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Dionissi Aliprantis, Kyle Fee, and
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This paper studies the relationship between local opioid prescription rates and labor market outcomes for prime-age men and women between 2006 and 2016. We estimate the relationship at the most disaggregated level feasible in the American Community Survey in order to provide estimates that include rural areas that have, in some cases, seen particularly high prescription rates. Given the limited time period, it is particularly important to account for geographic variation in both short-term and long-term economic conditions. We estimate three panel models to control for evolving local economic conditions: a difference-in-differences specification, a specification with specific controls for economic conditions, and a model that focuses on a comparison group of place with similar performance in 2000. These modelling approaches find a range of statistically significant and economically substantial results for both prime-age men and women. For example, we find that a 10 percent higher local prescription rate is associated with a decrease in the prime-age labor force participation rate of between 0.15 and 0.47 percentage points for men and between 0.15 and 0.19 percentage points for women, depending on the control strategy. We also estimate effects for narrower demographic groups and find substantially larger estimates for some groups, notably for white and minority men with less than a BA. We also present evidence on reverse causality. We show that a short-term unemployment shock did not increase the share of people misusing prescription opioids and that prescription levels vary substantially within quintiles of longer-term labor market performance. Our estimates are generally robust to estimation within those quintiles of 2000 labor market performance. These results argue against theories of reverse causation that rely on prescriptions rates being higher in labor markets that were already weaker.

JEL Classification Codes: I10, J22, J28, R12.

Keywords: Opioid Prescription Rate, Labor Force Participation, Great Recession, Opioid Abuse.

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1 Introduction

Opioids, including prescription pain killers, are widely recognized as the cause of a public health emergency in the United States. Drug overdose has become the leading cause of death for Americans under 50 years old (Katz (2017)), with the increase since 2010 due to opioids like heroin, OxyContin, and fentanyl.[1]

The interaction between opioids and the labor market is an important dimension of the opioid crisis (Case and Deaton (2017), Krueger (2017)). There is growing evidence that the supply of prescription opioids in an area depresses its labor force participation rate. Areas with higher opioid prescription rates have lower labor force participation rates (Krueger (2017)), and quasi-random variation in local prescription rates has been found to decrease labor force participation (Harris et al. (2019), Laird and Nielsen (2016), Deiana and Giua (2018)).[2] The full scope of the problem is uncertain, however, as identification is often obtained by focusing on a subset of states and time periods.

This paper focuses on understanding the national impacts of prescription opioids on US labor markets [over the past decade]. While deaths and direct costs to state and local governments have been a focus of attention, the potential for general labor market impacts is another important channel for costs of the opioid crisis. Labor market impacts represent a broad estimate of the affected population that could help with scaling an appropriate response. Finally, improved estimates on this critical issue can help to inform policy made in response to [the state of] the labor market, such as that of the Federal Reserve (Yellen (2017), Powell (2019)). Our primary contributions to understanding the impacts of prescription opioids on US labor markets are (i) to improve the joint measurement of labor market outcomes and local prescription rates and (ii) to improve the quality of controls for short- and long-term local labor market conditions.

One reason for the literature's focus on sub-national geographies is the search for credible identification. Another reason, though, is simply that it is difficult to create a nationally representative data set that includes both detailed labor market outcomes and opioid prescriptions. Opioid prescription rates can be measured at the county level in the United States from 2006 to 2016. To be able to examine the labor supply response, these prescription data should be geographically linked to data on labor force participation, unemployment, and employment.

Linking prescription and labor market data typically forces researchers to choose between constructing a data set that is not nationally representative, that ignores information on local opioid prescription rates, or that does not report individuals' decisions to participate in the labor market. Individual-level labor market data from the Current Population Survey or the American Community Survey do not report a respondent's county of residence when the county does not meet

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[1]According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), "Opioids are a class of drugs that include the illegal drug heroin, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and pain relievers available legally by prescription, such as oxycodone (OxyContin), hydrocodone (Vicodin), codeine, morphine, and many others." Quinones (2016) provides a timeline of the crisis.

[2]Results are not uniform: Currie et al. (2019) find that higher opioid prescription rates had a small positive effect on employment-to-population ratios for women.

a minimum population threshold. Approaches to addressing this issue include focusing on high-population areas, aggregating data from low-population areas into state-level observations, or using county-level employment estimates instead of individual-level labor market data.

Our improvement to these approaches for handling nonidentified counties is consequential, as 29 percent of the US population in our sample from the 2006 to 2016 American Community Surveys (ACS) resides in a nonidentified county. We measure an individual's local area as his/her county when identified, or else as his/her Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which is a combination of adjacent counties designed to have at least 100,000 residents. The PUMA is the most finely defined geography identified in the ACS along with annual individual-level labor market outcomes. This geography is labeled the *couma* in Case and Deaton (2017).

Turning back to the issue of credible identification, a central concern is that geography could create variation in labor market outcomes that might be mistaken for the effects of opioid prescriptions. To illustrate this issue over a short time horizon, consider that the opioid crisis has occurred simultaneously with the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery. Local labor markets were not equally impacted by the recession and recovery, making controlling for both national and local labor market demand conditions critical. Over a longer time horizon, differences in labor market conditions are very pronounced within the US, and these conditions could be correlated with prescription rates. We apply three approaches to modeling this issue: a standard difference-in-differences specification, a panel model with specific controls for business cycles and local labor market performance, and a panel model that uses initial labor market conditions to choose comparison locations to follow over time.

We have three main empirical results. First, regardless of the modeling approach, we find that opioid prescription rates and labor force statuses are strongly correlated for both prime-age men and women. We find that increasing the local opioid prescription rate decreases employment rates for both prime-age men and women by lowering labor force participation rates and (sometimes by) increasing unemployment. Application of multiple models implies a range of estimates, but any of the model estimates imply economically substantial reductions in prime-age labor force participation: for men, between 22 and 69 percent of the realized decline between 2000 and 2010, and for women, between 36 and 46 percent.

Second, inspired by Case and Deaton (2017) finding of demographic heterogeneity related to mortality, we use our data set to investigate heterogeneity across demographic groups. Consistent with Case and Deaton (2017), we find that opioids have a strong effect on the labor market outcomes of white men with less than a BA. However, we find that coefficients are actually largest for minority men with less than a BA. While the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) data indicate lower abuse rates of minority men nationally, we reconcile this seemingly contradictory finding by showing that the exposure to opioids, in terms of local prescription rates, is considerably higher for whites than minorities. The policy implications of this finding are clear: If exposure were to spread and increase for minority men, their labor force participation would likely decline from today's levels.

Third, we also provide evidence in favor of giving our results a causal interpretation. We begin by reviewing other recent literature that supports a causal link between opioid prescription rates and labor market outcomes. We then investigate reverse causality from economic conditions to opioid prescription rates. We find no increase in opioid misuse following the short-term unemployment shock that was the Great Recession in data from the NSDUH. We also estimate large coefficients of opioid prescription rates on participation when restricting attention to areas with weak labor markets in 2000. It turns out there is substantial variation in prescription rates within these areas. If the direction of causality went from labor market outcomes to opioid prescription rates, then we would expect to find both less variation in prescription rates within weak labor markets and a small estimated coefficient within these weak labor markets.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in the analysis, Section 3 discusses our empirical specifications and identification strategy, and Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 investigates threats to a causal interpretation of our results. Section 6 compares our results to key parts of the literature and Section 7 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Connecting Local Opioid Prescriptions with Labor Supply

2.1.1 Individual-Level Labor Market Data

When choosing which data source to use for our dependent variable, there are a few options, each with its strengths and weaknesses. Ideally, one would want to use individual-level data representing the entire country and released at a reasonable frequency to conduct this analysis. Individual-level data are preferred because we are studying an individual-level outcome, and aggregating outcomes to larger groups or areas would mean losing important information that can inform how individuals make their labor market decisions given the availability of legal opioids.

The Current Population Survey (CPS) as used in Krueger (2017) is one option. The CPS data set comprises individual-level observations but is limited with respect to the frequency at which the data are available. Krueger (2017) relies on two periods of three-year pooled data (1999-2001 and 2014-2016) to produce labor market estimates; pooling of the data to boost the sample size limits the frequency at which one has observations. Additionally, geographically identified CPS data primarily cover large metropolitan areas, and as a result, any analysis done with the CPS data has to aggregate most rural areas into state-level remainders.

Another option is the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) as used in Currie et al. (2019). The QWI are produced annually for most counties in the nation and includes some demographic information (age, sex, educational attainment, and race). However, the QWI are the county-level estimated averages of outcomes, which limits the ability to account for the way individual-level characteristics influence decisions to participate in the labor market and work. Furthermore, QWI employment figures reflect the location of work rather than the location of residence, which could

bias labor market estimates considering that 24 percent of workers work in a county outside their county of residence (authors' calculation using the one-year 2017 ACS). Additionally, the QWI data are somewhat noisy for counties below 100,000 residents, which causes Currie et al. (2019) to apply additional geographic aggregation to make the data more reliable.

