

# Banking on Uninsured Deposits

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# 2023 regional bank crisis

Since early 2022, the Fed has raised short-term rates by 5.25%

- long-term rates are up 2.5%

Banks held \$17T of long-term loans and securities with average duration 4 years

- implied loss of  $0.025 \times 4 \times 17 = \$1.7T$
- very large compared to \$2.2T bank equity




**Lawrence H. Summers** ✓

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
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SVB committed one of the most elementary errors in banking: borrowing money in the short term and investing in the long term. When interest rates went up, the assets lost their value and put the institution in a problematic situation.

## But why not earlier? Why not all banks?




# A natural hedge: low deposit betas



# The deposit franchise hedge (Drechsler, Savov, Schnabl 2021)

1. \$17 trillion of bank deposits
  - with a deposit beta of 0.4, banks are earning  $0.6 \times 5.5\% = 3.3\%$  deposit spread
  - $\$17 \times 3.3\% = \$561$  billion higher income per year
2. Gain on deposit franchise enough to offset asset losses in  $\sim 3$  years
  - deposits went from unprofitable to highly profitable
  - explains why bank stocks held up as rates rose

# Deposit outflows



- Deposit outflows of 5% (\$830 billion) from Mar 22 until Feb 2023
- Additional outflows of 4% (\$660 billion) from Mar 23 until Aug 2023

# This paper

Deposit franchise hedges interest rate risk...

**...but only if depositors remain with the bank**

Hedge can be undermined by two kinds of deposit outflows:

- rate-driven outflows - “deposits channel of MP” (DSS, 2017)
- **runs on the uninsured deposit franchise**

# Main results

1. Uninsured deposit franchise is a runnable asset
  - self-fulfilling runs even if loans/securities are fully liquid
2. Deposit franchise value rises with rates + uninsured DF is runnable
  - bank run risk increases at higher rates
3. Risk management dilemma:
  - need long-term assets to hedge bank's value to interest rates
  - but then relative value of uninsured DF rises with interest rates, raising run risk
  - cannot perfectly hedge both interest rate and run risk with uninsured DF
4. Solutions: options, “rate-cyclical” capital



# Model: deposit franchise with outflows

- Bank starts with assets  $A$  and deposit base  $D_{-1} = D$ .
- In period  $t$ , remaining deposits  $D_{t-1}$ 
  - pay deposit rate  $r_{d,t}$
  - require operating costs  $c$  per dollar
  - withdrawals  $X_t = D_{t-1} - D_t$
- Date-0 bank value (EVE)

$$V = A - L$$

where  $L$  is PV of liabilities

$$L = \underbrace{\sum_{t \geq 1} q_t D_{t-1} (r_{d,t} + c)}_{\text{interest expenses and costs}} + X_0 + \underbrace{\sum_{t \geq 1} q_t X_t}_{\text{withdrawals}}$$

# Simplifying assumptions

- Initial interest rate  $r_{-1} = r$ . One-time shock to  $r_0 = r_1 = \dots = r'$ .  
→ Deposit rate  $r'_d = \beta r'$
- $t \geq 1$ : exogenous outflows

$$X_t = \delta D_{t-1}$$

to capture natural decay of deposit base.

# Deposit franchise value

Rewrite

$$V = A + \underbrace{DF - D}_{-L}$$

where

DF = **deposit franchise**

## Proposition

Without runs,

$$\begin{aligned} DF(r') &= D \left[ \frac{(1-\beta)r' - c}{r' + \delta} \right] \\ DF'(r) &= D \left[ \frac{c + (1-\beta)\delta}{(r + \delta)^2} \right] > 0 \end{aligned}$$


