Measuring Uncertainty and Its Effects in the COVID-19 Era

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Abstract

We measure the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on uncertainty, and we assess the consequences of the uncertainty for key economic variables. We use a large, heteroskedastic vector autoregression (VAR) in which the error volatilities share two common factors, interpreted as macro and financial uncertainty. Macro and financial uncertainty are allowed to contemporaneously affect the macroeconomy and financial conditions, with changes in the common component of the volatilities providing contemporaneous identifying information on uncertainty. The model includes additional latent volatility states in order to accommodate outliers in volatility, to reduce the influence of extreme observations from the COVID period. Our estimates yield large increases in macroeconomic and financial uncertainty since the onset of the COVID-19 period. These increases have contributed to the downturn in economic and financial conditions, but the contributions of uncertainty are small compared to the overall movements in many macroeconomic and financial indicators. That implies that the downturn is driven more by other dimensions of the COVID crisis than shocks to aggregate uncertainty (as measured by our method).

Keywords: Bayesian VARs, stochastic volatility, pandemics

JEL classification codes: E32, E44, C11, C55

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1 Introduction

The outbreak of COVID-19 prompted extraordinary volatility in economic and financial variables, which suggests an increase in uncertainty about future conditions. For example, sources such as the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve emphasized that uncertainty was perceived to have risen dramatically. For example, the minutes of the Committee’s April 2020 meeting reported: “Participants commented that, in addition to weighing heavily on economic activity in the near term, the economic effects of the pandemic created an extraordinary amount of uncertainty and considerable risks to economic activity in the medium term.” Measures of uncertainty available at high frequency — the VIX and policy uncertainty as measured by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) — skyrocketed in the spring before easing up some.

Building on the immense research literature on uncertainty that emerged following the seminal work of Bloom (2009), Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) — henceforth referred to as CCM — developed an econometric model and method for jointly (1) constructing measures of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty and (2) conducting inference on uncertainty’s impacts on the macroeconomy. The CCM uncertainty measures reflect common factors driving time-varying volatilities in macroeconomic and financial variables, respectively. The model is a large, heteroskedastic vector autoregression (VAR) in which the error volatilities evolve over time according to a factor structure. The volatility of each variable in the system is driven by a common component and an idiosyncratic component. Changes in the common component of the volatilities of the VAR’s variables provide contemporaneous identifying information on uncertainty. Macro and financial uncertainty are allowed to contemporaneously affect the macroeconomy and financial conditions.

In CCM, estimates with monthly US data for the period 1959-2014 provided substantial evidence of commonality in volatilities, with increases in macro uncertainty associated with economic recessions. Their estimated impulse responses showed that (1) macroeconomic uncertainty has large, significant effects on real activity and a limited impact on financial variables and (2) financial uncertainty shocks directly impact financial variables and subsequently transmit to the macroeconomy. However, their estimates of historical decompositions indicated that they are not a primary driver of fluctuations in macroeconomic and financial variables. For example, over the period of the Great Recession and subsequent recovery, shocks to uncertainty...
made small to modest contributions to the paths of economic and financial variables, whereas shocks to the VAR’s variables played a much larger role.\footnote{In Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021), updated results for 1985-2014 that correct an algorithm mistake in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) yield the same patterns summarized in this paragraph.}

This paper uses the basic framework of CCM to measure changes in macroeconomic and financial uncertainty in the US since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and to estimate uncertainty’s effects. To do so, we need to address some challenges that come with measuring uncertainty from macroeconomic and financial data in the COVID-19 period. The period yielded unprecedented movements in many key variables. For example, payroll employment plummeted 14.8 percent from March to April, a decline nearly 17 times as large as the previous largest monthly decline, and employment rose 3.5 percent from May to June, an increase 3 times larger than the previous record growth rate.\footnote{These calculations use log growth rates and data from the September 2020 vintage of FRED-MD.} These extremes might unduly influence conventional estimates of time series models. In response, Lenza and Primiceri (2020) develop an approach to allow for temporary spikes in volatilities of innovations in an otherwise conventional Bayesian VAR (BVAR). The volatility spikes lead the BVAR to down-weight COVID observations in its parameter estimates.

In this paper, in light of possible questions around how much weight to allow COVID observations to have, we extend the model of CCM to allow for temporary volatility outliers. Stock and Watson (2016) developed a latent state approach to accommodating outliers in unobserved component models of inflation, and Carriero, et al. (2021b) extended the approach to BVARs and showed the efficacy of the model in macroeconomic forecasting accuracy. In this paper we add outlier states to the CCM model to assess uncertainty and its effects with a specification that has the potential to reduce the influence of extreme observations from the COVID period.

The estimates we obtain yield very large increases in macroeconomic and financial uncertainty over the course of the COVID-19 period. These increases have contributed to the downturn in economic and financial conditions. Although these contributions are sizable by historical standards, they are generally dwarfed by the immense and unprecedented magnitudes of changes in some variables from March through June 2020. That is, the contributions of uncertainty are small compared to the overall movements in many macroeconomic and financial indicators. That implies that the downturn is driven more by other dimensions of the COVID crisis.
than shocks to aggregate uncertainty (as measured by our method).³

The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 present the model, data, and results, respectively. Section 5 concludes.

2 Model

We denote the uncertainty model that includes the outlier volatility states as the BVAR-SVF-M-O specification, short for BVAR with stochastic volatility factors in the mean and outlier states added. The model of CCM takes the same form, with the outlier states omitted.

