Mark Greenlee |


Mark Greenlee is counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. His primary responsibilities are financial institution regulatory matters. Greenlee joined the Bank’s Legal Department in 1996. Previously, he served as in-house counsel for a regional bank holding company, primarily responsible for securities and bank regulatory matters.

Greenlee holds a BS in economics from Allegheny College and a JD from Capital University School of Law. His articles have been published in numerous books and legal journals.

  • Fed Publications
  • Other Publications
Title Date Publication Author(s) Type


January, 2014 Vol. 5, No. 1 Mark B Greenlee; Forefront
Abstract: Ways to expedite the foreclosure process for abandoned properties and to preserve homeowners? defenses in foreclosure actions are urgently needed.



2011-16 Mark B Greenlee; Thomas J Fitzpatrick; James B Thomson; Economic Commentary

How to best manage the failure of systemically important financial firms was the theme of a recent conference at which the latest research on the issue was presented. Here we summarize that research, the discussions that it sparked, and the areas where considerable work remains.



November 2008 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0808 Mark B Greenlee; Thomas J Fitzpatrick; Working Papers
Abstract: In this paper we investigate the history of negotiable instruments and the holder in due course rule and contrast their function and consequences in the 1700s with their function and consequences today. We explain how the holder in due course rule works and identify ways in which the rule’s application is limited in some consumer transactions. In particular, we focus on laws limiting application of the rule to some home mortgage loans. We investigate Lord Mansfield’s original justification for the rule as a money substitute, the lack of explicit justification of the rule by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1950s, the contemporary justification of the rule as a means of increasing the availability and decreasing the cost of credit, and the concerns of legislators and regulators about lack of consumer knowledge, bargaining power, and financial resources which caused them to limit the application of the holder in due course rule to some consumer transactions. We conclude that changes in policy justification, parties to negotiable instruments and the structure of the home mortgage market call for a reconsideration of the continuing appropriateness of holder in due course protection for assignees of home mortgage notes. We suggest further analysis based on economic theory and review of empirical research in order to formulate policy recommendations.



10.2008 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0807 Mark B Greenlee; Working Papers
Abstract: The article reviews legislative history and supervisory practices related to bank holding companies with a view toward understanding what Congress meant by referring to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as the “umbrella supervisor” in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The first part of the article looks at the historical development of bank holding company law and regulation, which laid the foundation for the current practice of umbrella supervision. The second part of the article provides answers to questions related to the Board’s current role as umbrella supervisor: What does “umbrella supervision” mean, and is it different from “consolidated supervision”? How does the GLB Act limit the Board’s authority and practice and when did the Board obtain all of the legal authority to allow it to practice umbrella supervision?

Title Date Publication Author(s) Type
Reconsidering the Application of the Holder in Due Course Rule to Home Mortgage Notes


July, 2009 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal, vol. 41 Mark B Greenlee; Thomas J Fitzpatrick; Journal Article