to be potentially upward-biased) in Chetty et al. (2011). The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks $\sigma_\nu$ is re-calibrated to match the response of the nominal rate of 30bp.
Figure 24: Model responses to monetary policy shocks when stickiest firm type is more flexible

Notes: This figure compares impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock in the baseline calibration to the setting in which we reduce the largest price rigidity, $\theta_1$, to the second-largest price rigidity, $\theta_2$. The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks $\sigma_\nu$ is re-calibrated to match the response of the nominal rate of 30bp.