Let \( y_t \) denote the \( n \times 1 \) vector of variables of interest, split into \( n_m \) macroeconomic and \( n_f = n - n_m \) financial variables. Let \( v_t \) be the corresponding \( n \times 1 \) vector of reduced-form shocks to these variables, also split into two groups of \( n_m \) and \( n_f \) components.

Following Stock and Watson (2016) and Carriero, et al. (2021b), outliers are accommodated as temporary spikes in the standard deviations of innovations to the VAR. Outliers are treated as independent over time and across variables. The outlier scale variable can take one of a grid of \( N_o = 20 \) values, ranging from 1 to 20.⁴ With probability \( 1 - p_j \), there is no outlier for variable \( j \) in period \( t \), and the outlier scale variable \( o_{j,t} \) takes a value of 1. With probability \( p_j \), an outlier occurs, and each of the possible values of 2 through 20 has the same probability of \( p_j / (N_o - 1) \). That is, outliers occur along a uniform distribution of 2 to 20. As in Carriero, et al. (2021b), the prior mean implies an outlier frequency of once every 4 years in monthly data (and prior precision consistent with 10 years’ worth of prior observations).

The reduced-form shocks are:

\[
v_t = A^{-1} O_t \Lambda_t^{0.5} \epsilon_t, \quad \epsilon_t \sim \text{i.i.d. } N(0, I),
\]

where \( A \) is an \( n \times n \) lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal, \( \Lambda_t \) is a diagonal matrix of volatilities, and \( O_t \) is a diagonal matrix of the i.i.d. outlier scale states (corresponding to standard deviations). The logs of the variances on

³Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2021) instead treat COVID as a disaster shock that causes both economic activity to plummet and uncertainty to rise.

⁴Stock and Watson (2016) apply the outlier model to inflation data with an upper bound of 10 on the outlier states, which we have extended to 20 to better accommodate swings in other variables.
the diagonal of $\Lambda_t$ follow a linear factor model:

$$
\ln \lambda_{jt} = \begin{cases} 
\beta_{m,j} \ln m_t + \ln h_{j,t}, & j = 1, \ldots, n_m \\
\beta_{f,j} \ln f_t + \ln h_{j,t}, & j = n_m + 1, \ldots, n.
\end{cases}
$$

(2)

The variables $h_{j,t}$ — which do not enter the conditional mean of the VAR, specified below — capture idiosyncratic volatility components associated with the $j$-th variable in the VAR, and are assumed to follow (in logs) an autoregressive process:

$$
\ln h_{j,t} = \gamma_{j,0} + \gamma_{j,1} \ln h_{j,t-1} + e_{j,t}, \quad j = 1, \ldots, n,
$$

(3)

with $\nu_t = (e_{1,t}, \ldots, e_{n,t})'$ jointly distributed as i.i.d. $N(0, \Phi_\nu)$ and independent among themselves, so that $\Phi_\nu = \text{diag}(\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n)$. These shocks are also independent from the conditional errors $\varepsilon_t$.

With this setup, the Cholesky residual of each macro variable $j$ consists of a conditionally Gaussian innovation $\varepsilon_{j,t}$ that is scaled by

$$
\tilde{\lambda}_{j,t}^{0.5} = o_{j,t} \lambda_{j,t}^{0.5} = o_{j,t} \sqrt{m_t^{\beta_{m,j}} h_{j,t}},
$$

and the reduced-form innovation variance matrix is $\Sigma_t = A^{-1} O_t \Lambda_t O_t' A^{-1'}$.

The same applies for financial variables, just with the financial factor $f_t$ replacing the macro factor $m_t$. As this indicates, the outlier state is idiosyncratic to each variable’s volatility. Uncertainty is instead defined as the common element in volatilities, distinct from the idiosyncratic components that may have some persistence and the i.i.d. outlier scale components. This outliers-augmented version of the model adds to the baseline CCM specification an entirely transitory volatility component (the outliers), on top of the idiosyncratic stochastic volatility process that may have some persistence (and, indeed, is estimated to do so for most of the variables of the VAR).

The variable $m_t$ is our measure of (unobservable) aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty, and the variable $f_t$ is our measure of (unobservable) aggregate financial uncertainty. Together, the two measures of uncertainty (in logs) follow an augmented VAR process:

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
\ln m_t \\
\ln f_t
\end{bmatrix} = D(L) \begin{bmatrix}
\ln m_{t-1} \\
\ln f_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
\delta_m' \\
\delta_f'
\end{bmatrix} y_{t-1} + \begin{bmatrix}
u_{m,t} \\
u_{f,t}
\end{bmatrix},
$$

(4)
where $D(L)$ is a lag-matrix polynomial of order $d$. The shocks to the uncertainty factors $u_{m,t}$ and $u_{f,t}$ are independent from the shocks to the idiosyncratic volatilities $e_{i,t}$ and the conditional errors $\epsilon_t$, and they are jointly normal with mean 0 and variance $	ext{var}(u_t) = \text{var}((u_{m,t}, u_{f,t})) = \Phi_u = \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{n+1} & 0 \\ 0 & \phi_{n+2} \end{bmatrix}$. The specification in (4) implies that the uncertainty factors depend on their own past values as well as the previous values of the variables in the model, and therefore they respond to business cycle fluctuations. Importantly, financial uncertainty affects macro uncertainty and vice-versa.

