| Title |
Date |
Publication |
Author(s) |
Type |
| Conducting Monetary Policy when Interest Rates Are Near Zero
|
December, 2009 |
|
Andrea Pescatori; Charles T Carlstrom; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: This Economic Commentary explains the concerns that are associated with the combination of deflation, low economic activity, and zero nominal interest rates and describes how monetary policy might be conducted in such a situation. We argue that avoiding expectations of deflation is key and that the monetary authority needs to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to preventing deflation. We also argue that price-level targeting might be a good device for communicating such a commitment.
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| The Great Moderation: Good Luck, Good Policy, or Less Oil Dependence?
|
March, 2008 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Andrea Pescatori; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Three explanations have been suggested for the moderation in real GDP and inflation that has occurred in industrialized countries since the 1980s: good luck, better monetary policy, and structural changes in the economy. Recent research finds that better monetary policy explains most of the moderation in inflation, and good luck and the less-intensive use of oil (a structural change) have played a major role in the moderation of GDP.
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| Oil and the Great Moderation
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November, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0717 |
Andrea Pescatori; Anton Nakov; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: We assess the extent to which the period of great U.S. macroeconomic stability since the mid-1980s can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil share in GDP. To do this we estimate a DSGE model with an oil-producing sector before and after 1984 and perform counterfactual simulations. We nest two popular explanations for the Great Moderation: (1) smaller (non-oil) real shocks; and (2) better monetary policy. We find that the reduced oil share accounted for as much as one-third of the inflation moderation and 13% of the growth moderation, while smaller oil shocks accounted for 11% of the inflation moderation and 7% of the growth moderation. This notwithstanding, better monetary policy explains the bulk of the inflation moderation, while most of the growth moderation is explained by smaller TFP shocks.
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| Inflation-Output Gap Trade-off with a Dominant Oil Supplier
|
October, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0710 |
Andrea Pescatori; Anton Nakov; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: An exogenous oil price shock raises inflation and contracts output, similar to a negative productivity shock. In the standard New Keynesian model, however, this does not generate any trade-off between inflation and output gap volatility: under a strict inflation-targeting policy, the output decline is exactly equal to the efficient output contraction in response to the shock. Modeling the oil sector from optimizing first principles rather than assuming an exogenous oil price, we show that the presence of a dominant oil supplier (OPEC) leads to inefficient fluctuations in the oil price markup. The latter reflects a dynamic distortion of the production process, and as a result, stabilizing inflation does not automatically stabilize the distance of output from first-best. Our model is a step away from discussing the effects of exogenous oil price changes and toward analyzing the implications of the underlying shocks that cause the oil price to change in the first place.
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| Incomplete Markets and Households' Exposure to Interest Rate and Inflation Risk: Implications for the Monetary Policy Maker
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October, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0709 |
Andrea Pescatori; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: The present paper studies optimal monetary policy when the representative agent assumption is abandoned and financial wealth heterogeneity across households is introduced. Incomplete markets make households incapable of perfectly insuring against interest rate and inflation risk, creating a trade-off between price level and debt-servicing stabilization. We derive a welfare-based loss function for the policymaker, which includes an additional target related to the cross-sectional distribution of household debt. The extent of the deviation from price stability depends on the initial level of debt dispersion. Using U.S. microdata to calibrate the model, we find an optimal inflation volatility equal to almost 20 percent of the actual volatility of the last 15 years. Finally, the paper studies the design of optimal simple implementable rules. Superinertial rules, which imply a hump-shaped interest rate response to shocks, significantly outperform standard rules.
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