Given the concerns around the CPS and the QWI, we decided to use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) of the 1 percent sample of the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006 to 2016.[3] This annual data set includes detailed information for individuals' labor market status, age, race, sex, and education level, but the county of the individual observations is not always identified. About 80 percent of counties are not identified because they have an estimated population below 100,000, and this accounts for 29 percent of the US population during our sample period. In those cases the smallest identified geographic unit is a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which by construction has a population over 100,000. Case and Deaton (2017) refer to using the lowest available geographic identifier of counties and PUMAs as coumas, and we adopt this terminology (although not all of our coumas would be identical to those used in Case and Deaton (2017)). We also require the geographic units to be consistent in the ACS over 2006 to 2016, which is challenging in some cases due to PUMA boundary changes in 2010. We use IPUMS-produced identifiers of consistent PUMAs and further aggregation when necessary to reach consistent geographic units, which we refer to as CPUMAs.[4] The scale of the issue raised by nonidentified counties is shown in Figure 1, which displays coumas while distinguishing between identified counties (tan) and CPUMAs (purple).


Figure 1: COUMAs
Note: Identified counties between 2006 and 2016 are shown in tan, and nonidentified counties (aggregated into CPUMAs) are shown in purple.

One minor tradeoff we make by drawing individual-level data from the ACS is that this weakens

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[3]Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, and Matthew Sobek. IPUMS USA: Version 8.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2018. https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V8.0

[4]More information on the specifics of the consistent PUMA definition can be found at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/cpuma0010.shtml.

the link to published labor force statistics that are drawn from the CPS. That said, the underlying labor market definitions are conceptually very similar, and the documented differences are mostly the result of different data collection processes (Kromer and Howard (2011)).

2.1.2   County-Level Opioid Prescription Data

We combine the individual-level IPUMS data with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) annual county-level data on prescription rates from 2006 to 2016 to measure each individual couma's prescription rate.[5] In cases where the individual's labor market county is not identified or where prescription data in a county are not available, both of which apply only to smaller counties, the individual is assigned the population-weighted average prescription rate of the observed counties within his/her PUMA. The CDC prescription opioid data set is derived from the records for approximately 59,000 retail (nonhospital) pharmacies, which cover nearly 90 percent of counties and nearly 90 percent of all retail prescriptions in the US. While the precise morphine milligram equivalents (MME) prescribed would be preferable to the number of prescriptions, which we use, these data are only publicly available for 2015. Moreover, these variables appear to provide similar measures, as the correlation coefficient between a county's number of prescriptions per person and a county's MME prescribed is 0.91 in 2015. Further reassuring us about the appropriateness of using prescription counts, the time series of national MME quantities is very similar to the time series of our average prescription counts between 2006 and 2016 (FDA (2018)).

2.1.3   Implication of Linking Prescription Rates with Aggregated Labor Market Data

We aimed to link prescription rate data at the lowest level of aggregation feasible to labor market data in order to allow economically distinct rural areas to influence our empirical results. Figure 2 shows the variation captured when aggregating low-population counties into substate CPUMAs rather than states. The raw 2010 county-level CDC data are presented in Figure 2a. Figure 2b shows these data when nonidentified counties are aggregated into CPUMAs, and Figure 2c shows these data when nonidentified counties are aggregated into states. This alternative aggregation is important because both Currie et al. (2019) and Krueger (2017) aggregate most rural counties up to the state level, and if one takes the perspective that closer measures are better than more aggregated ones, we can interpret aggregated measures in terms of measurement error.

A few states highlight the variation captured by coumas that is lost in state-level aggregation. Starting with Illinois, we can see that when nonidentified counties are aggregated into the state-level average in Figure 2c, they are all around the median prescription rate. However, the coumas in Figure 2b show that northern parts of Illinois have low prescription rates and southern parts of Illinois have high prescription rates. In Michigan, the state-level aggregation assigns a median prescription rate to northern parts of the state. Again we see a contrast with coumas, which assign higher prescription rates to some parts of northern Michigan while assigning the lowest rates to

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[5]https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html

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other parts of northern Michigan. In Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, we find similar patterns of non-trivial within-state measurement bias when state-level averages are used in place of coumas.

(a) County-Level Data

(b) Couma-Based Aggregation

(c) State-Based Aggregation

Figure 2: Geographic Variation in Prescription Rates

A more statistical way of examining the improved measurement of local prescription rates is displayed in Figure 3. Figure 3a shows that the distribution of prescription rates is much more uniform for counties than for states, with the distribution for coumas between the two. We can also look at mismeasurement directly if we consider counties to be the correct scale of measurement. Figure 3b shows mismeasurement of the prescription rates in nonidentified counties when they are assigned, instead of their true prescription rate, the average prescription rate in the couma or state to which they belong. Twenty percent more of the population in nonidentified counties is less than 0.4 standard deviations from the true county prescription rate when assigned the average

prescription rate of their couma rather than the average prescription rate of their state. In the density estimates in Figure 3b this is evident as a considerably larger mass of nonidentified counties (as measured in terms of population) within 0.4 standard deviations when measured at the couma level and a larger mass of nonidentified counties more than 0.4 standard deviations when measured at the state level.


(a) Prescription Rates by Geography   (b) Difference Relative to County Measure by Geography

Figure 3: Measurement of Prescription Rates at Different Scales

2.2 Measuring Local Labor Demand

A key challenge to identifying the effects of opioid availability on labor force outcomes is finding appropriate geographic controls that are able to properly account for time and geographically-varying economic factors without entirely absorbing the geographic variation in the prescription data.

2.2.1 Short-Term Shocks to the Local Labor Market

To assess local labor market shocks we use geographically and industrially consistent employment data on US counties derived from the US Census' County Business Patterns (CBP) data. CBP data draw on administrative records to estimate annual private nonfarm employment figures for all US counties disaggregated by detailed industry following the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). Unfortunately, many employment figures are suppressed in the CBP because they might reveal the operations of a single employer. However, in those cases the record is flagged and employment is put into ranges. Isserman and Westervelt (2006) document a process to overcome this suppression to provide consistent point estimates, based on the provided range information and adding up conditions that are applied geographically and industrially. The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research implements this approach to produce the Wholedata Establishment and Employment Database, which is our source for county-level employment data with three-digit NAICS coding.

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County-level employment figures would still reflect both labor demand and supply conditions, which would include any effects of opioids on the local labor market. To avoid this impact we follow the well-known shift-share approach used by Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) to isolate local labor demand shocks. Specifically, we follow Maggio and Kermani (2016) specification to define a demand shock based on the couma's initial industrial composition of employment interacted with national-level changes in employment in narrowly defined industries:

$$D_{jt} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \varphi_{j,k,\tau} \frac{\nu_{-j,k,t} - \nu_{-j,k,t-1}}{\nu_{-j,k,t-1}}, \tag{1}$$

where $\varphi_{j,k,\tau}$ is the employment share of industry k in couma j in the base year, 2006, and $\nu_{-j,k,t}$ is the national employment share of industry k excluding couma j in year t. This measure accounts for both business cycle fluctuation impacts on local employment (through differing industry effects) and specific industry-wide shocks, such as trade and technology changes, that are differentially experienced depending on the local industry mix.

Figure 4 shows a scatter plot by year of the Bartik local labor demand shock used in our analysis. The variation across places in any given year tends to go down over time. There was considerable variation in each year from 2006 to 2010, with the greatest variation in 2009. But from 2011 to 2015 the variation across space within a given year became quite low. One consequence of these patterns is that most of the shocks in the lowest 10 percent of shocks in our sample would be drawn from recession years.


Figure 4: Labor Demand Shocks

As Figure 4 shows, recessions and recoveries involve important dynamic local labor adjustments that are highly uneven. The labor market recession years of 2008 to 2010 show reliably low local labor market demand shocks, although at the onset of the recession many areas were still experiencing positive local labor demand growth. At the peak of the recession (2009 and 2010) all areas are experiencing negative local labor demand shocks, although 2009 has the largest range of demand

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shocks of any year. Some recovery years have relatively tight differences in local labor demand, but 2006 and 2016 stand out for the range of experiences across geographies. This variation in local labor market demand is a key reason why it is better to directly control for this important source of variation rather than just using dummy variables, which would only pick up the means for each year.

2.2.2 Persistent Geographic Patterns in Labor Markets

While the labor market outcomes we have in mind are the focus of both cyclical and trend analyses, geographic regions can also have persistently different labor market outcomes. Indeed, there could be a geographic component to the "cumulative disadvantage" of less-educated Americans that contributes to the rising mortality and morbidity found in Case and Deaton (2017). To directly account for this challenge we also include couma-level labor market statuses from the 2000 Census as an additional control and to help form comparison groups in another.[6] The 2000 labor market status should be relatively less impacted by opioid prescriptions.

2.3 Opioid Use

The Census and CDC data let us examine the geographic patterns in prescriptions and the labor market, but they contain limited information on the mechanisms underlying these patterns. When relevant, we turn to other data sets to examine individual-level drug use. The best measurement of drug use among civilians in the United States is the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH).[7] Since 2002 the NSDUH has gathered annual individual-level data on drug use by means of in-person interviews with a large national probability sample of the general civilian population age 12 and older in the United States. Every year, about 70,000 people from the US civilian, noninstitutionalized population age 12 and older are interviewed. The surveys are conducted by the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and use computer-assisted methods to provide respondents with a private and confidential means of responding to questions. Respondents are given $30 for participating in the NSDUH.

We measure opioid abuse as a respondent reporting nonmedical prescription pain reliever use or heroin use in the past 12 months.[8] We focus on abuse over the past 12 months rather than abuse over the past 30 days in the expectation that this longer time period should reduce measurement error, much as results in the literature on the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) in earnings show

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[6]County-level estimates from https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2000/dec/summary-file-3.html aggregated into our couma geography.