For identification, we fix the factor innovation variances and impose (using an accept/reject step in the Gibbs sampler) sign restrictions on the factor loadings so that $\beta_{m,1} > 0$ and $\beta_{f,n+1} > 0$. In addition, we deliberately include the block restrictions of factor loadings in the volatilities specification of (2) in order to allow the comovement between uncertainties captured in the VAR structure. Conceptually, these block restrictions are consistent with broad definitions of uncertainty: Macro uncertainty is the common factor in the error variances of macro variables, and financial uncertainty is the common factor in the error variances of financial variables. However, these uncertainties may move together due to correlated innovations to the uncertainties, the VAR dynamics of uncertainty captured in $D(L)$, and responses to past fluctuations in macro and financial variables ($y_{t-1}$).

The uncertainty variables $m_t$ and $f_t$ can also affect the levels of the macro and financial variables contained in $y_t$, contemporaneously and with lags. In particular, $y_t$ is assumed to follow:

$$y_t = \Pi(L)y_{t-1} + \Pi_m(L) \ln m_t + \Pi_f(L) \ln f_t + v_t,$$

where $k$ denotes the number of $y_t$ lags in the VAR, $\Pi(L) = \Pi_1 - \Pi_2 L - \cdots - \Pi_k L^{k-1}$, with $\Pi_i$ an $n \times n$ matrix, $i = 1, \ldots, k$, and $\Pi_m(L)$ and $\Pi_f(L)$ are $n \times 1$ lag-matrix polynomials of order $k_m$ and $k_f$. This model allows the business cycle to respond to movements in uncertainty, both through the conditional variances (contemporaneously, via movements in $v_t$) and through the conditional means (contemporaneously and with a lag, via the coefficients collected in $\Pi_m(L)$ and $\Pi_f(L)$).

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5We fix the factor innovation variances at $\phi_{n+1} = 0.0375$ and $\phi_{n+2} = 0.075$, similar to the estimates of Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021). Note that, for identification, CCM instead fixed the factor loadings $\beta_{m,1}$ and $\beta_{f,n+1}$ at values of 1 and estimated the variance-covariance matrix of innovations to the log uncertainty factors.
Note that, as a general matter of identification, our modeling strategy separates the total variance of the residual $A v_t = O_t \Lambda_t^{0.5} \epsilon_t$ into four orthogonal components: a common component, an idiosyncratic component that may have some serial correlation, an i.i.d. outlier scale component, and a component due to the conditionally independent shock $\epsilon_t$. When a large residual shock (represented by $O_t \Lambda_t^{0.5} \epsilon_t$) hits the economy, we let the data distinguish whether this is a large shock in the conditional error $\epsilon_t$ (so an outlier in a standard normal distribution, with a variance that is not moving) or rather a relatively ordinary draw for the conditional shock $\epsilon_t$ that is, however, scaled up by an increase in variance, which may be transitory or persistent, as well as common or idiosyncratic, as captured by the various components contained in $O_t \Lambda_t^{0.5}$.

In implementation with monthly data, we set the VAR lag order at $k = 6$, the lag order for the uncertainty factors in the VAR’s conditional mean ($k_m$ and $k_f$) at 2, and the lag order of the bivariate VAR in the uncertainty factors ($d$) to 2.

Following CCM, we estimate the model using an MCMC sampler. To make tractable the estimation of the large model, we rely on an equation-by-equation approach to the vector autoregression (VAR) based on a triangularization of the conditional posterior distribution of the coefficient vector. The published results of CCM were based on a triangularization approach that Bognanni (2021) shows to have a conceptual problem; the triangularization does not deliver the intended posterior of the VAR’s coefficients. In response, Carriero, et al. (2021) develop a corrected triangular algorithm for Bayesian VARs that does yield the intended posterior. Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021) employ the same algorithm to correct the estimates of CCM, using a sample of 1985 to 2014. In this paper, we follow the algorithm as deployed in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021) for the version of the uncertainty model without outlier states included. In the extended model of this paper, the algorithm includes all of the same steps, with adjustments to reflect the outlier states on top of the $\lambda$ and $h$ terms. Including the outliers requires two additional steps. One of these draws the outlier states from their posterior given the draw of the outlier probabilities; this step proceeds analogously to the sampling of the mixture states needed with the Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998) approach to the idiosyncratic volatility states $h$. The other draws the outlier probability for each variable from a (conditional posterior) beta distribution conditional on the draws of the time series of outlier states. All results in the paper are based on 5,000 retained draws, obtained by sampling a total of 35,000 draws, discarding the first 10,000, and
retaining every 5th draw of the post-burn sample.

In unreported results, we have also considered a different, simple approach to treating the COVID observations as unusual and reducing their influence: We augmented the VAR as in the original model of CCM to include dummy variables for each month of March through June 2020, with the dummy for month $s$ having a value of 1 in month $s$ of 2020 and 0 in all other periods. These dummies, of course, capture the variation of the COVID months and reduce their influence on the model estimates. This dummy-variable approach had mixed effects in our setting. With macro uncertainty, adding the dummies to the CCM specification yields an uncertainty estimate comparable to what we get with this paper’s SVF-M-O model. But the same does not apply to financial uncertainty: The model with dummies produces an increase in uncertainty in the COVID period much larger than the estimate from our SVF-M-O model. Nonetheless, this alternative specification with dummy variables yields impulse responses similar to those reported below, obtained from the SVF-M-O model.

