# Comments on

"Global Effective Lower Bound and Unconventional Monetary Policy" by Jing Cynthia Wu & Ji Zhang

# Andrew Levin Dartmouth College

October 2018

# The Broad Rationale for Central Bank Transparency

- Foster accountability to elected officials and the general public
- Foster the effectiveness of the central bank's decisions by clarifying its policy framework and strategy
- Foster the efficiency of the central bank's policy tools and operating procedures

# **QE Design Specifications**

#### **Asset Purchases**

- Composition (which securities?)
- Overall Size (fixed or contingent?)
- Pace (how quickly?)
- Taper (gradual or abrupt?)

# Normalization

- Timing (when?)
- Mode (runoff vs. sales?)
- Pace (how quickly?)
- End-Point (old vs. new normal?)

"The staff's analysis...indicates that [asset purchases] affect term premiums and thus longer-term interest rates primarily via their effect on the private sector's expectations of the future path of the stock of longer-term securities that will be held by the Federal Reserve (and thus not held by private agents)."

> FOMC Staff Memo on "Flow-Based Balance Sheet Policies: Communication Issues and Macroeconomic Effects" (August 2012)

"...the modeling framework used here assumes that investors know with certainty the total size and exact path of purchases...In practice, investors' assumptions about the total size of the program would likely evolve over time... as [they] acquire a better understanding of how the [FOMC] will actually respond—a learning process that would tend to reduce any differences in economic effects across policies."

> FOMC Staff Memo on "Options for Continuation of Open-Ended Asset Purchases in 2013" (Dec. 2012)

#### Benefits

- Did QE work thru the anticipated channels?
- Was QE effective in fostering the central bank's macroeconomic objective(s)?

## Costs

- By taking interest rate risk onto its balance sheet, how did QE affect the central bank's trajectory of net interest income?
- Did QE affect financial market functioning?
- Did QE induce imprudent risk-taking?

# Learning about QE

	<b>Ex Ante</b> (Autumn 2012)	Ex Post (Autumn 2018)
Size	\$0.6 to \$1.25 trillion	\$2 trillion
Taper of Purchases	Brief or None	Extended
End of Reinvestment	Around Time of First Rate Hike	Nearly 2 Years After Liftoff
Sale of MBS	Yes (over 3 to 5 years)	No
"New Normal" for Reserves	\$0.1 to \$0.5 trillion	\$0.4 to \$1 trillion

# U.S. Primary Dealers' Expectations about the Fed's Security Holdings

**USD Billions** 



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York surveys of primary dealers; Federal Reserve Board H.4.1 data.

# The U.S. Treasury Bond Term Premium



Source: Federal Reserve Board updates of Kim & Wright (2006) for term premium on 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond.

#### Lessons from the Taper Tantrum

"Most dealers stated that a change in perception of or heightened uncertainty around the FOMC's view of appropriate monetary policy were key factors in the rise in the 10-Treasury yield....Several dealers noted that technical and/or positioning factors exacerbated the moves...including flows related to volatility in the agency MBS market."

FRBNY Survey of Primary Dealers, June 2013

## Gauging the Impact of QE3 on U.S. Real GDP Growth



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (4-quarter chg, %)

# Gauging the Impact of QE3 on Growth in U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

# Gauging the Impact of QE3 on U.S. Core PCE Inflation



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (4-quarter chg, %)

# Transparency about the Potential Costs of QE to Taxpayers

Degree of Transparency	Timing of Disclosure	Rationale
None	no disclosure at all	concerns about undue political interference
Low	disclosure a few years after end of QE program	facilitate "lessons learned"
Moderate	disclosure while QE is underway	facilitate program effectiveness
High	disclosure in advance of QE program	facilitate risk management

# *Ex Ante* Assessments of Cumulative Net Interest Earnings (2012-2025)

Size of QE3	Interest Rate Scenario	
	Benchmark Path	Benchmark Path + 1% Post-Liftoff
None	\$630 billion	\$680 billion
\$0.75 trillion	\$590 billion	\$600 billion
\$1.25 trillion	\$530 billion	\$500 billion

Source: FOMC Staff Memo on "Options for Continuation of Open-Ended Asset Purchases in 2013" (circulated to FOMC in Dec. 2012; released to the public in Feb. 2018)

# Ex Ante Assessments of the Cost of QE3

(difference in net interest earnings from baseline)

Size of QE3	Interest Rate Scenario	
	Benchmark Path	Benchmark Path + 1% Post-Liftoff
\$0.75 trillion	\$40 billion	\$80 billion
\$1.25 trillion	\$100 billion	\$180 billion
\$2.0 trillion	\$140 billion?	\$260 billion?

Source: FOMC Staff Memo on "Options for Continuation of Open-Ended Asset Purchases in 2013" (circulated to FOMC in Dec. 2012; released to the public in Feb. 2018); note that the final row is merely a speculative guess.

#### The ECB's Asset Purchase Programme



#### **Euro Area Core Inflation**

#### **Core HICP Inflation (excluding food & energy)**



#### The Recent Japanese Experience

#### Core-Core CPI Inflation (ex. food & energy)



## **Tentative Conclusions about QE**

- QE can play a crucial role in mitigating financial disruptions in the midst of a crisis.
- By contrast, using QE to provide monetary stimulus appears to have only muted benefits and may incur substantial fiscal costs.
- Moreover, avoiding adverse effects on financial market functioning may impose binding constraints on the design of QE.
- These conclusions suggest that central banks should develop new tools (such as digital cash) for mitigating severe adverse shocks.

# The Rationale for Digital Cash

- An account-based system can provide an efficient and secure medium of exchange.
- Partnerships with commercial banks can foster innovation, preserve privacy, and promote financial stability.
- Graduated transfer fees can prevent arbitrage with paper cash and eliminate the ELB.
- The interest rate on digital cash can serve as the primary tool of monetary policy.
- The central bank can foster true price stability.