[7]While helpful for mechanisms, we do not use the version of these data that includes geographic identifiers. The main reason is that the geographically identified version of this data set is designed to be representative at the state level, but not below.

[8]The NSDUH questionnaire defines nonmedical use of a prescription drug as using a drug "that was not prescribed for you or that you took only for the experience or feeling it caused." Respondents are explicitly told that nonmedical use does not refer to "over-the-counter" drugs. We refer to the entire class of pain killers (analgesics) in the NSDUH survey as opioids, even though a very small share of such pain killers are nonopioids. See footnote 11 in Carpenter et al. (2017) for a discussion.

how transitory fluctuations can attenuate results when outcomes are measured over a short time horizon (Mazumder (2005)).[9] In addition to variables covering drug use in great detail, the NSDUH has the additional strength for our purposes of having information on demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes such as labor force participation, employment, and hours worked.

2.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample broken down by whether a couma is an identified county or a CPUMA. The first detail to notice is that low-population counties, which are consolidated into CPUMAs in our analysis, have opioid prescription rates that are nearly a full standard deviation higher than high-population identified counties. Another detail is that low-population areas tended to have slightly weaker economic performance as measured by their employment-to-population ratios or their labor force participation rates. Interestingly, average high- and low-population areas' labor market outcomes were more similar in 2000 than they were between 2006 and 2016.

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[9]The time horizons over which the NSDUH asks respondents about drug use are ever, in the past year, and in the past month. Previous literature has shown that estimates can be sensitive to the reference period used (Carpenter et al. (2017)).

Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics

	All Geography		Identified Counties		CPUMAs	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Rx Rate	78	29	68	25	90	29
LOG Rx Rate	4.29	0.38	4.16	0.37	4.45	0.33
Emp/Pop	0.59	0.49	0.60	0.49	0.58	0.49
Participation	0.64	0.48	0.65	0.48	0.63	0.48
Unemp/Pop	0.051	0.219	0.053	0.224	0.047	0.212
Demand Shock	0.007	0.025	0.008	0.024	0.006	0.025
Emp/Pop 2000	0.76	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.76	0.05
Participation 2000	0.80	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.05
Unemp/Pop 2000	0.044	0.017	0.046	0.019	0.042	0.013
Manuf. Share	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.04
Age	46	19	45	19	46	19
Male	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50
Less than HS	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36
High School	0.36	0.48	0.34	0.47	0.40	0.49
Some College	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42
College Grad.	0.25	0.44	0.28	0.45	0.22	0.42
White	0.75	0.43	0.70	0.46	0.82	0.38
Married	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.50

Note: The prescription (Rx) rate is the number of retail opioid prescriptions per 100 residents. The sample is for the years 2006-2016 and is a combination of data from the IPUMS-USA 1% sample of the ACS and the CDC's annual county-level prescription data.

3   Empirical Specifications

Conceptually, the experiment that we are interested in observing is how individuals' labor market outcomes respond to randomly-assigned levels of opioid prescriptions in their area. Because we do not observe this experiment, we are instead faced with the options of searching for quasi-random variation in prescription rates or else trying to control for confounders, or common causes, of local prescription rates and individuals' labor market outcomes. Since we are interested in understanding the magnitude of the effect of opioids on labor market outcomes at a national scale, we take the latter approach.

Our approach follows individuals' labor market outcomes as they respond to the conditions in their area in terms of both the level of prescription opioids and evolving labor market conditions. The equations we estimate are all a form of a linear probability model on an individual i's labor force status in couma j at time t, Y_{ijt}, based on a combination of the natural log of the opioid prescription rate in the individual's couma, P_{jt}, a function of the current local economic conditions (LECs) facing the individual, $f(LEC_{jt})$, individual characteristics observed at time t, X_{it}, and a term to represent any unobserved factors, ϵ_{it}:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha P_{jt} + f(LEC_{jt}) + \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \tag{2}$$

While this specification is similar to the specifications used in Krueger (2017), our individual-level labor market and county-level prescription data allow us to estimate regressions on an annual frequency. This improves on the timing in Krueger (2017), which is based on two periods of three-year pooled CPS data (1999-2001 and 2014-2016) and county-level data from 2015 on opioid prescription rates converted to morphine milligram equivalents (MMEs). This leaves the proper lag structure unclear, but prescription opioid rates are highly correlated over time (the correlation within two-year windows is always greater than 0.96). This indicates that the exact lag structure should result in only minor estimation differences so we use contemporaneous log prescriptions rates. Our data allow us to run panel regressions on individuals' labor force status from 2006 to 2016 with CDC data on average prescriptions per person in 648 coumas. We run all regressions separately for men and women, given prior evidence of differences in labor market attachment and differential impacts of opioid prescriptions.

LECs are almost certainly the most important confounding variable of local opioid prescription rates and an individual's labor market outcomes, so we consider three approaches to controlling for this potential confounder.[10] We also include a rich set of individual-level demographic controls: a four-term exponential expansion of age, level of education dummy variables, race dummy variables, and marital status. The samples in each local area are reasonably large, but in any even given period might over- or under-represent demographic groups that could impact the measured labor market performance of the location. Summing the dependent variables within geographies can generate average labor market values (employment-to-population ratio when Y is 1/0 in employment, labor force participation when Y is 1/0 in participation, and unemployment-to-population when Y is 1/0 in unemployment) for area j. Equivalent models could be estimated using average labor market outcomes if the individual characteristics could be controlled for or were assumed to be unchanged.

We start by using the panel structure of our data along with linearity and separability assumptions to account for this term using fixed effects. In this case,

$$f(LEC_{jt}) = \gamma_j + \delta_t. \tag{3}$$

With both a time and geographic fixed effect, this creates a difference-in-differences specification where the parameter α is identified based on how the difference-in-differences in labor market outcomes across locations relate to their difference-in-differences in prescription rates.[11] This model is well identified when t is large so that the measured differences in LECs across time can be substantial.

Our second approach is to use specific controls that directly measure LEC_{jt}. This alternative focuses controls for both cyclical and long-term economic conditions. The cyclical control, D_{jt}, is

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[10]Each of these models represents an extension of the specification used in Krueger (2017) that is possible due to our use of panel data.

[11]Related discussions can be found in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Angrist and Pischke (2009).

a Bartik measure of local impacts of national economic changes that is observable in each location over time. Average labor market outcomes in the location in a time prior to most of the growth in opioid prescriptions, $\overline{Y}_{j,2000}$ is a simple, and highly effective, approach to measuring the effects of long-term economic differences. In addition, we still include time effects and a location fixed effect, at a level of aggregation k above j, yielding:

$$f(LEC_{jt}) = \eta D_{jt} + \theta \overline{Y}_{j,2000} + \gamma_k + \delta_t. \tag{4}$$

This approach maintains panel elements to account for unobserved sources of variation, but allows some of the variation between places to identify opioid effects once the cyclical and long-term differences are accounted for.

Our third approach is to flexibly account for unobserved differences in the labor markets of coumas by creating a comparison group based on similar performance before the large-scale introduction of opioid prescriptions. $\widehat{Y}_{gt}$ is an evolving average level of labor market outcomes based on the location's decile of labor market outcomes by sex and whether it is an identified county in 2000 (g). We also account for the local cyclical labor market variable and the fixed effects used in Equation 4. In this case,

$$f(LEC_{jt}) = \eta D_{jt} + \theta \widehat{Y}_{gt} + \gamma_k + \delta_t. \tag{5}$$

This specification has the advantages of Equation 4, but allows for historically weak/strong labor markets to have better/worse labor market developments over the sample period.

4   Estimation Results

Prime-age individuals (ages 24 to 54) can be sorted into three mutually exclusive labor market statuses: out of the labor force, employed, or unemployed. Running population-weighted linear probability models of status produces demographically adjusted estimates of the labor force participation rate, the employment-to-population ratio, and the unemployment-to-population ratio for areas, and the marginal changes associated with the regressors on these rates.

4.1   Difference-in-Differences Estimates

Table 2 shows the results of these regressions for prime-age men and women using the difference-in-differences specification that is widely used in the literature. For these estimates we rely on year fixed effects to absorb the business cycle and other general time patterns in participation. The couma-level fixed effects pick up the average local differences in the period, leaving the coefficient on prescription rates to be identified by the time variation in localities.

For both prime-age men and women, the number of opioid prescriptions in their geographic area is associated with a lower probability of labor force participation and a lower employment rate with a high level of statistical significance. The results for the employment-to-population ratio and labor force participation are similar to the participation effects. Statistically weak unemployment

effects (that suggest increased employment) combined with statistically stronger participation effects indicate that opioid prescription levels appear to primarily affect labor markets through the individual's labor market participation decision. These estimates, which end up representing the lower bound on the magnitude of our estimated effects, are statistically significant and indicate that opioid prescription rates have economically relevant impacts on labor market outcomes. The difference in predicted participation rates between high and low prescription areas (about 1 log point) is a 1.5 percentage point difference for men and 1.9 for women. Given the results of Krueger (2017), one surprising feature of Table 2 is that estimates are lower for prime-age men than for women.

