| Title |
Date |
Publication |
Author(s) |
Type |
| Identifying and Resolving Financial Crises: A Conference Overview
|
August, 2008 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper, no. 24 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Policy Discussion Papers |
| Abstract: Financial crises remain a recurring problem despite, or perhaps, as some suggest, because of, extensive innovation in capital markets over the past several decades. Crisis interventions are fraught with trade-offs: What are the costs of doing nothing? What is the probability that markets will seize up? Are there viable alternatives? Will the intervention make further crises more likely? The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the FDIC sponsored a conference in April 2008 to debate and exchange ideas on these issues. The following document summarizes and ties together the contributions presented.
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| Central Banks and Crisis Management
|
June, 2008 |
2007 Annual Report |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Annual Report |
| Abstract: Fostering financial stability is a key role of a central bank. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's 2007 Annual Report reviews lessons from past financial crises that may help guide policymakers as they respond to future challenges.
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| Peak Oil
|
August, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Brent Meyer; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: When will the world's production of oil peak, and what will the economic consequences be? Calculating when turns out not to be so straightforward as it seems, but predicting the likely economic consequences is-and they're not as bleak as many fear.
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| Who Holds the Toxic Waste? An Investigation of CMO Holdings
|
June, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper, no. 20 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Deborah Lucas; |
Policy Discussion Papers |
| Abstract: "Toxic waste" refers to the riskiest derivative structures arising from collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). We use simulations to predict how this risk would manifest itself in various interest rate environments. We also look for evidence on the total dollar value of these securities, who holds them, and how much they hold. Very limited public information is available, but commercial banks are required to report on their holdings, and we investigate the extent to which the risk is concentrated in that sector.
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| Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management
|
April, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper, no. 19 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Policy Discussion Papers |
| Abstract: This Policy Discussion Paper reviews the restructuring and recapitalization of Long-Term Capital Management, looking at possible alternatives and paying particular attention to the Federal Reserve's role.
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| Credit Spreads and Subordinated Debt
|
March, 2007 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Stock and bond prices contain all sorts of information about investors' beliefs and expectations. For example, the interest rate on bank debt not insured by the FDIC has information about the health of the banks issuing the debt. Unfortunately, difficulties in extracting information from these subordinated debt prices reduces the information' usefulness to regulators and policymakers.
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| Forecasting with the Yield Curve; Level, Slope, and Output 1875-1997
|
October, 2006 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0611 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Michael D Bordo; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Using the yield curve helps forecast real growth over the period 1875 to 1997. Using both the level and slope of the curve improves forecasts more than using either variable alone. Forecast performance changes over time and depends somewhat on whether recursive or rolling out of sample regressions are used.
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| Does the Yield Curve Signal Recession?
|
April, 2006 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Experience has taught economic forecasters to expect a recession when the yield on short-term Treasury securities rises above the yield on longer-term securities-a situation known as a yield-curve inversion. But some economists suspect the yield curve might not be as reliable a predictor of output growth as it used to be.
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| Gross Loan Flows
|
January, 2006 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0604 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ben R Craig; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Changes in net lending hide the much larger and more variable gross lending flows. We present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time, bank size, and the business cycle. We look at both the intensive (increases and decreases) and extensive (entry and exits) margins. We compare these results with the output from a simple stochastic search model.
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| Umbrella Supervision and the Role of the Central Bank
|
December, 2005 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper, no. 11 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Policy Discussion Papers |
| Abstract: Deregulation and financial consolidation have led to the development of financial holding companies-allowing commercial banking, insurance, investment banking, and other financial activities to be conducted under the same corporate umbrella-and the Federal Reserve has been named supervisor of the consolidated enterprise. This Policy Discussion Paper will show that there likely are economies of scope between the Fed's inherent central-banking responsibilities and those of an umbrella supervisor and that these duel roles benefit both the Fed and functional regulators.
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| Umbrella Supervision
|
September, 2005 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Deregulation and financial consolidation have led to the development of financial holding companies-allowing commercial banking, insurance, investment banking, and other financial activities to be conducted under the same corporate umbrella-and the Federal Reserve has been named supervisor of the consolidated enterprise. This Commentary explains the increasing importance of an umbrella supervisor amid the sea of regulatory agencies, and why the Fed may be the best natural choice, both practically and conceptually, to assume the role.