3 Data

Following CCM, our results are based on a VAR including 30 macroeconomic and financial variables, which are listed in Table 1. Reflecting the available samples of the raw data and observations taken by transformations and model lags, the estimation sample is September 1960 to June 2020. Following common practice in the factor model literature as well as studies such as Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), after transforming each series for stationarity as needed, we standardize the data (demean and divide by the simple standard deviation) before estimating the model.

Our variable set includes 18 macroeconomic series, chosen for being major indicators within broad categories (production, labor market, etc.). With one exception, we take these series and some financial indicators from the FRED-MD monthly data set detailed in McCracken and Ng (2016), which is similar to that underlying common factor model analyses, such as Stock and Watson (2006). The one exception is

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6We took the data from the September release of FRED-MD. Although this vintage has data through June for most series, two of the series in our model only have observations through June (under FRED-MD’s usual timing).

7To reduce the potential impact of COVID extremes, in the standardization, we computed the means and standard deviations with data through 2019 and omitted 2020 observations.
the new orders index from the Institute of Supply Management, which FRED-MD is no longer able to include; we instead obtained this series from Haver Analytics.

Our variable set also includes 12 financial series, consisting of the return on the S&P 500, the spread between the Baa bond rate and the 10-year Treasury yield, and a set of additional variables made available by Kenneth French on his web page. Specifically, we use the French series on CRSP excess returns, four risk factors — for SMB (Small Minus Big), HML (High minus Low), R15_R11 (small stock value spread), and momentum — and sector-level returns for a breakdown of five industries (consumer, manufacturing, high technology, health, other).

As discussed in CCM, this specification reflects some choice as to what constitutes a macroeconomic variable rather than a financial variable. Reflecting the typical factor model analysis, the McCracken-Ng data set includes a number of indicators — of stock prices, interest rates, and exchange rates — that may be considered financial indicators. In our model specification, the variables in question are the federal funds rate, the credit spread, and the S&P 500 index. It seems most appropriate to treat the funds rate, as the instrument of monetary policy, as a macro variable. For the other two variables, the distinction between macro and finance is admittedly less clear. Whereas Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) treat these indicators as macro variables that bear on macroeconomic uncertainty and not directly on financial uncertainty, it seems more natural to consider these indicators as financial variables, in keeping with such precedents as Koop and Korobilis (2014) on the measurement of financial conditions. Accordingly, we include the credit spread and the S&P 500 index in the set of financial variables.

4 Results

This section first provides our estimates of outlier states, time-varying volatilities, and macroeconomic and financial uncertainty. It then presents impulse responses and historical decompositions.

4.1 Volatility and uncertainty estimates

Before taking up the main results of interest, it may be useful to consider the estimation of outlier states in the BVAR-SVF-M-O model. For most financial variables, the posterior mean probabilities of an outlier each month are low, at about 0.4 percent. Mean outlier probabilities are modestly higher for most — although not
all — macro variables. For example, the probability estimates are 0.9 percent for employment and 2.2 percent for real personal income.

Figure 1 provides posterior mean estimates of the outlier states $o_{j,t}$ for variable $j$, covering a subset of variables in the interest of readability. For some variables, reflecting the estimated low probabilities of an outlier, the mean state estimate is flat at 1 for most or much of the sample. At the other extreme, the estimates identify a number of outliers for personal income. More immediate to the matter of the COVID period, a number of variables experience outliers in the period of the COVID disruption to economic activity. For example, the posterior mean of the outlier state (recall that this scales up standard deviations) for consumer spending is nearly 14 in March; the estimate for employment is about 11 in March and 18 in April. As we discuss below, these outlier state movements contribute significantly to the variability of the affected variables of the model. Although a number of variables are found to experience outliers in recent months, it is not a majority of the series; for example, only 8 of the 18 macroeconomic variables in the model have a posterior mean of $o_{j,t}$ of 2 or more in the months of March or April. Accordingly, we proceed with treating the outliers as being independent across variables rather than common to most or all, in keeping with treating common, persistent changes in forecast error variances as changes in aggregate uncertainty.

Turning to overall volatility changes, Figure 2 shows the magnitudes of changes in volatilities in recent months, broken into contributions from the uncertainty factors, the outlier states, and the idiosyncratic volatility components. Whereas it would be difficult to compute contributions to changes in the diagonal elements of $\Sigma_t$, the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form innovations in the VAR, it is possible to directly compute percent changes in $\tilde{\lambda}_{j,t}^{0.5} = \sqrt{m_{t}^{j,m} \sigma_{j,t}^{2} h_{j,t}}$ for macro variables and $\tilde{\lambda}_{j,t}^{0.5} = \sqrt{\tilde{f}_{t}^{j,f} \sigma_{j,t}^{2} h_{j,t}}$ for financial variables. For each month $t$ from January 2019 through June 2020, we compute $0.5 \ln(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,t}/\tilde{\lambda}_{j,0})$, where $\tilde{\lambda}_{j,0}$ refers to the volatility of December 2018, and the contributions to this percent change in the standard deviation from the uncertainty factors, the outlier states, and the idiosyncratic volatility components. The charts report posterior means of the contributions, as stacked bars.

---

8If we followed conventions in the factor model literature (e.g., McCracken and Ng (2016)) and simply defined an outlier as an observation with distance from the median more than 5 or 10 times the width of the interquartile range, it would also be the case that only a few macro variables show an outlier in recent months.
Perhaps the most immediate result in these estimates is the giant increases in the volatilities of many variables. For example, the log change in $0.5t$ for employment is about 4, meaning that volatility (as measured by the standard deviation) has risen by 400 percent. Increases in most of the financial volatilities were more tempered although still dramatic, for example with the return volatilities rising about 100 percent.