Table 2: Labor Market States of Prime-Age Men and Women, Panel Controls

	Men			Women		
	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop
Prescrip. Rate	-0.015***	-0.010*	-0.005	-0.019***	-0.015***	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Age	0.067***	0.090***	-0.023**	0.080***	0.084***	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Age squared	-0.278***	-0.352***	0.073*	-0.397***	-0.405***	0.008
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.027)
Age cubed	0.051***	0.061***	-0.010	0.084***	0.084***	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Age to 4th	-0.004***	-0.004***	0.001	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Less than HS	-0.190***	-0.239***	0.049***	-0.320***	-0.363***	0.044***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
High School	-0.078***	-0.115***	0.037***	-0.130***	-0.161***	0.030***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Some College	-0.034***	-0.053***	0.019***	-0.053***	-0.072***	0.018***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
White	0.025***	0.028***	-0.003***	0.025***	0.031***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Black	-0.069***	-0.096***	0.027***	0.051***	0.026***	0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Hispanic	0.055***	0.067***	-0.011***	0.017***	0.016***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.115***	0.151***	-0.036***	-0.080***	-0.058***	-0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)
R-sqr	0.10	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
N	6440267	6440267	6440267	6655308	6655308	6655308

All regressions include year and couma fixed effects. Robust standard errors with clustering on couma x year.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The other coefficient estimates shown in Table 2 indicate, at least when the model is estimated in this multilevel approach, that demographic factors should be accounted for. If the regression

were estimated as a panel of geographic averages, many of these demographic differences would likely average out, but the highly significant coefficients raise the possibility that sampling variation by demographic group within small geographic areas could make the estimation less efficient. Demographic controls are included in all of our analyses, but to aid readability of the tables, we exclude these coefficients in the remaining tables.

While the difference-in-differences estimator controls for a wide variety of potential confounding factors, it does narrow the range of variation used to identify effects. In addition, we use a limited sample of years and both labor force status and drug use are known to be persistent. These problems suggest looking for additional identifying variation from the cross-section. Table 3 shows results for the same specification, Equation 2, for labor force participation regressions, with no additional controls, when the fixed effects are at a higher level of aggregation. When at the state level, this allows differences in prescription rates within the state to identify effects. At the Census division level, cross-state differences are also generally relevant.

Table 3: Participation of Prime-Age Men and Women, Varying Fixed Effects

	Men			Women		
	Census Division	State	Couma	Census Division	State	Couma
Prescrip. Rate	-0.041***	-0.050***	-0.015***	-0.010***	-0.006**	-0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
R-sqr	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.06
N	6440267	6440267	6440267	6655308	6655308	6655308

All regressions include demographic variables and year fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on couma x year.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3 indicates that the results are sensitive to the level of fixed effects used in the regression. Notably, the coefficient estimates become more negative for men with more aggregated fixed effects and fall somewhat for women. While it could be argued that state legal codes are a good reason to have fixed effects at the state level, we treat Table 3 primarily as evidence that pursuing alternative control group strategies could yield substantially different results.

4.2   Specific Cyclical and Local Labor Market Controls

For a specific control strategy to be effective it must control for factors that are both consequential sources of variation in the difference-in-differences model while allowing some cross-sectional variation absorbed by fixed effects to be used in identification. The controls that we add are a measure of cyclical demand (Bartik shocks) and a measure of the longer-run performance of the the local labor market (2000 Census labor prime-age labor force statistics). Importantly, both of these factors vary across coumas, so that if these were the factors that we aimed to account for with the couma fixed effects, then we could look to a higher aggregation of regional fixed effects.

Relative to the difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2, in the specific control specification

estimates in Table 4, the effects on the labor force participation rate and the employment to population ratio are substantially larger for men. For example, participation effects are estimated at -0.046 in this model versus -0.015 in the difference-in-differences model. The change in coefficients for the male employment to population ratio is even larger as unemployment effects have switched signs and are now statistically significant, indicating that higher opioid prescriptions are associated with both higher out of the labor force and higher unemployed populations for prime-age men.

In contrast, the female labor market status regressions are less changed from the difference-in-differences model results. This leaves the effect estimates approximately three times larger for men than for women (-0.046 versus -0.015, for participation). As with men, the coefficient on unemployment swings to the positive (but statistically insignificant), which implies unemployment effects bolstering participation for larger overall employment effects.

Table 4: Labor Market States of Prime-Age Men and Women, Specific Controls

	Men Participate	Men Emp/Pop	Men Unem/Pop	Women Participate	Women Emp/Pop	Women Unem/Pop
Prescrip. Rate	-0.046***	-0.049***	0.004**	-0.015***	-0.017***	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Demand Shock	0.309**	0.606***	-0.251***	-0.346**	-0.102	-0.199***
	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.068)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.057)
2000 Particip.	0.593***			0.450***		
	(0.044)			(0.027)		
2000 Emp/Pop		0.519***			0.396***	
		(0.034)			(0.023)	
2000 Unem/Pop			0.292***			0.188***
			(0.032)			(0.029)
R-sqr	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
N	6410469	6410469	6410469	6625455	6625455	6625455

All regressions include demographic variables, year, and Census division fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on coumas.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The second row of Table 4 shows that the local labor market demand shock variable is a highly significant factor for prime-age men's labor market status. Notably, men's employment rates are substantially affected by the demand shocks in a pro-cyclical pattern: A negative labor demand shock (such as a recession) reduces employment both through lower labor force participation and higher unemployment. In contrast, women's employment rates are not strongly correlated with the Bartik-style demand shocks, because both participation and unemployment rates tend to increase with a negative labor demand shock, resulting in offsetting movements. In the period we are considering, this could reflect the higher attachment of men to manufacturing and construction, which were nationally impacted, combined with family-level labor supply responses to the shock. While we do not observe the household-level motivations, the highly significant statistical patterns by sex make local demand conditions an important source of variation to be controlled for directly,

rather than assuming that time or location fixed effects will absorb these sources of variation.

The third through fifth rows of Table 4 show that long-standing local economic conditions are another key predictive variable for individuals' labor market status. As noted earlier, we measure the long-term labor market effects based on a couma's 2000 Census value of the relevant labor market statistics. The positive, statistically significant coefficients indicate that on average individuals in places with a better labor market in 2000 are relatively better off during our sample period. The coefficients are all positive, but the tightness of the relationship is the lowest for the unemployment rate, even when recent labor demand shocks are accounted for. This is consistent with regional differences in unemployment rates converging relatively quickly, while participation decisions are relatively persistent.

Despite the change from Krueger (2017) use of a cross-sectional model to annual panel data and the inclusion of additional controls, the results in Table 4 are similar to those in Krueger (2017) in the sign and in the pattern of generally stronger effects for men than for women. Given the Krueger (2017) strategy of estimating over two three-year periods, the most relevant comparison of his results to ours would be the combination of his "Log Opioids per Capita" and "Log Opioids x Period 2" coefficients. Combining these coefficients from Krueger (2017), Table 13, column 6 regressions, which are most similar to our regressions, his results indicate a somewhat smaller effect on participation from a log-point increase in MME of about -0.02 for prime-age men and -0.004 for prime-age women. This latter result (for women) combines a positive impact on labor force participation in the early period with a -0.014 effect of log opioids in the second period. While the opioid prescription variables are different, which makes the coefficient comparisons less direct, these specific-control results are qualitatively consistent. We will compare the full set of our results to Krueger's in Section 6.

4.3 A Less Restrictive Local Labor Market Comparison Group

These regressions can also be thought of as forming an artificial control group following Angrist and Pischke (2009). Implicitly the regressions in Table 4 use the 2000 labor market state of the location as a comparison group, once the other controls are accounted for. Given the importance of these 2000 controls, it is helpful to examine a more flexible control group, which can account for labor market developments shared among similar labor markets over the sample period.

Specifically, we assign each couma to groups based on deciles of their 2000 labor market outcomes. This process is done separately for men and women and for identified counties and counties that are part of a PUMA. We then use the the demographically adjusted labor market status of that group over time as a control in the regressions.[12] This new control accounts for how similarly positioned (in 2000) labor markets have fared. This could potentially include the effects of rising opioid prescription exposure in these groups, but the level of opioid prescription rates varies substantially across 2000 labor market performance levels. The advantage of this strategy is that

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[12]Regressions on labor market outcomes with the demographic controls from Table 2 are used to generate predicted labor market outcomes for an average demographic composition in each group over time.

it can account for shifts in the distribution of relative labor market performance across areas over time that might be the result of confounding variation not accounted for with the specific controls specification. For example, the split between identified counties and counties included in a PUMA would let a broad differential in the performance of rural versus metro areas from 2006 to 2016 to be picked up by the control.

Table 5: Labor Market States of Prime-Age Men and Women, Comparison Group

	Men Participate	Men Emp/Pop	Men Unem/Pop	Women Participate	Women Emp/Pop	Women Unem/Pop
Prescrip. Rate	-0.027***	-0.029***	0.004***	-0.015***	-0.012**	0.003**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Demand Shock	0.175*	0.511***	-0.319***	-0.057	-0.037	-0.210***
	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.138)	(0.048)
LR Particip.	0.917***			0.914***		
	(0.061)			(0.035)		
LR Emp/Pop		0.941***			0.843***	
		(0.060)			(0.066)	
LR Unem/Pop			0.922***			0.950***
			(0.086)			(0.095)
R-sqr	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
N	6424995	6424995	6424995	6641288	6641288	6641288

All regressions include demographic variables, year, and Census division fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on coumas.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The more flexible comparison group approach results in coefficient changes that are larger for the prime-age male regressions than for prime-age female regressions. The coefficients on opioid prescriptions for prime-age men are roughly a third smaller but still statistically significant. Estimated responses to demand shocks are similar in pattern but again smaller, which likely reflects some of the labor market performance differences being picked up by the changes in the comparison groups. Finally, the LR market status coefficient estimates move closer to one, indicating that the relative performance of the labor market performance distribution has evolved similarly. Altering the implicit control group clearly alters results but still indicates that higher opioid prescription rates are associated with weaker labor market performance.