# Adding uninsured deposits and runs

Exogenous share  $u$  of deposits uninsured: bank value

$$V = A - D + DF_I + \lambda DF_U$$

where  $\lambda$ : **endogenous** fraction of remaining uninsured depositors

$\lambda = \Lambda(v)$  increasing in  $v = V/D$ : earnings, stock price



# Runs on the deposit franchise

Bank solvency ratio given  $\lambda$ :  $v(\lambda, r') = v(0, r') + \lambda \cdot u \overbrace{\frac{(1 - \beta^U)r' - c^U}{r' + \delta}}^{=DF_U(r')/D}$

Equilibrium given  $A(r')$ :  $\lambda$  s.t.  $\Lambda(v(\lambda, r')) = \lambda$

## Proposition

If  $v(0, r') < \underline{v}$ : run equilibrium  $\lambda = 0$  exists (though A is fully liquid).

The larger is  $DF_U(r')$ , the higher is  $v(1, r')$  at which a run equilibrium exists.

This is when:

- the share of uninsured deposits  $u$  is higher
- the uninsured deposit beta  $\beta^U$  is lower
- **the interest rate  $r'$  is higher**


# Balance sheet: unique equilibrium at $r$

No run


A	D
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## Balance sheet: two equilibria at $r' > r$

No run



Run



# Optimal duration(s)

## Proposition

Hedging interest rate risk for all  $r'$  in no-run equilibrium requires:

$$T_A = (1-u) \frac{(1-\beta^l)\delta + c^l}{(r+\delta)^2} + u \times \frac{(1-\beta^u)\delta + c^u}{(r+\delta)^2}$$

Hedging liquidity/run risk for all  $r'$  requires:

$$T_A = (1-u) \frac{(1-\beta^l)\delta + c^l}{(r+\delta)^2} + u \times 0$$



# Risk management dilemma

$$v(1, r') = v(0, r') + DF_U(r')$$

Hedging interest rate risk: stabilize  $v(1, r')$

Hedging run/liquidity risk: maintain  $v(0, r') \geq \underline{v}$

## Proposition

Suppose the bank perfectly hedges interest rate risk in the good equilibrium.  
Then the run equilibrium exists for

$$r' > \bar{r} = \frac{c^U + \delta \frac{v^* - \underline{v}}{u}}{1 - \beta^U - \frac{v^* - \underline{v}}{u}}$$

No run equilibrium as  $\beta^U \rightarrow 1$ : dilemma caused by **low beta uninsured**

→ retail uninsured and corporate checking, **not** competitive wholesale funding

# Why can't the bank only hedge liquidity risk?

$A + DF_I$	$D$
$DF_U$	$V$

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$A + DF_I$	$D$
$DF_U$	$V$

$r' < r$

$V$  exposed to interest rate risk when rates **fall**

# Solution: Options

To hedge against runs when rates  $\uparrow$  and interest rate risk when rates  $\downarrow$  need

$$v(0, r') \geq \underline{v} \quad \text{and} \quad v(1, r') \geq v^* \text{ (initial level)}$$



## Proposition

Banks must hold puttable LT bonds: combination of LT assets + call options on  $r'$ :

$$A^*(r') = \underbrace{(1 + v^*)D - DF_I(r') - DF_U(\lambda = 1, r')}_{\text{LT assets}} + \underbrace{\max\{0, DF_U(\lambda = 1, r') - (v^* - \underline{v})D\}}_{\text{payer swaptions}}$$

- Banks already hold swaptions to hedge MBS negative convexity...  
need more to hedge run risk: keep uninsured DF from exceeding bank's equity
- Requires more capital up-front: to use efficiently, invest in options (not cash)

# Solution: Options



# Conclusion

1. Low beta uninsured deposits (uninsured retail, corporate checking) create a runnable deposit franchise asset ( $DF_U$ )
2. Since  $DF_U$  rises with interest rates, so does run/liquidity risk
3. Risk management dilemma: banks need assets with
  - long duration to hedge interest rate risk
  - short duration to avoid run risk (as  $DF_U$  becomes large relative to  $V$ )
4. Solution: options or “rate-cyclical” capital
  - raises capital as rates increase to keep  $DF_U/V$  in check