In the variance decomposition from the BVAR-SVF-M-O model, the relative importance of uncertainty, outliers, and idiosyncratic volatilities varies across variables. The uncertainty factors drive considerable increases in volatility for all variables. For financial variables, uncertainty factors are the dominant driver. For macro variables, uncertainty factors are important to most increases, but are occasionally dominated by outlier state contributions. As examples, with industrial production and unemployment, the estimates show outliers driving the volatility increases of March and April, respectively, and the uncertainty factors driving the increase of May. For some other variables, such as employment and the help wanted-to-unemployment ratio, increases in the idiosyncratic volatility components also contribute. But in general, the contributions of the idiosyncratic volatility components are smaller than those of the uncertainty factors and outlier states (and in some cases they lower, rather than raise, volatility).

By comparison, over the period January 2007-December 2009 spanning the Great Recession, Figure 3 shows that the overall rise in volatility was smaller for many variables — although still sizable — with a somewhat different composition than that observed for the COVID period. One pattern shared by the Great Recession period is that a sizable increase in aggregate uncertainty helped drive volatility higher. But outliers are estimated to have played a smaller role in 2007-2009 than in 2019-2020, affecting volatilities of only a few variables in the former period but several in the latter. The overall differences in the magnitudes of the volatility changes and the role of outliers point to the COVID period being unique.

Turning from variance contributions to the estimates of uncertainty, the top two panels of Figure 4 report our macroeconomic and financial uncertainty estimates, measured as the posterior medians of $m_t^{0.5}$ and $f_t^{0.5}$, respectively. The estimates show significant increases in 2020. Macroeconomic uncertainty moves up sharply (from a historical average level of about 1 in January) from March to May, peaking at nearly 5, and then moderating to about 2 in June. The estimate of financial uncertainty also picks up significantly in 2020, peaking at about 3 in April and declining to about
0.7 in June. As a more general matter, looking at the pre-COVID period from 1985 through 2019, adding the outlier states to the CCM model has little effect on the time series of macroeconomic uncertainty. For this period, the estimates of uncertainty from this paper’s model (fit using data through mid-2020) are very similar to estimates obtained by fitting the baseline model of CCM without outlier states to data for 1985 through 2019, with correlations of 0.95 for macroeconomic uncertainty and 0.99 for financial uncertainty.

There is considerable uncertainty around the estimate of uncertainty in the COVID period. Figure 5 provides the BVAR-SVF-M-O posterior median estimates of macroeconomic ($\mu_t^{0.5}$) uncertainty along with 70 percent credible sets, for the periods 1960-2019 (top) and January-June 2020 (bottom). Historically, from the start of the sample through December 2019, the width of the credible set averaged 0.2 (compared to an average level of the uncertainty index of 1), with the range commonly rising with spikes in uncertainty, usually around recessions. Over this period, the width of the credible set peaked at 0.8 in October 2008. As evidenced in the lower panel of Figure 5, the width of the 70 percent credible set has been much greater over the COVID period, peaking at 4.6 in May 2020. Of course, if the sample were extended beyond June 2020, with the additional data and two-sided smoothing, the precision of uncertainty estimates for the first half of 2020 could improve.

For comparison to other measures of uncertainty, the bottom panel of Figure 4 provides the VIX measure of uncertainty (through June 2020) and current estimates of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty based on the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) model (through June 2020, posted by Professor Ludvigson). The JLN estimates show a significant rise, with macroeconomic uncertainty increasing 39 percent from December 2019 to a peak in March 2020 and financial uncertainty increasing 32 percent over the same period. These increases are of course much more modest than those evident from our models. However, that is in keeping with historical patterns, in which our uncertainty estimates rise more than those of JLN around recessions (of course, this need not mean that our uncertainty measures yield larger impacts on the economy, since the greater sensitivity of the uncertainty measure to the cycle will be reflected in smaller response coefficients). The greater variability of our measures could stem from the various differences in our modeling approach as compared to JLN, including the fact that, in our one-step approach to estimating uncertainty and its effects on the economy, uncertainty responds directly
to fluctuations in the economy, through the inclusion of $y_{t-1}$ in the time series process of the factors.\footnote{In contrast, the JLN measures of uncertainty are obtained as simple averages of conventional stochastic volatility estimates obtained from simple autoregressive models (augmented to include factor indexes of the economy) of each series, without direct feedback of economic conditions to volatility.} The VIX measure of uncertainty displays a sharper rise, with the VIX more than tripling from January to March before drifting down over the following few months. Caggiano, Castelnovo, and Kima (2020) use estimates of a small VAR through April 2019 and scale up the size of a shock to the VIX to gauge (via impulse responses) the effects of the rise in uncertainty on world output during the pandemic, concluding that the effects are sizable. Altig, et al. (2020) review and compare movements of a range of measures of uncertainty before and during the pandemic.