4.4 Non-nested Model Comparisons with Akaike Information

The three models we have estimated are tightly related, but they are not formally nested. We use Akike information to measure the role of the predictive factors in the alternative models of labor force participation. Specifically, we consider the incremental gain in Akaike information stemming from the addition of groups of controls:

$$\Delta AIC(X_2, X_1) = -2\ln(L|X_2) + k_2 - (2\ln(L|X_1) + k_1), \tag{6}$$

where $\ln(L|X_2)$ represents the log likelihood of model 2 with X_2 data in the model and k_2 number of parameters compared to nested model 1, which must have fewer parameters. This formula is designed for nested models but it also yields informative comparisons across models when the included data sample is the same.

Clearly this measure is order dependent. In each case, we remove the demographic variation before the figure is plotted, because in our multilevel estimation strategy the demographic variables are large explanatory variables at the individual level, even though they are not the focus of the analysis. We then add time-varying factors (specific and then general) and then local labor market factors (specific and then general from most aggregated to least), before finally adding the prescription rate variable. This in no way invalidates or alters the significance tests in the individual regressions, but it can help clarify factors identifying variation in the models.


Figure 5: Role of Explanatory Variables in the Alternative Models

Figure 5 shows the analysis of the three models for female labor force participation. Starting with the difference-in-differences model, it is clearly evident that the variation picked up by the year fixed effects is far smaller than the cross-sectional variation identified by Census divisions, states and coumas. This is despite the fact that the sample period included a large recession and recovery.

In the other two models, this variation is largely picked up by the combination of the Bartik demand shock and the year fixed effects, although that combination accounts for more Akaike information because it includes some cross-sectional variation.

The limited impact of time variation leads us to focus on models that can identify more-specific forms of cross-sectional variation. While the 2000 prime-age labor force participation rate is just a single added variable in the specific controls model, it still absorbs a substantial fraction of the variance accounted for by the far more numerous fixed effects in the difference-in-difference model. Allowing the labor force participation rate to evolve with a related comparison group expands the information increment associated with the local labor market factor, but other patterns are similar. In our view this is a strong indication that pre-opioid labor market performance is a critical control that explains much of the persistence differences between places.

Prescriptions are added last and the explained variation is more limited due the inclusion of prior variables, but the increment in the AIC still varies between the models shown in Figure 5. The identified coefficients are quite similar for women across the three models: ranging form -0.015 to -0.019. Despite this agreement in the coefficient estimates, the AIC value for the difference-in-differences model is particularly small, reflecting the limited variation in prescription rates across coumas.

It is reassuring that the identification restrictions of the difference-in-difference model still imply a similar coefficient for women but the other two models' identification restrictions seem to absorb important differences in coumas without absorbing all of the differences picked up by couma-level fixed effects. From a simple Akaike information perspective, the difference-in -differences model would be preferred, but the other models offer more clarity on the specific comparisons that are being made while still explaining significant sources of confounding variation.[13]

4.5   Estimates for Detailed Demographic Groups

Given the number of observations available in the ACS in each couma, it is possible to explore the effects of opioid prescription rates on more narrowly defined subsamples of the population. The influential results in Case and Deaton (2015) and Case and Deaton (2017) suggest exploring effects by subgroups of sex, education level, and race/ethnicity. For our purposes we examine eight subgroups by splitting the sample by gender (men and women), non-Hispanic whites (white) and minorities including Hispanics (nonwhite), as well as holding a BA versus some college or lower.

Figure 6 shows the estimated coefficients for the demographic groups in each of the models, along with the associated 95 percent confidence intervals. For men without a college degree, the effect of opioid prescription rates on the labor force participation rate is larger in magnitude than for those with a college degree (see the correlations in the upper half of Figure 6).[14] The coefficient

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[13]The same qualitative features are evident in the same decomposition for males, but for brevity that figure is placed in the appendix.

[14]These categories follow Case and Deaton (2015). We also examined other possible splits and found that measured outcomes for individuals with some college were more similar to those of high school graduates than to those of college graduates.

Figure 6: Labor Force Participation Effects by Demographic Groups

for white prime-age men with less than a BA is about seven times higher than the equivalent coefficient for white prime-age men with a BA.

The magnitude of the coefficient for nonwhite men without a college degree is even larger than the coefficient for white men without a BA. These results show that there are quite large effects for relatively disadvantaged men along the lines suggested in Case and Deaton (2015) and Case and Deaton (2017), even if the mechanism is not identified in this exercise. It is worth emphasizing that this effect is on top of the generally lower participation rate expected for the group of less-educated men, which predated the growth of opioid prescriptions. That effect is accounted for in the other controls.

Another point worth emphasizing is that while Case and Deaton (2015) focus attention on white households, our results are just as troubling for nonwhite prime-age men. The coefficient for nonwhite men with less than a BA is a startling -0.101, larger than the -0.070 experienced for less-educated white men, although the difference is not quite statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Reinforcing the pattern, nonwhite men with a BA also experience a larger likelihood of not being employed in higher opioid prescription areas than their white counterparts

(-0.045 versus -0.021). By our measures it is hard to argue that white prime-age men are more vulnerable to opioids than their minority counterparts.

The lower half of Figure 6 repeats this analysis for groups of prime-age women. For white women with a BA, in contrast to other demographic groups, there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient on being in a higher opioid prescription couma, similar to Currie et al. (2019). Nonwhite women with a BA have a slightly lower and statistically insignificant expected participation rate in higher opioid prescription areas. For both white and nonwhite women without a BA, however, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant, although much smaller than the equivalent male demographic group. While most of the coefficients on log prescription rates continue to be statistically significant for key demographic splits of prime-age women, the coefficients reported here are generally less than half the magnitude of the coefficients for equivalent male populations.

In our analysis, we observe the effects of being location with a in a higher opioid prescription rate rather than whether an individual received a prescription. This could be an advantage given the documented patterns of prescription opioids being consumed by individuals in the local area other than the individual receiving the prescription (Powell et al. (2015)). On the other hand, our specification does prevent understanding the direct impacts of prescriptions along the lines of Laird and Nielsen (2016) or Barnett et al. (2017), and there could easily be demographic usage differences within a geographic location. We can, however, examine both the reported usage rates by demographic group from the NSDUH and the relative exposure of demographic groups through their residences within our sample.

Figure 7 shows opioid misuse or heroin use reported in the NSDUH for prime-age (24-49) adults by demographic characteristics over time. The gap in abuse rates across race/ethnicity is larger than the gap across sex and on par with the gap in abuse rates across educational attainment. Considerably lower abuse rates among nonwhite men help to explain why Case and Deaton (2015) focus on the white population to the extent that abuse differences are associated with related mortality differences, a result that may seem at odds with our large estimated labor market effects on nonwhite men.

Is there any way to reconcile our findings for minority men? Our findings are especially puzzling since one might reasonably assume that the effects of availability on employment at some point must pass through abuse. The answer is that yes, these seemingly contradictory results can be explained through differential exposure to local prescription rates. Figure 8a shows that nonwhites are exposed to much lower local prescription rates than their white counterparts. The median white prescription rate is the 73rd percentile of the nonwhite distribution. This compares with relatively similar exposure rates by education and sex.

Figure 7: Abuse by Demographic Groups

(a) White/Non-White   (b) BA/no BA   (c) Men/Women

Figure 8: Local Prescription Rates by Demographic Group

Interestingly, a public health review of the literature on pain treatment and race identified a substantial gap in the prescribing rates of opioids for minorities with symptoms equivalent to those of their white counterparts (Shavers et al. (2010)). This suggests that it could further be the case that minorities are less exposed to opioids even within geographic areas.

4.6 Specific Geographies

Informed scrutiny of the maps in Figure 2 and media accounts of the opioid crisis suggest possible geographic patterns to explore: rural counties, Appalachian counties, and perhaps the Rust Belt region. In each case, it has been argued that persistently bad economic outcomes might underlie the opioid crisis. To investigate whether these specific, defined regions are critical to the interpretation of our results, we ran regressions with interactions on the prescription coefficient to each specified geography. For Appalachian counties we use those listed by the Appalachian

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Regional Commission (ARC).[15] The Rust Belt counties are the counties identified by Schweitzer (2017) as being in the "Industrial Heartland" in 1969. Figure 9 provides a map with the specific boundaries of these regions. The regressions maintain the controls used in prior regressions in order to highlight the particular response of the prescription coefficients to these two interactions.


Figure 9: Appalachian Regional Commission and Rust Belt Counties

The primary coefficients on opioid prescriptions are all still statistically significant for both men and women, although in several cases a bit smaller than was seen in Table 4. The interactions are generally smaller but in several cases statistically significant, indicating that there are some persistent patterns occurring within these geographies. The regressions indicate that low-population regions (represented by the CPUMA interaction) see a larger reduction in male participation rates but a modestly (and statistically insignificant) higher female participation rate than in the higher-population identified counties. Appalachian coumas included in the ARC list of counties also saw a larger effect for both men and women in higher prescription counties. Finally, the coefficients for Rust Belt coumas show a smaller effect on men and a larger effect on women in Industrial Heartland counties. While there are modestly larger impacts in some of these geographies, these regressions demonstrate that the correlation between prescription rates and labor market outcomes is not dependent on the inclusion of these challenged geographies.

