Vinod Venkiteshwaran |

Research Economist


Vinod Venkiteshwaran is a research economist in the Banking Policy and Analysis Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He is primarily interested in corporate governance and corporate finance. His current research focuses on the governance structure of banking organizations and its effect on bank risk-taking and risk management practices.

Prior to joining the Bank in 2013, Dr. Venkiteshwaran held faculty positions at various institutions, including Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, Oklahoma State University, Ohio University, and the former Ohio-Manipal School of Business in India. A native of India, he earned his undergraduate degree in economics and graduate degree in econometrics from the University of Madras. He also holds a graduate degree in financial economics from Ohio University and he completed his Phd at Oklahoma State University’s Spears School of Business.

  • Other Publications
Title Date Publication Author(s) Type

 

August, 2011 Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2011) Vinod Venkiteshwaran; Journal Article
Abstract: Recognizing that industry and capital market conditions may impede a firm’s desire to achieve its targeted cash holding levels, we estimate a dynamic model that allows firms to adjust their cash holding levels over time and find evidence consistent with a trade-off type behavior in cash holding levels. We estimate a partial adjustment model and find that firms rapidly correct any deviation from their targeted cash levels. A typical firm in our sample closes this gap within two years. Inconsistent with the agency view of excess cash holdings, we find that cash holding levels for firms with excess cash persists over time compared to those that have a deficit. We also find that smaller firms typically hold excess cash and are quicker to correct deviations than large firms consistent with the view that it is more costly for financially constrained firms to operate at sub-optimal levels of liquid assets.

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September, 2010 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Fall 2010) Vinod Venkiteshwaran; Subramanian R Iyer; Ramesh P Rao; Journal Article
Abstract: The increase in activist campaigns by entrepreneurial investors and hedge funds in the past decade has raised considerable debate about their benefits for average shareholders. Although critics have longed charged that the proposals for change by such active investors typically do not increase the longer-run efficiency and values of the targeted companies, more recent studies have provided evidence of success, both in terms of increasing the market value of such companies and achieving at least some of the investors’ expressed objectives.This article attempts to add to these findings by examining the case of a single well-known investor, Carl Icahn, whose career as a shareholder activist now spans at least three decades. The authors report, first of all, that Icahn’s targets have included companies from a remarkable variety of industries, and that his stated objectives have varied with the industries of the targets. Although more of Icahn’s targets appear to have been overleveraged than underleveraged, a significant minority have had payouts ratios that were judged to be too low and more cash than they needed.

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