4.2 Impulse responses

To provide a basic assessment of the effects of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty, we compute impulse response functions for each of the 5000 retained draws of the VAR’s parameters and latent states and report the posterior medians and 70 percent credible sets of these functions. For a given shock of the size of one standard deviation, we report response estimates using black lines and gray shaded regions for posterior medians and 70 percent credible sets, for a subset of selected variables. Note that, although the models are estimated with standardized data, for comparability to previous studies the impulse responses are scaled and transformed back to the units typical in the literature.\footnote{We do so by using the model estimates to: (1) obtain impulse responses in standardized, sometimes (i.e., for some variables) differenced data; (2) multiply the impulse responses for each variable by the standard deviations used in standardizing the data before model estimation; and (3) accumulate the impulse responses of step (2) as appropriate to get back impulse responses in levels or log levels. Accordingly, the units of the reported impulse responses are percentage point changes (based on 100 times the log levels for variables in logs or rates for variables not in log terms).}

In broad terms, the impulse response estimates from the two models reported in Figures 6 (macroeconomic uncertainty) and 7 (financial uncertainty) are comparable and qualitatively the same as the corrected and updated estimates of CCM presented in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021). As shown in the last panel of row 3 of Figure 6, the shock to log macro uncertainty produces a rise in uncertainty that gradually dies out. Economic activity and the labor market decline in response, with indicators such as consumer spending, housing starts and permits,
manufacturing and trade sales, the ISM index of new orders, employment, and hours worked falling. Despite the significant decline of economic activity in response to the macro uncertainty shock, there doesn’t appear to be evidence of a broad decline in prices. The PPI for finished goods declines steadily, but the response is estimated imprecisely. Consumer prices as captured by the PCE price index instead show little change. Overall, as noted in CCM, this picture of price responses is in line with New Keynesian models, which predict a small effect of uncertainty on inflation due to sticky prices (and possibly wages). In the face of this deterioration in the real economy and in the absence of much movement in prices, the federal funds rate gradually falls. The responses of financial indicators to the shock to macro uncertainty are — collectively speaking — muted and imprecisely estimated. Aggregate stock prices and returns, as captured by the S&P 500 price index and the CRSP excess returns, show little change (whereas, in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021), these variables showed some decline). The spread between the Baa and 10-year Treasury yields undergoes a modest, but persistent and significant, rise, with a hump-shaped pattern.

The estimates of responses to a financial uncertainty shock in Figure 7 are also broadly similar to the estimates of CCM as corrected and updated in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2021). As reported in the last panel, the shock to log financial uncertainty produces a rise in uncertainty that gradually dies out. The financial uncertainty shock affects economic activity much as does a shock to macroeconomic uncertainty. In particular, the financial uncertainty shock depresses economic activity and leads to reductions in the federal funds rate and a rise (and eventual decline) in the credit spread. The most notable difference with respect to results for a macro uncertainty shock is that a financial uncertainty shock leads to a sizable falloff in aggregate stock prices and returns. The response of the S&P500 price level is negative and significant. The CRSP excess returns display a negative jump and then gradually recover. However, the responses of the risk factors included in the model are insignificant.

4.3 Historical decompositions

To assess the specific role of fluctuations in uncertainty shocks in the economy and financial markets in the period of the COVID-19 pandemic, we estimate historical decompositions. In a standard linear model, a historical decomposition of the total \( s \)-steps-ahead prediction error variance of \( y_{t+s} \) can be easily obtained by construct-
ing a baseline path (forecast) without shocks, and then constructing the contribution of shocks. With linearity, the sums of the shock contributions and the baseline path equal the data. In our case, the usual decomposition cannot be directly applied because of interactions between $\Lambda_{t+s}$ and $\epsilon_{t+s}$: Shocks to log uncertainty affect the forecast errors through $\Lambda_{t+s}\epsilon_{t+s}$, and, over time, shocks $\epsilon_{t+s}$ affect $\Lambda_{t+s}$ through the response of uncertainty to lagged $y$. CCM used a decomposition of the total contribution of the shocks into three parts: (i) the direct contributions of the uncertainty shocks $u_{t+s}$ to the evolution of $y$; (ii) the direct contributions of the VAR “structural” shocks $\epsilon_{t+s}$ to the path of $y$ taking account of movements in $\Sigma_{t+s}$ that arise as uncertainty responds to $y$ but abstracting from movements in $\Sigma_{t+s}$ due to uncertainty shocks; and (iii) the interaction between shocks to uncertainty and the structural shocks $\epsilon_{t+s}$.

To be more specific, consider a simple one-factor model with lag orders of 1, abstracting from outlier states:

$$
\begin{align*}
  y_t &= \Pi y_{t-1} + \Gamma_1 m_t + \Gamma_2 m_{t-1} + v_t \\
  m_t &= \delta y_{t-1} + \gamma m_{t-1} + u_t
\end{align*}
$$

where $v_t$ and $u_t$ are independent, with variances $\Sigma_t$ and $\Phi_u$, respectively. So we can replace $v_t$ above with $\Sigma_t^{0.5} \epsilon_t$, where $\Sigma_t^{0.5}$ is a shortcut notation for the Cholesky decomposition of $\Sigma_t$ and $\epsilon_t$ is $N(0, I_n)$. The one-step-ahead forecast errors are $y_{t+1} - E_t y_{t+1} = \Sigma_t^{0.5} \epsilon_{t+1} + \Gamma_1 u_{t+1}$. Now let $\hat{\Sigma}_{t+s|t}$ denote the future error variance matrix that would prevail in the absence of future shocks to uncertainty. This would be constructed from forecasts of future uncertainty accounting for movements in $y$ driven by $\epsilon$ shocks and the path of idiosyncratic volatility terms (incorporating shocks to these terms). The following decomposition can be obtained by adding and subtracting $\hat{\Sigma}_{t+1|t}$ terms in the forecast error:

$$
y_{t+1} - E_t y_{t+1} = \Gamma_1 u_{t+1} + \hat{\Sigma}_{t+1|t}^{0.5} \epsilon_{t+1} + (\Sigma_{t+1}^{0.5} - \hat{\Sigma}_{t+1|t}^{0.5}) \epsilon_{t+1}.
$$

In this decomposition, the first term gives the direct contribution of the uncertainty shock, the second term gives the direct contribution of the structural shocks to the VAR, and the third term gives the interaction component. The third term can be simply measured as a residual contribution, as the data less the direct contributions from the uncertainty shock and the structural shocks to the VAR.