4.7 Time Effects and the Implications of Increasing Illegal Opioid Usage after 2010

OxyContin was reformulated in 2010 to make it less prone to abuse. Evans et al. (2019) and Alpert et al. (2018) have documented that this reformulation was associated with a rise in heroin deaths that was attributed to consumers substituting heroin as an inexpensive alternative to OxyContin. In addition, mortality data show a sharp rise in deaths involving illicit opioids after 2010 (Ruhm (2018). If prescription opioids were less frequently abused after 2010, this could lead

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[15]https://www.arc.gov/appalachian_region/countiesinappalachia.asp

Table 6: Labor Force Regressions with Geographic Interactions

	CPUMA		Appalachia		Industrial Heartland	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Prescrip. Rate	-0.038***	-0.017***	-0.044***	-0.014***	-0.047***	-0.014***
CPUMA*Prescrip	-0.004***	0.001				
ARC*Prescrip			-0.002*	-0.002**		
IH*Prescrip					0.003*	-0.003***
Demand Shock	0.045	-0.309**	0.268*	-0.381***	0.254*	-0.279**
2000 LFPR	0.573***	0.452***	0.586***	0.442***	0.595***	0.447***
R-sqr	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.06
N	6424995	6641288	6424995	6641288	6424995	6641288

All regressions include demographic variables, year, and Census division fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on coumas.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

our estimates to understate the strength of the relationship pre-2010 and overstate the relationship post-2010.

By design our panel regression models all include time dummies to absorb the large cyclical pattern in labor market states associated with the Great Recession and the recovery. These time dummies will also absorb the national average response to opioid prescriptions and any national turn from opioid prescriptions to illegal opioids. That said, evidence of the changing impact of prescriptions after 2010 could still be identified in cross-sectional differences in the couma-level labor market outcomes associated with the levels of prescriptions before and after 2010 (after controlling for economic conditions). In order to assess whether coefficients have shown a time pattern, we run variants of the specific control and the comparison group models as a sequence of cross-sectional regressions.[16]

$$Y_{ijT} = \alpha P_{jT} + f(LEC_{jT}) + \beta X_{iT} + \epsilon_i, \text{ for each possible year } T \tag{7}$$

Of course, $f(LEC_{jT})$ can no longer include fixed effects on years, which eliminates the difference-in-differences model.

Applying a panel regression as in Table 4 does increase the available variation for identification while imposing constant coefficients over time. Figure 10 shows the results of these sequential regressions for prime-age male labor force participation.

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[16]In our view, it does not make sense to consider the difference-in-difference model because its only cyclical controls are the time effects.

Figure 10: Coefficient Estimates from Sequential Models: Male

First is worth noting that the coefficient estimates of the sequential models are on average very similar to the panel model results in Tables 4 and 5, but with larger confidence intervals. Next it is immediately evident that cross-sectional variation in the post-2010 years for labor market performance continues to be strongly correlated with prescription rates. This could reflect the tendency for illegal opioid problems to be higher in places that already had higher levels of prescriptions, but this question deserves considerably more analysis than we can do with our data given the growing prominence of illegal opioids in the mortality data; see Ruhm (2016).


Figure 11: Coefficient Estimates from Sequential Models: Male

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The same analysis is repeated for women in Figure 11 with both of the conclusions from the men's analysis repeated: Similar coefficient estimates with wider confidence bands and effects get modestly stronger in later years. The one additional conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there may be some cyclical effects showing up in the sequential results, notably in the larger negative coefficient for 2009. This is the worst year for labor force participation, and female participation is more cyclical than male participation. This is another reason to favor the panel estimates, even though this approach does not allow for an easy way of assessing whether the estimated effects of opioid prescriptions are declining in recent years. For both sexes and both models the expected effect of opioid prescriptions is modestly larger after 2010.

5   Evidence on Causality

What differentiates our analysis from those already in the literature is our population, our timeline, and our ability to investigate alternative causal mechanisms. Our approach broadens those already in the literature by generating a data set that improves measurement, covers a longer time horizon, and represents the full US population. In addition, our analysis is able to control for important alternative causes that could drive the correlation between prescription rates and labor market outcomes. That said, we first want to recognize the growing literature working on identifying a causal connection.

5.1   Evidence in the Literature

A growing number of papers have found a large, negative effect of opioid prescriptions on labor market outcomes. These studies have used quasi-random variation for US subpopulations over short time horizons. When used as a source of identifying variation, the location of pill mills (Harris et al. (2019)), moves to new physicians (Laird and Nielsen (2016)), and the timing of state-level opioid laws (Deiana and Giua (2018)) have all provided evidence that increasing local prescription rates decreases participation. Likewise, variation in prescribing behavior across care providers has provided evidence that the duration of disability following an injury increases when long-term opioid treatment is prescribed (Savych et al. (2018)).

The mechanisms creating these labor market effects have also been documented: Increasing the local opioid prescription rate generates diversions to nonmedical uses (Powell et al. (2015)), and increasing the local prescription abuse rate increases an individual's likelihood of abusing prescription opioids (Finkelstein et al. (2018)).[17] At the individual level, increasing a physician's opioid prescribing rate increases the long-term opioid use of their patients (Barnett et al. (2017)).[18]

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[17]In addition to the evidence related to the reformulation of OxyContin cited earlier, there is also evidence on the relationship between the abuse of legal and illegal opioids. The majority of heroin users today are typically found to have abused prescription opioids before ever using heroin (Compton et al. (2016)), a reverse of the ordering of abuse from the 1960s (Cicero et al. (2014)).

[18]Barnett et al. (2017) document wide variation in rates of opioid prescribing among physicians practicing within the same emergency department. They use this within-hospital variation as their identifying variation.

In the opposing causal direction, both "poisoning deaths," which in recent data are dominated by drug overdoses, and the intensity of clinical disorders associated with opioid abuse have been found to be mildly countercyclical in the US (Ruhm (2015), Carpenter et al. (2017)). Similarly, Hollingsworth et al. (2017) find that short-term fluctuations in the local unemployment rate increase opioid abuse and deaths from opioids, while Charles et al. (2018) show that declining local manufacturing employment is associated with increased local opioid abuse. Together, these results suggest a potential increase in drug use in recessions and after labor demand shocks.

Other research discounts the purely economic motivations for opioid abuse. Glei and Weinstein (2019) observe that drug abuse may be related to perceived economic distress that is not captured by headline statistics. Ruhm (2019) finds that drug death rates increased more in places experiencing relative economic decline than in places with more robust economic growth, but he attributes this weak relationship to confounding factors related to the demographic composition of places. The lack of social capital (Zoorob and Salemi (2017)) and social determinants of health (physical and psychological trauma, concentrated disadvantage, isolation, and hopelessness) have also been linked as root causes to drug and opioid abuse (Dasgupta et al. (2018)).

5.2   Reverse Causality: The Impact of Unemployment Shocks on Opioid Use

During our sample period, the easiest alternative explanation for the strong correlation between opioid prescriptions and lower labor force outcomes is simple reverse causality: Poor labor market outcomes might drive opioid misuse. While we cannot directly assess this possibility in terms of prescription rates and labor market statuses, we can look at the relationship between labor market outcomes and opioid misuse in the NSDUH, especially just before and after the onset of the Great Recession. From the perspective of opioid research, the Great Recession is a large source of exogenous variation. While there was a large change in labor market outcomes over the course of the Great Recession, this was not accompanied by any discernible increase in the rate of opioid misuse. If we look in terms of linear trends as in Figure 12, we might even conclude that the Great Recession caused an inflection point that decreased opioid misuse.

We interpret these time series patterns in the data to be evidence against the role of reverse causality driving our estimation results, at least in terms of short-term economic conditions. Much like Case and Deaton (2017), who found that short-term economic conditions do not seem to explain the secular increase in mortality among midlife non-Hispanic whites in the US, we suspect that any labor market impacts on the share of the population abusing opioids would need to be long term in nature.

(a) Unemployed (b) Opioid Misuse or Heroin Use

Figure 12: Labor Market Outcomes and Opioid Use over Time

5.3 Local Economic Conditions and Causal Paths

The simplest path to reverse causality would be that prescriptions simply flowed more frequently into depressed labor markets. The medical literature and Krueger (2017) both suggest a surprising degree of randomness in prescription frequencies across the United States. Usefully, we have direct evidence in the form of the cross-sectional variation between 2000 prime-age labor market participation rates and early opioid prescription rates. Figure 13 offers some immediate conclusions on the association between labor market status in 2000 and prescription rates. First, there are both high and low prescription rate places in at least the first four quintiles. So we would have to be concerned if our identification of prescription effects was overly reliant on the fifth quintile. Second, a simple regression line (shown in red) shows a near-zero upward slope of prescription rates to improving participation rates, with a low correlation of 0.05. Third, the remarkable range in prime-age participation rates (from 56.9 to 89.9 percent) is largely a result of weaker performing places, as 60 percent of coumas have participation rates between 76.1 and 83.2 percent. Overall, there does seem to be substantial variation in prescription rates across places that is not associated with the relative performance of their labor markets prior to the opioid crisis.