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| Too Much Risk?
|
March, 2005 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ben R Craig; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Are asset prices climbing too far too fast? Do they signal the approach of an unsustainable boom that the FOMC should step in and stop before it gathers speed? Bubbles are notoriously hard to spot beforehand, and even if we were better at it, no one is sure what the best monetary policy response would be.
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| Oil Prices: Backward to the Future?
|
December, 2004 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Patrick C Higgins; Janet Miller; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: A useful first guess about the future spot price of a commodity is usually found in its current futures price. But it doesn’t work that way when the commodity in question is oil. This Commentary explains why the characteristics of oil, particularly the value it can offer its owner by remaining in the ground, cloud the information that oil futures prices give about future oil prices.
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| Interest Rates, Yield Curves, and the Monetary Regime
|
June, 2004 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: The yield curve has a wealth of information about future interest rates and economic conditions. Users should exercise caution, though, as many of the relationships that hold between the behavior of the curve and what it fortells depend on the monetary regime in place at the time the curve is drawn.
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| The Yield Curve, Recessions, and the Credibility of the Monetary Regime:
|
April, 2004 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0402 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Michael D Bordo; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: This paper brings historical evidence to bear on the stylized fact that the yield curve predicts future growth. The spread between corporate bonds and commercial paper reliably predicts future growth over the period 1875-1997. This predictability varies over time, however, particularly across different monetary regimes. In accord with our proposed theory, regimes with low credibility (high persistence of inflation) tend to have better predictability.
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| Expensing Stock Options
|
November, 2003 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Many market commentators argue that companies should expense the stock options they give their employees. Will expensing give investors better information about what companies earn and spend?
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| Pricing Kernels, Inflation, and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
|
October, 2003 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0308 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ben R Craig; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: The authors estimate a discrete-time, multivariate pricing kernel for the term structure of interest rates, using both yields and inflation rates. This gives a separate estimate of the real kernel and the nominal kernel, taking into account a relatively sophisticated dynamical structure and mutual interaction between the real and nominal side of the economy. Along with obtaining an estimate of the real term structure, they use the estimates to obtain a new perspective on how real and nominal influences interact to produce the observed term structure.
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| Information and Prices
|
May, 2003 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ozgur Emre Ergungor; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Information problems pervade the economy. This Commentary describes the challenges they create and the clever solutions markets find to overcome them.
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| Getting the most out of a mandatory subordinated debt requirement
|
January, 2002 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0214 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Rong Fan; Peter Ritchken; James B Thomson; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Recent advances in asset pricing-the reduced-form approach to pricing risky debt and derivatives-are used to quantitatively evaluate several proposals for mandatory bank issue of subordinated debt. The authors find that credit spreads on both fixed- and floating-rate subordinated debt provide relatively clean signals of bank risk and are not unduly influenced by non-risk factors. Fixed-rate debt with a put is unacceptable, but making the putable debt floating resolves most problems. The authors' approach also helps to clarify several different notions of "bank risk."
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| Swaps and the Swaps Yield Curve
|
December, 2001 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Interest rate swaps have become a popular financial derivative, and market watchers and economists are paying closer attention to them and their associated yield curves. This Commentary gives a brief introduction to swaps and their relation to other interest rates.
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| The sources and nature of long-term memory in aggregate output
|
June, 2001 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 15-30 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Andrew W Lo; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: This article examines the stochastic properties of aggregate macroeconomic time series from the standpoint of fractionally integrated models, focusing on the persistence of economic shocks. The authors develop a simple macroeconomic model that exhibits long-range dependence, a consequence of aggregation in the presence of real business cycles. To implement these results empirically, they employ a test for fractionally integrated time series based on the Hurst-Mandelbrot rescaled range. This test is robust to short-range dependence and is applied to quarterly and annual real GDP to determine the sources and nature of long-range dependence in the business cycle.
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| Sharing with a risk-neutral agent
|
March, 2001 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 2-8 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: In the standard solution to the principal-agent problem, a risk-neutral agent bears all the risk. The author shows that, in fact, multiple solutions exist, and often the risk-neutral agent is not the sole bearer of risk. As risk aversion approaches zero, the unique risk-averse solution converges to the risk-neutral solution, wherein the agent bears the least amount of risk. Even a small degree of risk aversion can result in agents bearing significantly less risk than the standard solution suggests.