One complication with this approach is that, in the interaction components, there
is not a good way to separate the roles of aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic volatility, because $\Sigma_1$ is the product of such terms containing innovations to aggregate uncertainty and innovations to idiosyncratic components. Since the terms are multiplicative and not additive, there isn’t a clear way to isolate the role of aggregate uncertainty from the role of idiosyncratic components. In light of these complications, and because the interaction effects are empirically much less pronounced than the direct effects, CCM did not attempt to separate the roles of aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic volatility in the interaction component. CCM’s reported results focused on the more important contributions from the first two pieces of the decomposition: shocks to uncertainty and VAR shocks.

In the recent extreme variation in the data, the interaction term of the simple decomposition drives much of the variation in some variables. Such a pattern, of course, means that the variation is difficult to decompose in a meaningfully complete way. However, in this paper, we are primarily interested in the magnitudes of the contributions of uncertainty shocks. As a result, we simplify the historical decomposition analysis and focus on just contributions from uncertainty shocks. In the simple one-step-ahead example, the direct contribution from uncertainty shocks is measured by just $\Gamma_1 u_{t+1}$; this contribution and contributions at later periods are easily computed.

Figure 8 provides the estimated contributions from uncertainty shocks (stacked bars), along with the actual data (black lines), for January 2019 through June 2020. Each panel shows the data series (demeaned for simplicity) and the direct contributions of shocks to (separately) macroeconomic and financial uncertainty. These panels use two scales, with the left for the data and the right for the contributions of the uncertainty shocks. The reported estimates are posterior medians of decompositions computed for each draw from the posterior. In light of space constraints, the figure provides results for a subset of selected variables.

In the estimated historical decomposition for 2019-2020, uncertainty shocks account for some of the sharp data changes that have occurred in recent months. By historical standards, the contributions are sizable; in fact, for many of the variables, the contributions of uncertainty shocks are larger in 2020 than during the Great Recession (using results for a 2003-2014 decomposition not reported in the interest of brevity). But in the COVID period, the contributions of uncertainty shocks are dwarfed by the dramatic size of the total changes. For example, averaged in the months of March and April (the worst months of the pandemic), combined
shocks to macroeconomic and financial uncertainty pulled down employment and consumption by about 2 basis points and industrial production by 12 basis points. Annualized (multiplied by 12), these are notable contributions by conventional business cycle standards. But averaged over March and April, the actual growth rates of employment, consumption, and industrial production (with historical mean growth rates removed) fell by unprecedented magnitudes of 8, 10, and 9 percent, respectively. Consistent with the impulse response estimates, shocks to macroeconomic uncertainty are more important to macro variables than are shocks to financial uncertainty, and the reverse applies for financial variables.

As sizable as our estimates of the contributions of uncertainty to the COVID downturn are by historical standards, some research has obtained even larger estimates. Pellegrino, Castelnuovo, and Caggiano (2020) and Pellegrino, Ravenna, and Zullig (2021) obtain larger effects of an uncertainty shock using a nonlinear VAR in which uncertainty shocks can have more adverse effects during recessions than during normal times. In addition, Barrero and Bloom (2020) suggest that uncertainty will reduce US GDP growth in 2020 by 2 to 3 percent (on a four-quarter basis); with data for the first half of the year in hand, private-sector forecasters surveyed by the Wall Street Journal in mid-September put GDP growth for the year at about -4 percent. These estimated effects of uncertainty are based on the cross-country methodology of Baker, Bloom, and Terry (2020), who relate GDP growth to uncertainty as measured by stock market volatility and who address possible endogeneity by instrumenting with episodes of natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and political shocks. The difference in magnitudes in their results as compared to ours likely is at least in part due to methodology and probably less due to the measure of uncertainty. We say this based on a simple comparison to BVAR estimates (methodology like ours) that measure uncertainty with stock market volatility (underlying uncertainty measure relied on by Barrero and Bloom). In unreported results, if we use stock market volatility as the measure of uncertainty and add it to a conventional BVAR with uncertainty ordered first, the peak effect of the contributions to shocks to uncertainty is about -2 percentage points for employment, consumption, and industrial production — sizable but still well short of the peak 15 percent decline seen in the actual data. We conjecture that Baker, Bloom, and Terry’s cross-country instrumental variables approach based on historical disasters boosts the estimated effects.\footnote{Consistent with this, Baker, Bloom, and Terry (2020) obtain smaller estimated effects with a} Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2021) use structural VARs and historical data
on natural disasters to estimate COVID’s effects on the economy and uncertainty. In their estimates, treating COVID as a disaster-type shock (and calibrating its immense size) yields declines in activity indicators like those observed in the data, as well as a rise in economic and financial uncertainty due to the disaster shock.