A more subtle alternative explanation for a noncausal interpretation of our results is that there might be a common cause of local labor market conditions and local opioid availability. This concern is especially salient because some areas with notably poor local labor market conditions tend to also have higher prescription rates (Appalachia, for example) than areas with good local labor market conditions.

The directed acyclic graph (DAG) in Figure 14 helps to illustrate this concern. The issue of a common cause is that the same unobserved local factors U_j that drive economic performance might also drive local prescription rates. Alternatively, individuals with "low" unobservables U_i with respect to their labor market outcomes Y_i might choose to reside in locations with poor local labor market conditions LEC_j and high prescription rates P_j.

Figure 13: Association between 2000 LFPR and 2007 Prescription Rates

Throughout our analysis we have directly controlled for LECs (LEC_j) that influence labor market outcomes in the coumas. We have also partially controlled for individuals' geographic sorting by controlling for a rich set of demographic variables. Since these earlier specifications might have relied too heavily on a linearity assumption (Imbens (2015)), here we examine more flexible controls for long-term economic conditions and short-term labor market shocks. To be concrete, we allow the coefficient on opioid prescription rates to vary with the prior economic conditions of the place.

$U \equiv$ Unobserved Characteristics
in Location j or of Individual i
$X \equiv$ Observed Characteristics
of Individual i
$LEC \equiv$ Local Economic Conditions
in Location j
$P \equiv$ Prescription Rate
in Location j
$Y \equiv$ Labor Market Outcome
of Individual i
$O \equiv$ Opioid Use

Figure 14: Directed Acyclic Graph of Opioids Affecting Labor Force Participation
Note: This figure follows the convention from Pearl (2009) of communicating that a variable is observed by drawing a solid line to its descendants and communicating that a variable is unobserved by drawing a dashed line to its descendants.

Specifically, we estimate the coefficients on prescription rates separately for areas depending on their position in the distribution of initial labor market conditions, LEC_{j0}, as measured by the labor force participation rate in 2000. The specifications are unchanged from those described in Section 3, but constrained to only include observations in a given quintile. If the observed correlation between prescription rates were being primarily driven by individual selection on unobservables U_i or some common local factor U_j that our previous specification did not adequately control for, then we would expect to see near zero coefficient estimates within the quintiles based on their local labor market conditions. In contrast, if the pattern is driven by variation in prescription practices (exposure) independent of initial economic conditions, then the estimated coefficients should be similar to the panel results shown in Tables 2 to 5. For this comparison we again limit ourselves to labor force participation.


Figure 15: Coefficeint Estimates by Quintile of 2000 Labor Market Conditions

Figure 15 shows the results, which provide evidence against the selection hypothesis. Starting from the left side of the male results, the difference-in-difference coefficient estimates are a little larger than the Table 2 estimate of -0.015, with the exception of the fifth quintile. Thus we would conclude that results for this estimation are quite insensitive to estimating within quintiles of 2000

labor market conditions. Turning to the same model for women, the estimates are less reliable in the first and second quintiles, but still generally supportive of the panel estimated effect of -0.019 in the other quintiles.

The specific controls model relies on the 2000 labor market participation as its key control variable, so estimating it within quintiles of the same variable has the potential to weaken key identifying restrictions on the effects of prior labor market information on the current value. Still, the men's results all remain statistically significant and supportive of relatively large impacts, even if the better preforming quintiles are estimated to have smaller estimated coefficients. The women's estimates for the specific controls, in contrast, show that only the first quintile sample can produce a statistically significant estimate. If this was our only estimation approach, we would need to be concerned that the female estimates might be revealing some reverse causation, but by design, this is a less efficient means of estimating a relationship that is already smaller among prime-age women.

Finally, turning to the third model, which focuses on an evolving comparison group, the results are more robust to estimation within quintiles. For men, the estimated coefficients for each quintile are consistent with the panel estimate of -0.027 shown in Table 5. Similarly, the female coefficients are smaller and more varied, but still generally consistent with the panel estimate of -0.015.

Overall, we think that the fact that these coefficients can generally be estimated within quintiles of labor market performance argues against flexible versions of the reverse causality story that rely on unobserved factors persistently affecting both prescription rates and local labor market.

6 Comparing Our Results to Key Parts of the Literature

6.1 Krueger and the Implied Scale of the Effects

By design, this analysis has used variation between areas in their opioid prescription rate and their labor market conditions to measure the impact of opioids on the labor market. It is easy to say what the difference in labor force participation rate is expected to be for a high opioid prescription area relative to a low prescription area. As a rough measure, the difference between the 10th and 90th percentiles is roughly 1 log point. This implies that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as the expected impact of being in a high-opioid-prescription-rate area. These are clearly substantial values, particularly for men, but differences in the measures (opioid prescription rates versus morphine milligram equivalents), data sources (American Community Survey versus Current Population Survey), and structure of timing (10-year panel versus a cross-sectional comparison of two three-year windows) makes direct comparison of coefficients across our studies challenging.

However, from Krueger (2017) onward there has been an interest in associating the rise of the opioid crisis with declines in labor market outcomes, especially those seen for male participation. As Equation 2 implies, we should be able to apply the coefficients to the average prescription rate even if the coefficients are identified off of cross-sectional variation, with the model uncertainty partially revealed by comparing the range of estimates. During our sample period (2006-2016), the

net changes in participation due to opioid prescriptions would be negligible, since nationally the prescription rate rises and then falls back.

The national rise of opioid prescriptions largely predates 2006, and much of the impact of opioid prescriptions on participation would accrue during these years. Fortunately, we were able to find a source for national opioid prescription rates from 2000 to 2006, Kenan et al. (2012), that is derived from a very similar set of pharmacy records used to generate our county-level data. Using that 2001-2006 data, we can infer the effects of prescription rates on labor market outcomes over the entire period from 2001 to 2017. Importantly, the change in national prescription rates is well within the variation seen between low- and high-opioid-prescription-rate areas within our sample.


Figure 16: National Labor Market Effects Estimates

Figure 16 shows the implied average effects for male and female labor force participation for each of our estimated models.[19] Model uncertainty is present in the male estimates, but every one of these effects estimates would have to to be viewed as economically important. The difference-in-difference results still suggest a peak reduction in the prime-age male labor participation rate of a half percentage point. The estimates based on specific controls imply a more than 1.5 percentage point decline in participation of prime-age men. The women's estimates are all clustered around a peak effect of 0.5 percentage points.

We can use these results to compare the expected decline in participation rates implied by our estimates with the declines estimated in Krueger (2017). Krueger (2017)'s results imply a decline of 0.6 percentage points in participation for men between 1999 and 2015 and a decline of

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[19]Estimates could be calculated for other labor market statuses, including the employment to population ratio. As our discussion of Table 5 suggested, there is little difference between the implied time patterns between the labor force participation rate and the employment-to-population ratio.

0.8 percentage points for women over the same period. Our results generally imply a larger decline for prime-age men and a smaller decline for prime-age women. For men we find that the decline in the labor force participation rate associated with rising opioid prescriptions is between 0.6 and 1.7 percentage points between 2000 and 2016 (depending on the model specification), but that the decline is between 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points for women. In our estimation, then, opioid prescriptions account for between 8 and 24 percent of the realized decline in the prime-age male participation rate and 10 to 13 percent for prime-age women from 2000 to 2016. If instead of measuring the effects in 2016 after a considerable rebound associated with lower prescription rates we compared the period from 2000 to 2010, opioid prescriptions would account for between 22 and 69 percent of the decline in prime-age male labor force participation and between 36 and 46 percent of the decline in prime-age female labor force participation.

6.2   Consistency with Harris, Kessler, Murray, and Glenn

Harris et al. (2019) use county-level regressions on data from 10 states with prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) primarily between 2013 and 2015.[20] They use the plausibly exogenous variation in the concentration of high-volume prescribers, which are not available for most of the US, as an instrument to achieve causal identification. Their empirical specification is similar to ours, but the opioid prescription is measured in per capita rates rather than log rates per hundred residents. They use county-level labor market outcomes, whereas we use individual-level labor market outcomes, but as Equation 2 shows, our measures can be related to one another. Loose comparisons of the coefficients can be made by considering a one standard deviation shift in the relevant prescription variables: One standard deviation is 0.42 in Harris et al. (2019) and 0.39 in our analysis.

Harris et al. (2019) show results for the 10 states in their sample that are considerably larger than our estimates for the entire US. Focusing on their labor force participation results, they have a coefficient of -0.065 for all adults in their preferred IV specification compared to our largest estimates (from the specific controls model) of -0.046 for prime-age men and -0.015 for prime-age women. A one standard deviation shift in prescriptions in Harris et al. (2019) produces a 2.7 percentage point decline in the labor force participation rate. Using our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in log prescriptions produces a 1.8 percentage point decline for prime-age men and a 0.6 percentage point decline for prime-age women. Taking the weighted average of male and female results in a combined decline of 1.2 percentage points. The difference in these results is unlikely due to the inclusion of younger and older demographic groups in Harris et al. (2019). While not reported, our estimates for both younger (age less than 24) and older (age greater than 54) groups have smaller coefficients and larger standard errors.