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| Risk Management and Financial Crises
|
February, 2001 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Some financial failures occur when people don’t understand the risks they take. Others are simply bad luck. But the most important cases happen when private risks have an extra social aspect.
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| Coalitions, Power, and the FOMC
|
January, 2001 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0103 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Owen F Humpage; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: We apply a notion of power defined for coalitions derived from the Shapley value. We calculate the power of coalitions within a twelve-person committee, meant to correspond to the FOMC.
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| Productivity and the term structure
|
December, 2000 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 2-9 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: The recent record-setting economic expansion and the accompanying record-setting bull market in stocks are often attributed to Federal Reserve interest rate policy and increased productivity. But if interest rates behave differently when productivity changes, interest rate policy may need to change as well. This article examines how productivity changes affect the entire term structure-from short-term interest rates like the federal funds rate, to long-term rates like mortgages, car loans, and corporate bonds.
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| Waiting for Policy Rules
|
January, 2000 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Should central bankers be free to decide what policy actions they will take and when they will take them, or should they agree to an explicit policy rule and stick to it? The discretion versus rules debate is an old one; unfortunately, it has rarely addressed the fact that the benefits of moving from one regime to the other depend on the timing of the move. This Economic Commentary explores the value of waiting to adopt rules and the way it is affected by uncertainty.
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| Gross loan flows
|
January, 2000 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 0014 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ben R Craig; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: We present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time, bank size, and region. We define loan creation as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased loans since last quarter. Loan destruction is similarly defined as the absolute value of the change in loans at all banks that decreased loans. The gross flow (akin to what the labor literature calls reallocation) is the sum of creation and destruction.
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| Term structure economics from A to B
|
September, 1999 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 2-9 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: The interest rates for bonds of different maturities are related, but the interplay of factors that influence these rates is not easy to tease apart. The author leads the reader through the development of a model of the term structure of interest rates, then works with the model to provide some insights into the interplay of factors, especially the effect of uncertainty on interest rates. His analysis shows how a common simplification known as the expectations hypothesis obscures the significant contribution that uncertainty can make to the determination of interest rates.
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| Banking and Commerce: A Liquidity Approach
|
January, 1999 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9907 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Joao Cabral dos Santos; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: This paper looks at the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce,
using the \liquidity" approach to nancial intermediation. Adding a commercial
rm makes it easier for a bank to dispose of assets seized in a loan default. This `internal
market' increases the liquidity of such assets and improves the bank's ability to perform
nancial intermediation. More generally, owning a commercial rm may act either as a
substitute or a complement to commercial lending. In some cases, a bank will voluntarily
refrain from making loans, choosing to become a non-bank bank in an unregulated
environment.
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| Subordinated debt: tough love for banks?
|
December, 1998 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: Several recent proposals aim to restore market discipline to the banking sector by forcing banks to issue debt that is not guaranteed by the government, termed subordinated debt. This Commentary examines the reasoning behind such proposals and assesses the likelihood of their success.
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| Bank Diversification: Laws and Fallacies of Large Numbers
|
April, 1998 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 2 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: Conventional wisdom on bank diversification confuses risk with failure. This article clarifies the distinction and shows how increasing bank size may increase bank risk, even though it lessens the probability of failure and lowers the expected loss. The key result is an application of Samuelson's "fallacy of large numbers."
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| Gold prices
|
March, 1998 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: The price of gold commands attention because it serves as an indicator of general price stability or inflation. But gold is also a commodity, used in jewelry and by industry, so demand and supply affect its pricing and need to be considered when gold is a factor in monetary policy decisions.
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| Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: a clinical study of Mellon Bank
|
January, 1998 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9803 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: An analysis of the 1987 change in control at Mellon, which was one of only a few banks with a large shareholder. It finds that the large shareholder did not monitor the firm extensively before it experienced performance difficulties, but was able to enforce a management change when problems arose-without having to acquire a majority stake.