In the broader context of uncertainty and its effects, particularly in a period as unusual as that of the pandemic, we should emphasize that our estimates obtained by Bayesian methods are explicitly conditional on the model and the data available to date. Over time, as more data become available, the model’s estimates of uncertainty and contributions to the economic fluctuations of the COVID period could change. Moreover, there are some respects in which uncertainty could matter in ways outside the scope of our aggregate model. In particular, uncertainty at a micro level could have important effects, particularly in the COVID downturn. Some of the uncertainty literature (pre-COVID) has emphasized the important role of volatility shifts at the micro level (see, e.g., Bloom, et al. (2018)). Such micro changes need not be captured as aggregate uncertainty in models such as ours. The subjective uncertainty indicators considered in Altig, et al. (2020) display a sizable rise in firm-level uncertainty following the COVID outbreak. In addition, Knightian uncertainty may have been particularly important in the months immediately following the pandemic’s outbreak, as some kinds of economic activity shut down in unprecedented ways.

5 Conclusions

In this paper we measure the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on macroeconomic and financial uncertainty, and the consequences of uncertainty for key economic variables.

We use a large, heteroskedastic vector autoregression (VAR) in which the error volatilities share two common factors, interpreted as macro and financial uncertainty, in addition to idiosyncratic components. Macro and financial uncertainty are allowed to contemporaneously affect the macroeconomy and financial conditions, with changes in the common component of the volatilities providing contemporaneous identifying information on uncertainty. The model used in this paper extends that of Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) with the addition of latent states to accommodate outliers in volatility, to reduce the influence of extreme observations

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different VAR-based identification applied to just US data.
from the COVID period.

The estimates we obtain yield large increases in macroeconomic and financial uncertainty over the course of the COVID-19 period. These increases have contributed to the downturn in economic and financial conditions, but the contributions of uncertainty are small compared to the overall movements in many macroeconomic and financial indicators. That implies that the downturn is driven more by COVID-related supply and demand shocks that, at least with our methodology, are not measured as shocks to aggregate uncertainty.
References


Table 1: Variables in the baseline model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroeconomic variables</th>
<th>Financial variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All employees: total nonfarm ($\ln$)</td>
<td>S&amp;P 500 ($\ln$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production index ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Spread, Baa-10y Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity utilization: manufacturing ($\Delta$)</td>
<td>Excess return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help wanted to unemployed ratio ($\Delta$)</td>
<td>SMB FF factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate ($\Delta$)</td>
<td>HML FF factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real personal income ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Momentum factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weekly hours: goods-producing</td>
<td>R15_R11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing starts ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Industry 1 return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing permits ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Industry 2 return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real consumer spending ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Industry 3 return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real manuf. and trade sales ($\ln$)</td>
<td>Industry 4 return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISM: new orders index</td>
<td>Industry 5 return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders for durable goods ($\ln$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. hourly earnings, goods-producing ($\Delta^2 \ln$)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI, finished goods ($\Delta^2 \ln$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI, commodities (primary metals, $\Delta^2 \ln$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE price index ($\Delta^2 \ln$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal funds rate ($\Delta$)</td>
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</table>

Note: For those variables transformed for use in the model, the table indicates the transformation in parentheses following the variable description.
Figure 1: Posterior means of outlier states, BVAR-SVE-MO
Figure 2: Posterior means of contributions to percent changes in volatilities, measured as $\Delta \ln \lambda_{i,t}^{0.5}$, BVAR-SVF-M-O

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<table>
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<th>Factor</th>
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<th>2020</th>
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<td>Federal funds rate</td>
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<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
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<td>HML</td>
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<td>R15_R11</td>
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<td>Industry 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry 5</td>
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</table>

Figure 2: Continued, means of contributions to percent changes in volatilities, measured as $\Delta \ln \lambda_{i,t}^{0.5}$, BVAR-SVF-M-O
Figure 3: Posterior means of contributions to percent changes in volatilities in the Great Recession, measured as $\Delta \ln \tilde{\lambda}_{t,t}^{0.5}$, BVAR-SVF-M-O
Figure 3: Continued, means of contributions to percent changes in volatilities in the Great Recession, measured as $\Delta \ln \lambda_{i,t}^{0.5}$, BVAR-SVF-M-O
Figure 4: The top two panels report posterior median estimates of the macroeconomic \( m_{t}^{0.5} \), top) and financial uncertainty \( f_{t}^{0.5} \), middle) factors from the BVAR-SVF-M-O model. The bottom panel provides the uncertainty estimates of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and the VIX measure of uncertainty. Shaded regions denote periods between NBER business cycle peaks and troughs.
Figure 5: The panels report BVAR-SVF-M-O posterior median estimates of macroeconomic ($m_t^{0.5}$) uncertainty along with 70 percent credible sets, for the periods 1960-2019 (top) and January-June 2020 (bottom). Shaded regions denote periods between NBER business cycle peaks and troughs.
Figure 6: Impulse response estimates for shock to macroeconomic uncertainty. The black line and gray shaded region provide posterior medians and 70 percent credible sets from the BVAR-SVF-M-O specification.
Figure 7: Impulse response estimates for shock to financial uncertainty. The black line and gray shaded region provide posterior medians and 70 percent credible sets from the BVAR-SVF-M-O specification.
Figure 8: Historical decomposition (posterior medians) with contributions from just uncertainty shocks, January 2019-June 2020, BVAR-SVF-M-O. Chart is two-scale, with scale for actual data on the left side and scale for estimation contributions on the right.