Overall, our estimates are roughly half of those in Harris et al. (2019). There are many differences in the analyses, but key differences include our longer sample period, broader set of states, and controls for individual and labor-market conditions. While we cannot identify the relevant

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[20]See Buchmueller and Carey (2018) and Horwitz et al. (2018) for related evidence on PDMPs.

margins that produce the differences in the estimate effects, we view Harris et al. (2019) as focused on and strongly supportive of the causal impacts of opioid prescriptions. Thus Harris et al. (2019) complement our results, which focus on improving the geography covered and controls used in order to better estimate the economy-wide impacts of opioid prescriptions on prime-age adults.

6.3 Sources of Differences with Currie, Jin, and Schnell

Currie et al. (2019) examine directions of causation between quarterly prescription data that are specific to age-sex groups and quarterly employment to population ratios from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) for the same age-sex groups. They find that opioid prescriptions have a positive and significant effect on the employment-to-population ratio for women and no effect for men. They find ambiguous effects when they explore the effects of employment on opioid prescriptions rates. Given the substantive differences in their estimates and ours, we undertook a more thorough comparison of the two sets of results, even though we cannot directly estimate their model because we do not have access to the prescription data used in their analysis. There are key differences in geographic groupings, age-sex groupings, the available controls, and regression specifications. Our prescription rate data are broader, limited to an annual frequency with no age or sex information, but our labor market data are at the individual level, allowing for specifc demographic controls available in the ACS. Currie et al. (2019) also rely on a different approach to geographically grouping less populous counties. Their approach uses a county-state grouping that consolidates all of the counties in a state with fewer than 100,000 people into one observation. Section 2.1 describes our rationale for using coumas. Finally, Currie et al. (2019) use models that rely on fixed effects rather than controlling for individual-level demographics and area-level economic conditions that can be time-varying.

While our methods and results differ from those in Currie et al. (2019) in several ways that cannot be fully compared, differences in results in Tables 2-5 provide some suggestive evidence on key differences. Importantly, the employment to population ratio is quite cyclical and, as we noted earlier, cyclical impacts were uneven across the country during the Great Recession and its aftermath. Our estimates for employment to population ratios, particularly for men, are closer to zero in the difference-in-differences specification, where the included fixed effects may be absorbing relevant variation. As this paper has tried to emphasize, the specific nature of the controls for both cyclical and longer-term local labor market outcomes is critical for estimating this relationship. This is further complicated in Currie et al. (2019) because the QWI-based employment to population ratio includes commuters in the numerator but not the denominator, which may exaggerate the urban and suburban cyclical changes. Having examined the three possible labor market outcomes, we find that most of the action in the result is in the labor market participation equation, which is better measured using prescriptions and outcomes at the individual's residence rather than his/her place of work. Currie and Schnell (2018) find important non-economic factors that drive prescription rates, which is consistent with the patterns that we observe for prescription rates, which underlies our analysis of causality. Overall, we would emphasize in the comparison of results that our labor

force participation estimates are economically substantial and statistically robust to a range of model specifications. In addition, our results are consistent with demographic patterns evident in mortality statistics (Ruhm (2019)).

7   Conclusion

This paper makes a contribution to our understanding of the scale and scope of the opioid crisis' effect on the labor market. We constructed a data set allowing us to accurately and jointly measure individuals' labor market outcomes along with the opioid prescription rate in their area. Our use of coumas to link a nationally representative data set on individuals' labor market outcomes with data on local opioid prescription rates allowed us to: (i) improve measurement of prescription rates, particularly in the rural areas that are a critical part of the opioid crisis, (ii) investigate demographic heterogeneity in the relationship between prescription rates and labor market outcomes, and (iii) account for geographic variation in short-term labor demand shocks, long-term economic conditions, and residential sorting.

The scale of the opioid crisis makes it likely that the crisis would generate labor market impacts. Our results confirm that these effects have been substantial, depressing economic outcomes in counties that have had high rates of opioid prescriptions even within the same state. Our results paint a picture of widespread impacts within the group most affected by the opioid crisis: less-educated men. While abuse and mortality rates have rightly focused attention on white men with less than a BA, we found that the labor market outcomes of minority men with less than a BA are even more impacted when exposed to high prescription rates. We showed a variety of evidence indicating that the labor market effects of opioid prescriptions are consistent across areas, regardless of their long- or short-term economic conditions.

Although we have confidence in the measured impacts of higher prescriptions rates, we have little evidence on the reversibility of these effects. That would require carefully examining places that had effectively reduced their prescription rates (and likely illegal opioid availability as well) through specific measures. At this point, the data do not include many viable candidate areas, although prescription rates have gradually declined in most areas of the United States since 2010.[21]

While many relevant policy issues are outside the scope of this paper, our work serves to show the scale of the impact of the opioid crisis on the labor market. In our view, the impact of the opioid crisis on regional and national labor markets looks to be large and statistically robust.

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[21]Two CPUMAs (Oklahoma pan handle and eastern Texas) actually experience large declines in prescription opioid rates over our sample time frame but the reasons for those declines are unkown.

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A Additional Tables and Figures

Table 7: Participation of Prime-Age Men and Women, Varying Fixed Effects FULL TABLE

| | Men | | | Women | | |
	Region	State	Couma	Region	State	Couma
Prescrip. Rate	-0.041***	-0.050***	-0.015***	-0.010***	-0.006**	-0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Age	0.068***	0.068***	0.066***	0.081***	0.080***	0.080***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Age squared	-0.283***	-0.284***	-0.276***	-0.403***	-0.399***	-0.398***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Age cubed	0.052***	0.052***	0.051***	0.085***	0.084***	0.084***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age to 4th	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Less than HS	-0.198***	-0.197***	-0.190***	-0.322***	-0.321***	-0.320***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
High School	-0.085***	-0.084***	-0.078***	-0.131***	-0.131***	-0.130***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Some College	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.034***	-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.053***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
White	0.021***	0.021***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Black	-0.069***	-0.070***	-0.069***	0.047***	0.049***	0.051***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Hispanic	0.051***	0.054***	0.055***	0.011***	0.013***	0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.116***	0.116***	0.115***	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.080***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R-sqr	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.06
N	6440267	6440267	6440267	6655308	6655308	6655308

All regressions include demographic variables and year fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on geography x year.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Labor Market States of Prime-Age Men and Women, Specific Controls FULL TABLE

	Men			Women		
	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop
Prescrip. Rate	-0.046***	-0.049***	0.004**	-0.015***	-0.017***	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Demand Shock	0.309**	0.606***	-0.251***	-0.346**	-0.102	-0.199***
	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.068)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.057)
2000 Particip.	0.593***			0.450***		
	(0.044)			(0.027)		
2000 Emp/Pop		0.519***			0.396***	
		(0.034)			(0.023)	
2000 Unem/Pop			0.292***			0.188***
			(0.032)			(0.029)
Age	0.068***	0.091***	-0.023**	0.082***	0.087***	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.007)
Age squared	-0.283***	-0.357***	0.073*	-0.404***	-0.417***	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.026)
Age cubed	0.052***	0.062***	-0.010*	0.085***	0.087***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Age to 4th	-0.004***	-0.004***	0.001	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Less than HS	-0.192***	-0.240***	0.048***	-0.318***	-0.362***	0.043***
	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)
High School	-0.081***	-0.117***	0.036***	-0.129***	-0.159***	0.030***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Some College	-0.036***	-0.054***	0.018***	-0.052***	-0.070***	0.018***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
White	0.020***	0.023***	-0.003***	0.025***	0.031***	-0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Black	-0.063***	-0.091***	0.028***	0.052***	0.026***	0.025***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Hispanic	0.060***	0.068***	-0.009***	0.019***	0.015***	0.003**
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Married	0.115***	0.151***	-0.036***	-0.081***	-0.058***	-0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
R-sqr	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
N	6410469	6410469	6410469	6625455	6625455	6625455

All regressions include year and Census division fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on coumas.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: Labor Market States of Prime-Age Men and Women, Comparison Group FULL TABLE

	Men			Women		
	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop	Participate	Emp/Pop	Unem/Pop
Prescrip. Rate	-0.027***	-0.029***	0.004***	-0.015***	-0.012**	0.003**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Demand Shock	0.175*	0.511***	-0.319***	-0.057	-0.037	-0.210***
	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.138)	(0.048)
LR Particip.	0.917***			0.914***		
	(0.061)			(0.035)		
LR Emp/Pop		0.941***			0.843***	
		(0.060)			(0.066)	
LR Unem/Pop			0.922***			0.950***
			(0.086)			(0.095)
Age	0.068***	0.092***	-0.024**	0.080***	0.087***	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.007)
Age squared	-0.283***	-0.359***	0.074*	-0.399***	-0.417***	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.026)
Age cubed	0.052***	0.062***	-0.010*	0.084***	0.086***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Age to 4th	-0.004***	-0.004***	0.001	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Less than HS	-0.192***	-0.241***	0.049***	-0.322***	-0.364***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)
High School	-0.079***	-0.116***	0.037***	-0.131***	-0.160***	0.031***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Some College	-0.035***	-0.053***	0.019***	-0.054***	-0.071***	0.018***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
White	0.023***	0.026***	-0.003***	0.024***	0.032***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Black	-0.068***	-0.095***	0.028***	0.051***	0.023***	0.026***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Hispanic	0.054***	0.064***	-0.009***	0.016***	0.011**	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Married	0.115***	0.151***	-0.036***	-0.081***	-0.058***	-0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
R-sqr	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
N	6424995	6424995	6424995	6641288	6641288	6641288

All regressions include year and Census division fixed effects.

Robust standard errors with clustering on coumas.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 17: Role of Explanatory Variables in the Alternative Models