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| The dark side of liquidity
|
September, 1997 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Joao Cabral dos Santos; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: A look at the disadvantages of a firm’s having too much liquidity, explaining that when a company has a great deal of its worth tied up in liquid assets, it has a harder time attracting investors, who must be convinced that the firm’s managers will not “take the money and run.”
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| Stock market fundamentals
|
January, 1997 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: An explanation of the primary factors driving stock market fundamentals and an examination of how well those factors explain—or fail to explain—current market trends.
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| Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy
|
November, 1996 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
| Abstract: In the United States, the Federal Reserve has responsibility for both monetary policy and bank supervision. Other countries separate these functions to varying degrees. What lies behind this global diversity? Should a central bank be charged with conducting monetary policy and regulating banks, or does it make more sense - both economic and political - to keep these activities separate? The answer is not a simple yes or no. Rather, it appears that the right choice depends on a country&rquo;s prevailing conditions, including its financial system, its political environment, and the preferences of the public.
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| Predicting real growth using the yield curve
|
March, 1996 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 26-35 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ann M Dombrosky; |
Economic Review |
top |
| Commitment as Investment Under Unceratinty
|
January, 1996 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9606 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Joseph A Ritter; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: An explanation of how irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options can apply to a broad range of problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade policy.
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| Dynamic Commitment and Imperfect Policy Rules
|
January, 1996 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9601 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Joseph A Ritter; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.
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| Derivative Mechanics: The CMO
|
September, 1995 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
top |
| Vagueness, credibility, and government policy
|
March, 1995 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 13-19 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
top |
| Imperfect state verification and financial contracting
|
January, 1995 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9506 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Standard work on costly state verification, monitoring, and auditing generally assumes perfect signals about the underlying state, especially in questions about financial contracting. Relaxing that assumption has several intriguing consequences. Most imperfect audits turn out to be useless, and those that are useful cannot be ranked by conventional criteria such as Blackwell's information measure. Thus, the notion of "more" or "less" information becomes problematic.
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| Fear and loathing in executive pay
|
November, 1994 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
top |
| A Conference on Federal Credit Allocation
|
July, 1994 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 30, no. 3 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: In October 1993, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking sponsored a conference that examined the costs, causes, and consequences of credit allocation by the federal government. The eight presenters looked at the broad rationale for government intervention in U.S. credit markets, analyzed some issues related to pensions and federal pension guarantees, and discussed a number of specific programs and regulations, including credit imperfections in housing markets, risk-based capital requirements for banks, and community reinvestment rules. This article is an overview of those proceedings.
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| Bank Diversification: Laws and Fallacies of Large Numbers
|
January, 1994 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9417 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: The conventional wisdom on bank diversification confuses risk with failure. This paper clarifies that distinction and shows how increasing bank size may increase bank risk even though it lessens the probability of failure and lowers the expected loss. The key result is an application of Samuelson's "fallacy of large numbers."
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| Executive Compensation: A Calibration Approach
|
January, 1994 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9416 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ivilina Popova; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: We use a version of the Grossman and Hart (1983) principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory.
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| Loan sales: Pacific Rim trade in nontradable assets
|
January, 1994 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9414 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Foreign banks play a large role in the loan sales market. We examine this role using individual bank data on foreign-owned banks in the United States. We find that the motives for loan sales and purchases differ between U.S. and foreign-owned banks and between foreign banks of different regions. The evidence is consistent with foreign banks' using the market for diversification.
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| The Evolving Loan Sales Market
|
July, 1993 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Economic Commentary |
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| Capital Requirements and Shifts in Commercial Bank Portfolios
|
July, 1993 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 29, no. 3 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Paul Wachtel; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: Since 1989, U.S. commercial banks have shifted their portfolios away from commercial loans toward government securities. Using data for individual banks, the authors document this shift and test for whether it can be attributed to the imposition of risk-based capital requirements. Their results indicate that these requirements may indeed account for part of the portfolio shift.
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| Loan sales, implicit contracts, and bank structure
|
January, 1993 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9307 |
Joseph G Haubrich; James B Thomson; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: We document some recent changes in the market for loan sales. We use a Tobit model to characterize the determinants of loan sales and purchases by banks, relating quantities bought and sold to bank size, capital, risk, and funding mode. The results, though not definitive, broadly confirm the Pennacchi model of sales. Other data cast doubt on the importance of mergers and acquisitions for this market and on the comparability of different data sources.
