Workshop on Government Policy with Incentive Problems
Workshop held on June 16-18, 2003
Papers Presented
Optimal Taxation with Endogenously Incomplete Debt Markets
Christopher Sleet, University of Iowa
Sevin Yeltekin, Northwestern/MEDSCoordination and Policy Traps
George-Marios Angeletos, MIT
Christian Hellwig, UCLA
Alessandro Pavan, NorthwesternDynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions
Matthias Doepke, UCLA
Robert Townsend, University of ChicagoOptimal Paternalism
Manuel Amador
Ivan Werning, MIOptimal Policy with Endogenous Fiscal Constitutions
Stefania Albanesi, Duke University
Christopher Sleet, University of IowaOpportunity and Social Mobility
Christopher Phelan, Federal Reserve Bank of MinneapolisA Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation: Implications for Wealth Taxes and Asset Prices
Narayana Kocherlakota, Stanford UniversityThe Optimal Unemployment Insurance Contract: Why a Replacement Ratio?
Rui Zhao, University of Illinois at Urbana ChampaignOptimal Welfare-to-Work Programs
Nicola Pavoni, University College of London
Gianluca Violante, New York University
or alternativelyOptimal Unemployment Insurance with Human Capital Depreciation and Duration Dependence
Nicola Pavoni, University College of LondonDesigning Optimal Disability Insurance
Mike Golosov, University of Minnesota
Aleh Tsyvinski, University of Minnesota
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