Economic Research and Data

Conferences and Workshops

Frequently Requested Proceedings



For Further Conference Information

  • Research Department
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
    P.O. Box 6387
    Cleveland, OH 44101-1387
  • t. 216-579-3111
    f. 216-579-3050

Workshop on Government Policy with Incentive Problems

Workshop held on June 16-18, 2003

Papers Presented

  • Optimal Taxation with Endogenously Incomplete Debt Markets
    Christopher Sleet, University of Iowa
    Sevin Yeltekin, Northwestern/MEDS

  • Coordination and Policy Traps
    George-Marios Angeletos, MIT
    Christian Hellwig, UCLA
    Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern

  • Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions
    Matthias Doepke, UCLA
    Robert Townsend, University of Chicago

  • Optimal Paternalism
    Manuel Amador
    Ivan Werning, MI

  • Optimal Policy with Endogenous Fiscal Constitutions
    Stefania Albanesi, Duke University
    Christopher Sleet, University of Iowa

  • Opportunity and Social Mobility
    Christopher Phelan, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

  • A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation: Implications for Wealth Taxes and Asset Prices
    Narayana Kocherlakota, Stanford University

  • The Optimal Unemployment Insurance Contract: Why a Replacement Ratio?
    Rui Zhao, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign

  • Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs
    Nicola Pavoni, University College of London
    Gianluca Violante, New York University
    or alternatively

  • Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Human Capital Depreciation and Duration Dependence
    Nicola Pavoni, University College of London

  • Designing Optimal Disability Insurance
    Mike Golosov, University of Minnesota
    Aleh Tsyvinski, University of Minnesota