# Higher Order Beliefs in Survey Data: Discussion



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## Disclaimer

"The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or those of the Federal Reserve System."

## Summary

### This is a very **rich**, **novel** and **dense** paper

#### The authors

- 1. Provide novel evidence on 2<sup>nd</sup> order beliefs about inflation
  - Run an information experiment
  - Test link between 2<sup>nd</sup> order inflation beliefs and behavior
- 2. Rely on a noisy-information model to
  - Develop testable hypotheses
  - Calibrate structural parameters
- 3. Conduct a beauty contest experiment
  - In which 2<sup>nd</sup> order beliefs are elicited (this is novel)
  - To try to refine noisy-information model

So essentially 3 papers in 1 !!!

## 2<sup>nd</sup> order Beliefs in the SCE

Starting in 2016, we have collected 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> order inflation expectations each month

## 1st order point prediction question

"Over the next 12 months I expect the rate of inflation/deflation to be ""

## 2<sup>nd</sup> order point prediction question


"I think that, on average, people who answer the survey this month expect the rate of inflation over the next 12 months to be ""

# Features of the two Surveys

	Coibon et al.	SCE
Country	New Zealand	U.S
Respondents	Firms	Household heads
Frequency	Conducted twice	Monthly rotating panel
Horizon of expectations	1 year ahead	1 year ahead
1 <sup>st</sup> order belief elicitation method	Point prediction & density forecast	Point prediction & density forecast
2nd order belief elicitation method	Density forecast	Point prediction
Experiment	Information experiment & beauty contest	Financially incentivized belief elicitation

Coibon et al.	SCE
2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs are well calibrated	

#### First and Second Order Beliefs each Month




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<b>√</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order expectation are highly correlated (0.68)	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order expectation are highly correlated (0.72)

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	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs respond similarly to information	

## Change in 1st and 2nd second order Inflation Expectations



Month to Month Change in Individual 1st Order Belief

	Coibon et al.	SCE
<b>✓</b>	2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs are well calibrated	2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs are biased upward
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<b>✓</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order expectations are highly correlated (0.68)	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order expectations are highly correlated (0.72)
√(?)	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs respond similarly to information	1 <sup>st</sup> order beliefs are revised more than 2 <sup>nd</sup> order beliefs

## Effect of incentives

- Would survey responses be different if respondents were paid according to the accuracy of their predictions?
- Difficult to incentivize 1<sup>st</sup> order inflation belief because uncertainty is resolved only 1 year later
- But, one can incentivized 2<sup>nd</sup> order beliefs because uncertainty is resolved as soon as survey is closed


## Effect of incentives

- To address this question we conducted an experiment
- Half of the respondents got a <u>non incentivized question</u>

"I think that, on average, people who answer the survey this month expect the rate of inflation over the next 12 months to be %"

Half of the respondents got got an incentivized question

"I think that, on average, people who answer the survey this month expect the rate of inflation over the next 12 months to be \_\_\_\_\_% If your guess is correct within 0.1% then you will earn an extra \$20"



◆Average Point Prediction
◆Average 2nd Order Belief Unincentivized
◆Average 2nd Order Belief Incentivized