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| Sharing with a risk-neutral agent
|
January, 1993 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9301 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: In the standard solution to the principal-agent problem, a risk-neutral agent bears all the risk. This paper shows that, in fact, multiple solutions exist, and often the risk-neutral agent is not the sole bearer of risk. Furthermore, as risk aversion approaches zero, the unique risk-averse solution converges to the risk-neutral solution wherein the agent bears the least amount of risk. Even a small degree of risk aversion can lead to agents' bearing significantly less risk than the simple solution suggests.
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| Integrating business and personal income taxes
|
October, 1992 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Jeffrey J Hallman; |
Economic Commentary |
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| Sluggish deposit rates: endogenous institutions and aggregate fluctuations
|
June, 1992 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 23-35 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
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| Gilt by association: uncovering expected inflation
|
June, 1992 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; Ann M Dombrosky; |
Economic Commentary |
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| Commitment As Irreversible Investment
|
January, 1992 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9217 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Joseph A Ritter; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Considering time inconsistency as a problem of irreversible investment brings some neglected points to the fore. Making a policy choice in real time and under current conditions emphasizes the importance of the timing of commitment, the regret over past decisions, and the option value of not committing. This paper applies these concepts to monetary policy, banking regulation, and capital taxation.
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| Financial Efficiency and Aggregate Fluctuations: An Exploration
|
October, 1991 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 27, no. 4 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Review |
| Abstract: Changes in the efficiency of the financial system can greatly affect the overall economy. A simple real business cycle framework shows how banks can be a source, rather than just a filter, for output shocks. This paper develops and tests predictions about cointegration between several bank and output series, as well as explores the comovement of output and combined banking variables. Use of the vector error-correcting model provides additional information on the role of banks as both transmission mechanisms and originators of cyclical disturbances.
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| Do Excess Reserves Reveal Credit Crunches
|
July, 1991 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Economic Commentary |
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| Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem
|
January, 1991 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9118 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: This paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal-agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of CEO compensation. The numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of Grossman and Hart and of Holmstrom and Milgrom. While the correct incentives for a CEO can greatly enhance a firm's performance, providing such incentives need not be expensive. For many parameter values, CEO compensation need only increase by about $10 for every $1,000 of additional shareholder value; for some values, the amount is 0.003 cents. The paper thus answers two challenges posed by Jensen: that principal-agent theory does not yield quantitative predictions, and that CEO compensation is insufficiently sensitive to firm performance.
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| The sources and nature of long-term memory in the business cycle
|
January, 1991 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9116 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Andrew W Lo; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: This paper examines the stochastic properties of aggregate macroeconomic time series from the standpoint of fractionally integrated models, focusing on the persistence of economic shocks. We develop a simple macroeconomic model that exhibits long-range dependence, a consequence of aggregation in the presence of real business cycles. We then derive the relation between properties of fractionally integrated macroeconomic time series and those of microeconomic data and discuss how fiscal policy may alter the stochastic behavior of the former. To implement these results empirically, we employ a test for fractionally integrated time series based on the Hurst-Mandelbrot rescaled range. This test, which is robust to short-term dependence, is applied to quarterly and annual real GNP to determine the sources and nature of long-term dependence in the business cycle.
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| Consumption and Fractional Differencing: Old and New Anomalies
|
January, 1990 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9010 |
Joseph G Haubrich; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: A calculation of the stochastic properties of consumption when income follows a fractional stochastic process, showing how this may explain excess-smoothness results noted in previous studies
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| Sticky prices, money, and business fluctuations
|
January, 1990 |
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 9008 |
Joseph G Haubrich; Robert G King; |
Working Papers |
| Abstract: Can nominal contracts create monetary nonneutrality if they arise endogenously in general equilibrium? Yes, if (1) agents have complete information about the money stock and (2) shocks to the system are purely redistributive and private information, precluding conventional insurance markets. Without contracts, money is neutral toward aggregate quantities. However, risk-sharing between suppliers and demanders creates an incentive for both parties to use nominal contracts. in particular, if an increase in the money growth rate signals a rise in the dispersion of shocks to demanders' wealth, then prices adjust only partially to monetary shocks and money is positively associated with output.
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